RESEARCH REPORT
A QUALITATIVE STUDY
THE IMPACT OF PNPM RURAL
EAST JAVA—WEST SUMATRA—SOUTHEAST SULAWESI

APRIL 2012

LEMBAGA PENELITIAN
SMERU
RESEARCH INSTITUTE
TOWARDS PRO-POOR POLICY THROUGH RESEARCH
# CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</th>
<th>V</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>VII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS</td>
<td>XI</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INTRODUCTION</th>
<th>XIII</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CHARACTERISTICS OF STUDY AREAS</td>
<td>XIII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAIN FINDINGS</td>
<td>XIV</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## 1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND | 1 |
1.2 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES | 1 |
1.3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY | 3 |
1.4 STUDY AREAS | 4 |
1.5 CHARACTERISTICS OF THE STUDY AREAS | 4 |
  1.5.1 TOPOGRAPHY AND DEMOGRAPHY | 4 |
  1.5.2 THE SOCIOECONOMIC CONDITION | 6 |
  1.5.3 THE GOVERNMENT | 7 |
1.6 RESEARCH TEAM AND SCHEDULE | 8 |
1.7 REPORT STRUCTURE | 8 |

## 2. IMPLEMENTATION OF PNPM–RURAL IN STUDY AREAS

2.1 GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE PROGRAM AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION | 11 |
2.2 IMPLEMENTED ACTIVITIES | 11 |
2.3 WOMEN’S SAVINGS AND LOAN (SPP) | 14 |
2.4 INSTITUTIONS IN THE KECAMATAN AND VILLAGE | 14 |
2.5 COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION | 17 |

## 3. GOVERNMENT, PARTICIPATION, AND TRANSPARENCY IN THE VILLAGE

3.1 INFORMATION FLOW AND TRANSPARENCY IN THE VILLAGE | 23 |
3.2 PARTICIPATION AND REPRESENTATION IN POLICY-MAKING | 25 |
3.3 REPRESENTATION SYSTEM | 29 |
3.4 COMPLAINTS, CONFLICTS, AND THE SOLUTION MECHANISM | 30 |
3.5 ACCOUNTABILITY AND RESPONSIVENESS OF THE VILLAGE ADMINISTRATION | 33 |
3.6 IMPACT OF PNPM ON GOOD GOVERNANCE IN THE VILLAGE | 34 |
4. THE DYNAMICS OF POVERTY IN THE STUDY AREAS 37
   4.1 POVERTY AND ITS DYNAMICS 37
      4.1.1 POVERTY INDICATORS 37
      4.1.2 THE CAUSES OF POVERTY 41
   4.2 FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE THE DYNAMICS OF COMMUNITY WELFARE 41
      4.2.1 GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS/ASSISTANCE 45
      4.2.2 OTHER ACTIVITIES/VILLAGE PEOPLE’S INITIATIVES 47
      4.2.3 IMPACT OF PNPM ON POVERTY REDUCTION 48
5. ACCESS TO AND QUALITY OF PUBLIC FACILITIES IN THE VILLAGE 53
   5.1 ACCESS TO MARKET 53
   5.2 ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE AND TRANSPORTATION 54
   5.3 EDUCATION SERVICES 57
   5.4 HEALTH SERVICES 59
   5.5 CLEAN WATER FACILITIES 61
   5.6 ADMINISTRATION 63
6. VILLAGE PRIMARY NEEDS AND THEIR FULFILMENT 67
   6.1 PRIORITIES OF VILLAGE NEEDS 67
   6.2 FULFILMENT OF PRIMARY NEEDS 70
      6.2.1 ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT 71
      6.2.2 ROLE OF THE COMMUNITY 72
      6.2.3 ROLE OF SOCIAL GROUPS 72
      6.2.4 ROLE OF PNPM 73
   6.3 THE LIMITS TO PNPM’S EMPOWERMENT ASPECT 76
      6.3.1 EMPOWERMENT AS A VERY MECHANISTIC CONCEPT 76
      6.3.2 CONTRADICTING WITH LOCALITIES 78
      6.3.3 FACILITATORS AND FACILITATING PROBLEMS 78
7. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 81
   7.1 CONCLUSIONS 81
   7.2 RECOMMENDATIONS 82
   NOTES 84
   LIST OF REFERENCES 85

APPENDICES 87
   APPENDIX 1 87
   APPENDIX 2 90
   APPENDIX 3 91
   APPENDIX 4 92
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We express our thanks to John Voss, G. Kelik Agus Endarso, and Lina Mariani from the PNPM Support Facility, who have supported this research, for their technical guidance, valuable comments, and suggestions provided during the course of the study.

Our thanks also go to all the community members in all the sample areas who have been willing to become respondents and informants and have taken part in providing valuable information for this study. Our sincere thanks also go to the PNPM implementers who were willing to accept and discuss with the research team in the middle of their busy time. We also highly appreciate all the help given by the sub-district heads, community health centers (Puskesmas) heads, village officials, and integrated health service post (Posyandu) cadres who have spent their precious time to make it possible for the researchers to meet and discuss with the community. We would also like to extend our appreciation to the local government officials at the district/town and sub-district levels in the study areas who had granted the permit to conduct this research. Our high appreciation also goes to the regional researchers for their dedication to the research by working hard and being willing to live in the sample villages with all the limitations that existed.

Muhammad Syukri, Sulton Mawardi, Akhmadi
The National Program for Community Empowerment (PNPM) Mandiri is a poverty reduction program launched by the Government of Indonesia in 2007. This study aims to look at the impact of PNPM–Rural especially on poverty reduction, community participation, and the accountability, transparency, and responsiveness of the government at the village level. In addition, this study also examines the impact of PNPM–Rural on the fulfillment of the poor's primary needs in rural areas as well as the extent to which empowerment has occurred. The study was carried out in 18 villages in three provinces, namely East Java, West Sumatra, and Southeast Sulawesi. Initially, it was designed to cover treatment and control areas. However, in 2010 PNPM–Rural covered all districts, there were no research areas that could be fully regarded as control areas anymore. In terms of methodology, this study uses a qualitative panel and compares the results of the 2010 PNPM Impact Study with the 2007 PNPM Baseline Study. In general, this study finds that PNPM–Rural has been implemented properly. For the ‘open menu’ program, almost all the villages used it for infrastructure development. However, only a small part of the female saving and loan (SPP–PNPM) program was actually accessed by the poor. In relation to poverty, there has been a decrease in poverty to varying degrees in almost all research areas. However, for the issues of participation, transparency, and accountability, there was a big difference found between what happened inside and outside of the program. Participation, transparency, and accountability worked very well in the implementation of PNPM–Rural. But outside of PNPM–Rural, namely in the village administration or in the implementation of programs other than PNPM–Rural, participation, transparency, and accountability remained low. Furthermore, from the perspective of the match between the needs of the poor and project activities proposed in PNPM–Rural, there are almost no PNPM projects that match well with the needs of poor people. This could indicate that efforts to support community empowerment have not yet been successful in PNPM.

Keywords: PNPM–Rural, impact, poverty, participation, transparency, accountability
# LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADD</td>
<td>Village Funds Allocation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APBD</td>
<td>Regional Budget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLT</td>
<td>Direct Cash Transfer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMT</td>
<td>baitul maal wa tamwil [an Islamic microfinance institution]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPKB</td>
<td>Vehicle Ownership Certificate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOS</td>
<td>School Operational Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPD</td>
<td>Village Representative Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPRN</td>
<td>Nagari People Representative Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FK</td>
<td>Kecamatan fasilitator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FGD</td>
<td>focus group discussion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gardu Taskin</td>
<td>Integrated Movements in Poverty Reduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamkesda</td>
<td>Regional Health Insurance for the Poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamkesmas</td>
<td>Health Insurance for the Poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JPD</td>
<td>Village Axis Road</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUT</td>
<td>Farm Road</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KK</td>
<td>household head/family card</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kopwan</td>
<td>Female Cooperative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPMD</td>
<td>Village Community Development Cadres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KTP</td>
<td>ID card</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KUBE</td>
<td>Cooperative Work Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KUD</td>
<td>Village Unit Cooperative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPM</td>
<td>Community Empowerment Institution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAD</td>
<td>inter-village consultative meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAN</td>
<td>inter-nagari consultative meeting or public Islamic senior high school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>musdes</td>
<td>village consultative meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>musjor</td>
<td>jorong consultative meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTs</td>
<td>Islamic junior high school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NU</td>
<td>Nahdatul Ulama [a religious–social organization]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAUD</td>
<td>early childhood education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pamsimas</td>
<td>Community–based Clean Water and Sanitation Supply</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDAM</td>
<td>Regional State Drinking Water Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PJOK</td>
<td>Person in charge of a project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKH</td>
<td>Family of Hope Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKK</td>
<td>Family Welfare Empowerment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNPM</td>
<td>National Program for Community Empowerment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNS</td>
<td>civil servant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>polindes</td>
<td>village maternity post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>posyandu</td>
<td>integrated health service post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPK</td>
<td>Kecamatan Development Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PU</td>
<td>Public Works</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>puskesri</td>
<td>nagari health center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>puskesmas</td>
<td>community health center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pustu</td>
<td>secondary puskesmas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTO</td>
<td>Technical Guidelines for Operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RA</td>
<td>raudatul atfal [Islamic kindergarten]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAPBDes</td>
<td>Village Budget Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raskin</td>
<td>Rice for the Poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RT</td>
<td>neighborhood unit consisting of several households</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RTM</td>
<td>poor households</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RTSM</td>
<td>very poor household</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RW</td>
<td>administrative unit consisting of several RT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>elementary school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMA</td>
<td>senior high school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMP</td>
<td>junior high school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPP</td>
<td>Women’s Savings and Loan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TK</td>
<td>kindergarten</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TKI</td>
<td>Indonesian migrant worker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPK</td>
<td>program implementation team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UEP–SP</td>
<td>Savings and Loan–Urban Economic Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPK</td>
<td>project implementing unit</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

The National Program for Community Empowerment (PNPM) Mandiri is a poverty reduction program launched by the Government of Indonesia in 2007. One of the biggest components of the program is the empowerment of village communities. Following the format of its predecessor, the Kecamatan (Sub–district) Development Program (PPK), PNPM Mandiri encourages community participation in every stage of the program. Based on what is agreed by the community, the village administration then submits development proposals to the sub–district. The program requires that the block grants be allocated for distribution at the sub–district level; the villages must compete to prove that they deserve the grant based on the principals of urgency and significance for the community.

To evaluate the impact of the program, the SMERU Research Institute in cooperation with the PNPM Support Facility (PSF) conducted a qualitative evaluation study. This study compared the sample villages’ recent condition with their condition prior to the program implementation, the data of which had been collected through a baseline study in 2007. The data collection was done through focus group discussions (FGDs), in–depth interviews, and observation of the PNPM Rural activities. The study was conducted in 18 villages in nine kecamatan (sub–districts) in three provinces, namely East Java, West Sumatra, and Southeast Sulawesi. Following the sampling method of the baseline study, the locations of the study were divided into three categories: (i) villages/nagari that had participated in PPK phase two (PPK–II) since 2002 and were recipients of the PNPM 2007 (hereafter referred to as K1); (ii) villages/nagari that had not participated in PPK–II but were recipients of the PNPM 2007 (hereafter referred to as K2); and (iii) villages/nagari that had not participated in PPK–II nor the PNPM 2007 but were recipients of the PNPM 2009 (hereafter referred to as K3) when the government proved their commitment to include every sub–district in the program implementation. The study was conducted between March and October 2010.

CHARACTERISTICS OF STUDY AREAS

All sample villages are rural areas that mainly depend on farming. Some of the villages are located in coastal areas, but the majority of the villagers live from farming and keeping livestock. In addition to farming, the villagers work in the small trading sector as kiosk owners and in the service sector as ojek (motorcycle taxi) service providers, construction workers, or migrant workers. In the last two years, many villagers in Kabupaten Bombana and Kabupaten Konawe Selatan (Southeast Sulawesi) have worked at public gold mining sites both as miners and as providers of goods and services for the miners.

The condition of road infrastructure in the sample villages was relatively varied. In East Java and West
Sumatra, most of the village and dusun\textsuperscript{2} roads are in good condition, whereas in Southeast Sulawesi, many parts of the districts or even province roads that pass the sample villages are in very bad condition. During the past three years, most of the damaged roads have been repaired, partly funded by PNPM. However, inadequate public transport facilities remain an unsolved problem and the villagers generally rely on ojek for transportation.

In the sectors of basic education and health, most of the sample villages are already equipped with adequate facilities. However, primary schools are not available in some villages in Southeast Sulawesi so the children have to attend schools at the not-so-near neighboring villages. Other education facilities such as preschools, junior high schools, and senior high schools are generally unavailable in villages other than kecamatan capitals. Health facilities in the sample villages in Southeast Sulawesi are still lacking in numbers. In other sample villages, health facilities such as Polindes (village maternity polyclinics), Pustu (secondary Puskesmas\textsuperscript{3}), and Posyandu (integrated health service posts) are available but their condition is in need of improvement.

In terms of clean water supply, most of the villagers in sample areas do not consider it a major issue. However, some villagers from certain dusun or RT\textsuperscript{4} still find it difficult to access clean water supply. Economic facilities, such as traditional markets are accessible for the sample villages in general.

**MAIN FINDINGS**

1. **IMPLEMENTATION OF PNPM RURAL**

Almost all sample villages chose infrastructure projects for the open menu program category. Only one village (in Dharmasraya) submitted a proposal for a non-infrastructure activity — training on developing home industries. Infrastructure projects constructed were roads, bridges, irrigation systems, waterways, school buildings, and posyandu. The villages chose infrastructure projects because (i) there is not adequate numbers of infrastructure at the study area; (ii) PNPM was regarded as a program for the general public; (iii) they wanted to cushion the perceived negative impact of targeted programs such as the Direct Cash Transfer (BLT), Rice for the Poor (Raskin), Household Conditional Cash Transfer (PKH), and Health Insurance for the Poor (Jamkesmas); (iv) the bias towards elite and nonpoor villagers opinions during the decision making process.

The Female Savings and Loan (SPP) program is considered greatly beneficial because it has (i) developed the recipients’ businesses, (ii) improved households’ financial capacity, and (iii) replaced loan sharks. The recipients used the program fund to develop their old business and to create new business. The program implementers required that recipients already have their own business. A small portion of the program fund was used for households’ urgent needs. Especially in Ngawi, SPP has reduced the villagers’ dependency on loan sharks since the program offered competitive interest rates and simple procedures for those who have already had their own business.

There are cases where PNPM implementers limited the poor’s access to the SPP program by imposing strict requirements for fear that the poor would not be able to repay the loan. There were also cases in which certain people cheated to get the fund by including names of the poor on the list of people who submitted the program proposal without their consent. The fund would then be used by the cheating non-poor for their own benefit.

The SPP fund distribution was often considered by most of the program implementers in the villages and the village apparatus as a pre-requrement to get the open menu program. Therefore, a lot of community members did whatever they could to get the fund, including by means of deception. For example, many business groups applying for the SPP loan were instantly established only to get the fund. In many areas, names of the poor were falsely included on the list of the fund recipients; but when the money was disbursed, it was distributed among the non-poor. Owing to the misinterpretation of SPP as a prerequisite to get the open menu program, program implementers and villagers “collude” to make their village entitled to SPP in order to ensure they get the open menu fund. They gave the
loan to non-poor recipients out of fear that the poor cannot pay back the loan and thus would jeopardize the village’s chance to get the open menu fund. For them, this misuse of name is justifiable as long as there is no case of non-performing loan. However, in one village in East Java, the community leaders deliberately refused to get the SPP fund for fear that they would not be able to repay the loan; consequently, they did not get the open menu program.

**Participation is still high in PNPM fora, however, the villagers' participation in the decision making of the open menu program and the SPP was often instrumental, only to fulfill the program's formal requirement.** The increasing number of villagers present at PNPM meetings did not fully alter the village elites domination in the decision making process. The villagers in general, particularly the poor, were still passive participants. The condition was due to some factors: (i) kinship, (ii) patronage system, (iii) the village elite’s reluctance to live by the principles of democracy, and (iv) the elite’s feeling of superiority over their fellow villagers. These factors caused inequality during the decision making process.

**Female participation is high in the PNPM planning and implementation process, however, the increasing female participation still did not reduce male dominance.** Although male dominance was less noticeable in a special forum for females (a meeting held to generate females’ ideas which would propose one suggestion for the SPP and another for the open menu program) it was still critical in influencing the results of the special forum. In some sample villages, the final decisions regarding the suggestions from this forum were made at the village level where the decision makers were the village elites, which are dominantly males.

**In sample villages, no serious conflicts have happened during PNPM implementation.** However, in a small number of villages, PNPM implementation could and had led to conflicts, such as conflicts of interests between jorong/dusun, conflicts between the village administrations and the program implementation team (TPK), between the TPK and the community, between the locals and the nonlocals (those who migrated to the villages from other places), and conflicts regarding supplies of goods and services. In addition to lack of knowledge about the program — most likely due to lack of program socialization — lack of coordination with or involvement of relevant people in the program implementation also caused the conflict. In West Sumatra, the area unit for the program implementation was jorong. The nagari leaders felt they were not involved so no one could facilitate communication between jorong. Lack of coordination also created conflicts between the village administration and the TPK, while conflicts between the locals and the nonlocals were triggered by jealousy over economic gaps —the villages where the nonlocals live are more developed than those where the locals live— just like what happened in Dharmasraya. With the PNPM requiring the community self-sufficiency, the program funds were often granted to the nonlocals’ villages; the roads there are wider and the villagers had more lands so they were willing to give these up their lands for the program when requested. At the local villages, the roads were narrow and the villagers were not willing to give away their small lands, so they did not get the PNPM infrastructure projects.

**The sub-district facilitators considered that the workloads given were not evenly spread within the available resources.** Some facilitators had working areas covering 10 villages, while some others had to facilitate more than 50 villages, as happened in one sub-district (not a sample sub-district) in Agam District, West Sumatra. Moreover, the facilitators thought that the technical and administrative work, such as monthly report writing, has taken most of their time so they could not make the most of their job as facilitators.

**The sub-district facilitators also believed that there should have been special facilitators who were assigned to empower the SPP recipients, because they already had heavy workload and because not all facilitators at the sub-district had the skills related to microcredit empowerment.** There were microcredit facilitators at the district level but they were actually more needed at the sub-district level.
2. GOVERNANCE PARTICIPATION, AND REPRESENTATION IN DECISION MAKING

In most of the sample villages, although villagers participated in the decision making forum, the decision making process generally involved only the village elites—the village apparatus and the community leaders. These people believed that they already represented the whole community. Other members of the community were usually passive participants when they were present, only listening to and agreeing to what the elites decided. Some villagers, especially the poor, did not attend the meetings because they felt inferior. Other reasons for the villagers’ absence in the meetings were apathy, unfavorable time of the meetings, and not getting any invitation.

During the decision making process at the village level, the females were often represented by formal institutions regarded to speak for women, such as the Family Welfare and Empowerment (PKK) or Bundo Kanduang in West Sumatra. Consequently, women were less represented than men. However, compared to the past (i.e. pre–PPK/PNPM era), more women attended the decision making process at the village level although it did not really change the fact that men still dominated the process. In addition, most villagers still believe that men are leaders so they, instead of women, should make the decisions.

The system of representation did not function properly, clearly seen from the absence of mechanisms at the RT/dusun level to get the villagers’ aspirations or to disseminate results of the village meetings. No meeting was held to absorb the villagers’ aspirations at RT/dusun level because the village elites claimed to understand the villagers’ problems more than the villagers themselves. The village elites also thought that not all the decisions made and information gathered from the village meetings should be disseminated to the community, especially if money was involved. The fact that the villagers very rarely asked their leaders about any information, decisions, and activities at the village level added to the problem. Information, if any, was usually given to the villagers during informal meetings, such as arisan⁶ and religious gatherings.

The villagers were generally passive when it came to information on development, except for that on direct aid such as Raskin and BLT. At the village or dusun level, such information was usually given orally from the head of the village to the head of dusun/RW/RT and then from the head of dusun/RW/RT to the villagers. The information was generally on the program’s activities and implementation. Information regarding activity funds or budget was seldom given to the public. Moreover, the village administration staff generally gave information which was instructive and mobilizing, such as the information on community work.

When there were problems or unsatisfactory results, the villagers generally did not voice their complaints or dissatisfaction to the village administration. They only talked about the problems among themselves or with the community leaders. Only a few villagers were willing and had the courage to tell the village administration. This condition was due to some factors, such as the villagers’ reluctance, fear of the village apparatus, and apathy (because of previous unattended complaints).

In general, the participation model set out by the PNPM did not have any significant impact on the changes in the governance system (participation, transparency, and accountability) at the village level. This was apparent from all villages, regardless of whether they had been beneficiaries of the PNPM since 2002, 2007, or 2009. Only one village claimed to feel the impact of PNPM on other activities. In other villages, participation and transparency applied during the PNPM implementation were regarded as the program’s special features that did not have to be applied on other programs.

The fact that PNPM did not have any significant impact on the government system in general was caused by some factors, namely: (i) the elites dominance and the villagers’ lack of initiative, thus preserving the status quo; (ii) there is no guarantee (incentive) for the village apparatus and the villagers that if they applied the PNPM mechanisms on other programs, they would be given something in return, such as a project; and (iii) the village apparatus and the villagers’ tendency to live by the existing norms. If a program or an activity did not require participation, transparency, and accountability, they would not impose those requirements.
3. POVERTY AND ITS DYNAMICS

In the majority of the sample villages, the number of poor people was declining although the rates of decline differed among the villages. Factors that have brought about the decline were, among others, (i) new job opportunities such as the gold mine exploitation in Kabupaten Bombana, Southeast Sulawesi; (ii) opportunities to become migrant workers; (iii) regional segregation, creating new economic centers; and (iv) new factories/plantations at the neighborhood. In addition, the decline was also caused by the rising prices of dry land commodities in West Sumatra and sea commodities in Southeast Sulawesi. Other factors were the better rural roads infrastructure, the increase of farming productivity, and government aid. PNPM contributed by facilitating the construction of infrastructure such as roads and bridges for the general sectors and irrigation systems and farm roads for the farming sector.

In contrast, two villages in East Java saw an increase in the number of poor people. This was due to the decrease in sea commodities productivity caused by environmental degradation (sea pollution from industrial waste) and the decline in labor participation caused by industrial mechanization. In the two villages, they did not make use of PNPM as an instrument to solve the problems.

Villagers usually only connected poverty characteristics with the aspects of asset ownership, daily needs (including education and health) fulfillment, and type of occupation. For example, having minimum assets and no fulltime job was considered as the main reason for someone being poor. This belief has not changed significantly during the period of PNPM implementation in the villages (three to eight years depend of village category).

Poverty dynamics were determined by factors, such as economy, social, public and government institutions, the government’s support, and programs’ targeting.

Economic factors, such as the rise and fall of prices of farm/sea commodities and prices of daily needs as well as government aids, played the biggest role in most of the cases of poor households whose economic condition has fluctuated for the past eight years.

Groups of poor people that remained poor were generally caused by the absence of skills and capital to improve their livelihood. It was specifically because (i) there was limited number of alternative job opportunities in addition to their main field work, which is in the farming sector; (ii) the poor were generally junior high school graduates and had only traditional skills (as farmers, fishers, or construction workers); (iii) they did not have enough capital, especially cash. Although there had been some aid offering credit for capital, what they felt was really needed was financial aid, like direct cash transfer, that they did not have to repay. Other significant factors according to the villagers were: mental attitude that did not feel the need to develop or felt satisfied easily, lack of productivity due to old age, being economically dependent (widows who do not have job), and the increasing price of daily needs.

Poverty alleviation programs, especially those with special targets, such as BLT, Raskin, and Jamkesmas, contributed significantly in preventing the poor from getting poorer. The BLT fund, Jamkesmas cards, and Raskin were considered to have helped the poor with their main needs of emergency cash, health expenses, and food. The three programs have also been regarded as the top three government programs which are considered most beneficial for the poor. Unfortunately, the program targeting was in the hands of the officials/village elites with no room for the poor to participate or for transparency in targeting.

PNPM implementers did not think of PNPM as a poverty reduction program. Hence, PNPM was regarded as not having significant direct role in reducing poverty. They regarded it as merely a regular village development program. Consequently, they did not put the poor as top priority. This was apparent from the fact that they made project plans without considering the benefits for the poor; they did not specifically include the poor on the list of workforce for the PNPM construction projects; and they did not exempt the poor from providing cash contribution for project activities.
4. DYNAMICS OF ACCESS AND QUALITY OF PUBLIC SERVICE

In general, the sample villages already had public service facilities in education, health, water supply, and the economy (markets). This has contributed to an increase in the villagers’ access to public services during the past three to eight years (of PNPM implementation). In this matter, PNPM was thought to be quite beneficial since it helped to provide additional facilities or to improve the condition of the existing facilities, including road repairs. The road infrastructure improvements facilitated by the program were also considered helpful in improving the villagers’ economy. Nonetheless, in some sample villages, public facilities were still difficult to access by some villagers. This was caused by, among others, (i) the limited number of facilities, (ii) the unavailability of public transport to reach the facilities, and (iii) the absence of quality service provision especially in health.

The villagers thought that the quality of public services needs to be improved. In health, for example, Jamkesmas card holders felt that they are not treated as well as other patients. In some sample villages, civil administration services, especially the obtainment of ID card and family card, were considered complicated since the villagers had to go all the way to the kabupaten.

5. DYNAMICS OF NEEDS AND FULFILLMENT

In almost all sample villages, the poor’s main needs were job opportunities, additional capital, and skills upgrade. After that came scholarships, free health services, and infrastructure to support their main livelihoods (such as an irrigation system and farm roads). The government and some groups of villagers had made efforts to fulfill the needs but to no real avail. This was because (i) the existing programs were not adequate to fulfill the villagers’ needs, (ii) sociocultural conditions in the villages, such as social envy, the elites’ or nonpoor’s bias, and (iii) corruption or ineffectiveness during program implementation that reduced the impact on the villagers’ needs fulfillment.

PNPM–Rural was seldom used to fulfill poor villagers’ fundamental needs. The PNPM open menu program was often used to build general infrastructure. While this had general access and economic benefits, this did not directly cater for the poor’s expressed needs. This is due to the view that PNPM is a program for all villagers, not for poor people. The SPP could partly fulfill the needs for capital loans, but it was difficult for the poor to gain access to the program due to its strict conditions that required borrowers to have a business before applying for a loan.

PNPM has not been fully successful in empowering the village community owing to a number of factors: (i) the structure of power in the villages where the elites were dominant, marginalizing the poor; (ii) the mechanistic model of empowerment of the program, in which facilitators were only told to make sure that the program stages were properly conducted and not to improve villagers’ awareness or capacity with regard to program objectives to encourage the creation of good governance (participation, transparency, and accountability) and the improvement of the villagers economic capacity based on self-sufficiency; and (iii) the cases of mismatch between the program mechanisms and the local cultural characteristics, in which PNPM encouraged individual participation in the program implementation or in the village/nagari administration matters, while the local culture (such as in West Sumatra) urged stronger communal representation by restoring the nagari administration tradition; (iv) the ineffective work of the facilitators due to heavy loads of technical and administrative work; and (v) poor quality and inexperienced facilitators and their frequent rotation as well as high facilitator turnover.
1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND

In August 2007, the government of Indonesia launched a poverty reduction umbrella program named the National Program for Community Empowerment (PNPM) Mandiri. Under this umbrella program, there are numerous types of PNPM and one of the biggest is PNPM–Rural (PNPM Perdesaan). The design of PNPM–Rural is based on its predecessor, the Kecamatan (Sub–district) Development Program (PPK). PNPM Rural was implemented in 2007 and currently (2010) covers 4,805 sub–districts. In general, PNPM aims at reducing poverty, increasing cooperation between the community and regional government to improve the effectiveness of poverty reduction, increasing community’s participation in the development process, improving the regional governments’ capability in providing public service, and improving the capacity of community institutions in the regions.

After PNPM–Rural had been implemented for three years, the SMERU Reserach Institute in cooperation with the PNPM Support Facility (PSF) conducted a qualitative study to learn the latest conditions as well as the changes that have occurred in relation with the goals of PNPM in reducing poverty, increasing community’s participation, and strengthening regional government institutions. The results of this study are compared with the results of the baseline study of PNPM–Rural which was already carried out in 2007 to determine what changed, how far the changes have taken place, and what caused those changes.

1.2 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

This study attempts to collect data on the changes that have occurred between points in time and the impacts that were brought about by PNPM–Rural by comparing it with the results of the baseline study conducted in 2007. Therefore, this study goes back to the same sample areas as the baseline study. The main objectives of this impact evaluation of PNPM–Rural are:

a. to document the latest conditions related to the principles and goals of PNPM–Rural after the program has been conducted for two years in the treatment (and control) areas;

b. to document and analyze the changes that have occurred over time as well as to determine what PNPM Rural has contributed to the changes; and

c. to understand the main reasons and factors that have caused the changes over time that could also have affected the implementation as well as the results of the program.

Moreover, this study investigates issues related to poverty, poverty targeting, and access to markets and public facilities, regional government, and empowerment as shown in Table 1.
# Table 1. Research Questions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research Questions</th>
<th>Topics To Be Studied</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poverty and Poverty Targeting</td>
<td>1. How does the community (village/government) understand poverty, its causes, and its solutions?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. How has poverty changed in the community in the past two years?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. How does the community (village/government) target the poor?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Community’s (village/government) understanding on the characteristics of poor household.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Community’s (village/government) understanding on the reasons why a poor household becomes poor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Have the factors affecting poverty in the community changed in the last two years?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Community’s understanding (village/government) on ways to move out of poverty.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Poverty targeting in the village (namely, for project location determination of recipients)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government, participation, and transparency</td>
<td>4. How have the inclusivity, transparency, and responsiveness of the village administration in the decision-making process changed in the past two years?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. How much is the demand of the community for participation and information and what are the changes in the past two years?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Information flow in the village (from top to down and vice versa).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Community’s participation in the village in decision-making, both in the whole activities and in the activities of PNPM Rural only.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The performance of the representation system (<em>dusun</em>/RT**) and the implementation of PNPM Rural.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Problem solving by the village administration, including the mechanism for complaint handling/conflict resolution in PNPM Rural.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Responsiveness of the village administration towards the needs and problems of the village people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Expectation of the village community on the result of community participation versus the decision-making of the village representative/administration or elites.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Changes of perception among the villagers on the importance of participation and access to information in order to fulfil needs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empowerment and village needs</td>
<td>6. How have participation in decision-making and access to information affected the ability of the community to fulfill their needs and what are the changes in the past two years?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Priority of the village needs (for example, infrastructure or service).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Strategy to fulfil needs/solve problems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Results of various activities, including the development managed by the community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Experience in applying numerous strategies to solve problems (successes and failures).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Reasons behind limited access to services (health, education, clean water, administration) and market.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Perception on service quality (health, education, clean water, administration).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Cooperation among the community in the neighbourhood, in various village layers and among the formal and semiformal groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Roles and responsibilities of social institutions versus the village administration in solving problems.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*A *dusun* is an administrative area within a village, consisting of a number of RT (neighborhood units).*

** An RT, or neighborhood unit, is the smallest unit of local administration consisting of a number of households.
1.3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This impact evaluation is a qualitative study that attempts to compare the condition of the treatment areas with the condition of the control areas in three different periods of time, which are a year ago (2009), three years ago (2007), and eight years ago (2002). The year 2009 was the year when all control areas during the baseline study had accepted the program (becoming treatment areas). The year 2007 was when the baseline study was implemented and 2002 was when the second stage of PPK, the predecessor of PNPM Rural, had started. The purpose of comparing the treatment areas with the former control areas in three periods of time is to investigate the characteristics of changes that occurred in relation with the length of the implementation of the program. It is assumed that the longer the implementation of the program, the stronger the institution and the more likely it will become successful.

Data collection was carried out using four methods: in–depth interviews, focus group discussions (FGD), observation on the process or results of PNPM activities, and relevant document collection. In–depth interviews based on interview guidelines were conducted with key informants and household informants. Key informants consist of government officers related to the implementation of PNPM in sub–district and villages, such as sub–district heads or persons in charge of projects (PJOK), village heads, heads of village development affairs, or dusun heads; PNPM implementers, such as sub–district facilitators (FK) and project implementing units (UPK) at the sub–district level, and project implementing teams (TPK) and Village Community Development Cadres (KPMD) at the village level; active community leaders in the village both male and female; and commoners that consists of the poor and the middle/rich, male and female.

In addition, FGDs were conducted five times in every village: one FGD with the village community’s representatives which included government officers and community leaders, two FGDs with the poor community in which male and female FGDs were conducted separately, and two FGDs with the middle/rich community where male and female FGDs were conducted separately. Besides

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key informants for in–depth interviews (at the sub–district and village levels)</th>
<th>Sub–district heads/PJOK</th>
<th>1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Project implementers at the kecamatan level (FK/UPK)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village heads</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other village officials (head of affairs/dusun/RT)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male community leaders</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female community leaders</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project implementers/former project implementers in the village (TPK/KPMD)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>8</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village informants (at the village level)</td>
<td>Regular male residents from the poor group</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Regular female residents from the poor group</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Regular male residents from the middle/rich group</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Regular female residents from the middle/rich group</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>4</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus group discussions (at the village level)</td>
<td>FGD with village representative (officers and leaders)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FGD with poor male residents</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FGD with poor female residents</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FGD with middle/rich male residents</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FGD with middle/rich female residents</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>5</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
the interviews and FGDs, there were also observations on the process (when available during the field visit) or the results of PNPM activities. Finally, various relevant documents were collected, both prior to and during the field visit.

1.4 STUDY AREAS

The study areas for this qualitative study of PNPM are the same as the 2007 PNPM Rural baseline study, located in three districts in East Java, three districts in West Sumatra, and three districts in Southeast Sulawesi. The study areas in the three provinces are divided into three categories, namely K1 for areas which have been receiving treatment since 2002, K2 for areas which have been receiving treatment since 2007, and K3 for areas which have been receiving treatment since 2009.

Areas which were previously designated as control areas, namely those which had not received PPK 2 or PNPM 2007, since 2009 have started receiving the programs. Therefore, in this study, there are no longer any areas which may be categorized as pure control areas. That is why the comparison analysis between treatment and control areas cannot be conducted accurately. In this condition, what can be done is inter-periodic analysis. By observing changes that happen in the areas which have been receiving treatment at different times, the study is expected to be able to see PNPM-Rural’s contribution towards the changes. Furthermore, in each sub-district, two villages were chosen for different welfare categories: a poor village and a middle/rich village. The detailed list of study areas can be seen in Table 4.

Based on the description above, it can be seen that there are three comparisons carried out simultaneously in this study: comparisons between the treatment and “control” areas; interperiodic comparisons between K1, K2, and K3; and comparisons between poor and rich areas. From these three-dimensional comparisons, the complexity of problems/issues in the implementation and effectiveness of PNPM Rural is expected to be captured.

1.5 CHARACTERISTICS OF THE STUDY AREAS

1.5.1 TOPOGRAPHY AND DEMOGRAPHY

The villages that are included in this study are the same villages that were enrolled in the 2007 baseline study. Therefore, the general information on the villages’ characteristics now and back then in 2007 is almost identical, except when there have been changes in the past three years. The topography has not undergone any significant change compared to three years ago. Some of the study villages are remote villages; some hilly, some flat. A small number of villages are located in coastal areas; for example, Wetan Village in Gresik District and part of Mawar Village in Konawe Utara District. The study villages are divided into developed and poor villages. The developed ones are usually located very near the city, or at least near the administrative center, so they have urban

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Location Category</th>
<th>East Java</th>
<th>West Sumatra</th>
<th>Southeast Sulawesi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>K1: In PNPM 2007, as treatment sb–district; had previously received PPK 2.</td>
<td>2 villages in 2 sub–districts</td>
<td>2 villages in 2 sub–districts</td>
<td>2 villages in 2 sub–districts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K2: In PNPM 2007, as treatment; sub–district had not received PPK 2 before.</td>
<td>2 villages in 2 sub–districts</td>
<td>2 villages in 2 sub–districts</td>
<td>2 villages in 2 sub–districts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K3: In PNPM 2009, as treatment sub–district; had not received PPK 2 or PNPM 2007 before (control areas for impact evaluation).</td>
<td>2 villages in 2 sub–districts</td>
<td>2 villages in 2 sub–districts</td>
<td>2 villages in 2 sub–districts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. Study Area Categories
characteristics. Examples are Jorong Koto Tangah, Nagari Luhak, Agam District; Cempaka Village, Konawe Selatan District; Nagari Darek, Solok District. The poor villages are usually situated rather far from the city or administrative center, except for Kidul Village, Lumajang District, which is situated quite near Kota Lumajang, and Tanah Tinggi Village, Agam District, which is near Kota Bukittinggi even though it is quite far from the regent capital. Some villages are adjacent to a forest such as Lor Village, Lumajang District, and Kenanga Village, Bombana District. The people of Kenanga complain about their village being flanked by a protected forest, thus decreasing the size of their arable land. Their opinion is that if parts of the forest were allowed to be managed by the locals, it would help alleviate their burden of poverty.

In East Java, Ndoyong Village, Ngawi District, has the largest area, 87.78 km². But, it also has a large population of 7,723 people. The smallest sample area is Jejeg Village, Ngawi District, which is only 21.64 km² and has a relatively small population of 1,296 people. The most densely populated areas are Nagari Gantuang, Dharmasraya District, Lor Village, Lumajang District, and Nagari Darek, Solok District. The least populated area is Mawar Village, Konawe Utara District. The most densely populated areas are Nagari Gantuang, Dharmasraya District, Lor Village, Lumajang District, and Nagari Darek, Solok District. The least populated area is Mawar Village, Konawe Utara District (369 people/20.00 km²).

Table 4. Study Areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Province/ Kabupaten</th>
<th>Kecamatan</th>
<th>Village/Kelurahan* (not real name)</th>
<th>Category</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East Java</td>
<td>Gresik</td>
<td>Bungah</td>
<td>Wetan</td>
<td>Category 2, poor village</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Lumajang</td>
<td>Tempursari</td>
<td>Lor</td>
<td>Category 1, middle village</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Ngawi</td>
<td>Sine</td>
<td>Jejeg</td>
<td>Category 3, poor village</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Paron</td>
<td>Ndoyong</td>
<td>Category 2, middle village</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast Sulawesi</td>
<td>Bombana</td>
<td>Paron</td>
<td>Mawar</td>
<td>Category 3, poor village</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Konawe Utara</td>
<td>Sawa</td>
<td>Jejeg</td>
<td>Category 3, poor village</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Asera</td>
<td>Angrak</td>
<td>Category 1, poor village</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Konawe Selatan</td>
<td>Moramo</td>
<td>Angrek</td>
<td>Category 2, middle village</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ranomeeeto</td>
<td>Cempaka</td>
<td>Category 3, middle village</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Sumatra</td>
<td>Dharmasraya</td>
<td>Koto Baru</td>
<td>Nagari* Gantuang</td>
<td>Category 2, poor village</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Solok</td>
<td>IX Koto Sungai Lasi</td>
<td>Nagari Bukik Barisan</td>
<td>Category 1, middle village</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>Agam</td>
<td>Sungai Puar</td>
<td>Nagari Luhak-Jorong Koto Tangah</td>
<td>Category 3, poor village</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Nagari Luhak-Jorong Koto Tangah</td>
<td>Category 2, middle village</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * A kelurahan is a village-level administrative area located in an urban center.
** A nagari is a village-level administrative unit in the West Sumatra Province.
*** Jorong = dusun in West Sumatra.
The distance of the study villages from their respective district capital is quite far, on average, more than 20 km. Four villages that are quite close to their district capital are Nagari Darek, Solok District (5 km), Ndoyon Village, Ngawi District (9 km), Kidul Village, Lumajang District (approximately 8 km), and Kenanga Village, Bombana District (17 km). Three farthest villages are Nagari Luhak–Jorong Koto Tangah (80 km) and Nagari Tanah Tinggi (65.7 km), both located in Agam District, although they are very close to Bukittinggi Town; and Kamboja Village, Konawe Utara District (75 km). The rest of the villages lie around 20–45 km from their district capital through relatively difficult terrain due to the hills or damaged roads.

Administratively, the villages/nagari are divided into several dukuh or jorong (for West Sumatra), namely around two to five dukuh or jorong. In East Java and Southeast Sulawesi, on average, the number of dusun/dukuh per village is around two to four. Jejeg Village, Ngawi District, has only two dusun/dukuh, namely Dusun Sukomulyo and Dusun Jejeg, whereas the nagari usually have around two to five jorong on average.

1.5.2 THE SOCIOECONOMIC CONDITION

Most of the PNPM villages in East Java, West Sumatra, and Southeast Sulawesi are of the agricultural type, whether it is dominated by rice fields (irrigated or rain–fed), palawija (secondary) crops, vegetables, or plantations and forests. Only Wetan Village, Gresik District, is truly a coastal village. Other than that, part of Kamboja Village, Konawe Utara District, is categorized as coastal area. Nevertheless, only a small number of the people in this village work as fishermen. Most of the villagers work as fish farmers.

Generally, the people in the study areas are farmers, either farmland owners, tenant farmers, or farm workers. One case that is slightly different is that of Nagari Luhak–Jorong Koto Tangah, Agam District where non-agricultural sector
also supported the economy: more than 50 household heads here work as civil servants.

More than 50 percent of the land in PNPM study villages is agricultural land. For example, 62 percent of the land in Kulon Village is used for agricultural purposes and in Nagari Darek, the agricultural land reaches 80 percent. The land produces a variety of agricultural commodities. The villages in East Java commonly produce rice, sugar cane, vegetables, and palawija crops. Besides producing rice, the villages in West Sumatra and Southeast Sulawesi produce plantation crops such as rubber, coffee, cashew nut, cocoa, palm oil, and candlenut, as well as various vegetables. However, as rice producing areas, the villages rely solely on the rain, and as a consequence, can only harvest rice once a year, followed by palawija crop planting. Only Wetan Village, Bungah Sub-district, Gresik District, produces saltwater fish and farmed fish.

The villages in Southeast Sulawesi are less developed in the agricultural sector compared to the villages in the other two provinces. This is because agriculture is relatively new to villages in Southeast Sulawesi. The villages in Konawe Selatan or Bombana had just been introduced to rice field agriculture in the late 1970s, when transmigration was at its peak. According to the locals, the transmigrants had taught them how to cultivate rice fields. The villages in Konawe Utara, besides relying on agriculture, also reap benefits from plantations. There are several large plantations that provide alternative jobs for the locals. The community of Bombana District, and even Southeast Sulawesi communities in general, since the middle of 2007 until 2008, when the business was at its peak, had discovered and gotten the advantage of running gold mines. Some of the locals tried to supply the needs of the miners. Nevertheless, in 2009, the regional government had forbidden the people from operating illegal mines. The locals believed that there had been some kind of lobbying from the business people to the regional government to take over the mines; therefore, the government issued the law forbidding illegal mining. At the moment, only very few locals dare to mine without permits.

From the market access point of view, there are no significant problems in almost all of the study areas. In almost all villages, there is a market, or at least a pasar kaget (literally, “sudden market”; similar to a Sunday market) that operates once a week for two to three hours in the morning. The village farthest from a market is Nagari Rantau-Jorong Taruko, Dharmasraya District, which is approximately 20 km away from the nearest market due to the ineffectiveness of the local market and Village Cooperative Unit (KUD). The farmers in this nagari usually sell their agricultural and plantation produce to the intermediary traders who then take the products to the market.

1.5.3 THE GOVERNMENT

In general, there are three kinds of institutions in the study villages, namely the village/nagari administration institutions, social–religious institutions, and organizations formed by various programs. Even though formally each of these villages has a Village Representative Council (BPD), this institution has yet to function optimally. The institutions that are more dominant are the village/nagari administration institutions and religious organizations.

The villages in Java, particularly in East Java where this study was conducted, are the bases of the religious organization Nahdatul Ulama (NU). Because of that, organizations affiliated to NU such as Muslimat and Fatayat are very actively involved in social activities in these villages. Beside that, informal organizations and groups such as farmers’ groups, arisan groups, and tahlilan groups are also active and thriving. On the other hand, the social organizations that are thriving in villages in Southeast Sulawesi are the ones affiliated to village officials such as the Village Family Welfare Movement (PKK), Karang Taruna (village youths’ organization), posyandu (integrated health service post), and farmers’ groups. The social organizations active in West Sumatra are mostly extensions of the adat (customary)/nagari organizations.

In the political field, in the past few years, the villages in East Java, Southeast Sulawesi, and West Sumatra revealed different conditions. The study villages in East Java have shown that transition in power happens festively. On the other hand, in Southeast Sulawesi, the election of village heads is not that lively. The tendency is that not many people are interested in running for the election. This is partly because most of the people come from one large
family and have tight familial relationships. In such an atmosphere, a campaign vying for power is considered unethical. In addition, the dull election race is also caused by the lack of incentives for the village head. A village head in Konawe Selatan said that his economic condition has become stagnant ever since he became the village head. A completely different condition is found in villages in Java, where the incentives received by village heads are quite significant. In Lor Village in Kabupaten Lumajang, for example, a village head could receive up to 5 million rupiah from his paycheck and *tanah bengkok* (village-owned land that is bequeathed to the ruling village head).

In West Sumatra, *adat* organizations are so strong and influential that in the *nagari* where the study was conducted, there was no bustle of a *wali nagari* (village head) election. The *nagari* administration in West Sumatra is evidently a communitarian governing model with a representation of *kaum* (familial groups from various generations of the same clan) which is strongly regarded. A village in Agam District has designed a representation model in the village administration with a “one *kaum* one chair” system in decision-making within the *nagari*. Each and every decision made can only be legitimate if it has been approved by the *kaum* representatives (usually represented by the *mamak*, or head, of each *kaum*), which can be numerous. In addition, the boundaries of a *nagari* are not determined based upon normal territorial administration, but by *adat* laws.

### 1.6 RESEARCH TEAM AND SCHEDULE

This study was conducted by The SMERU Research Institute under the leadership of Muhammad Syukri, with five other core researchers, namely Sultan Mawardi, Akhmad, Sirojuddin Arif, Kartawijaya, and Asep Kurniawan. In each study province, the SMERU researchers were assisted by twelve regional researchers. A small team of one core researcher from SMERU and two regional researchers was responsible for carrying out study in each village.

As a whole, this study took six months, from March to September 2010. The preparation was done from March to the middle of April 2010 which was continued by field visits from April 18th to June 10th 2010. From the middle of June to July, the finalization of field notes and village reports was carried out. Then, at the end of July, the results of the study were analyzed. Finally, the report was written until the end of August.

### 1.7 REPORT STRUCTURE

This report consists of seven main chapters, plus an executive summary and various relevant appendices. Chapter I is the introduction that gives descriptions of the study, research methodology, and the characteristics of the study areas. Chapter II describes the implementation of PNPM–Rural in the study areas. This part is the gateway for explanations about the successes or failures of the program. Chapter III discusses the various aspects relevant to government, participation, and accountability. This chapter reinforces the explanations about the implementation and impact of PNPM Rural on the strengthening of regional government institutions. In Chapter IV, the dynamics of poverty are discussed. This part shows the most recent poverty conditions and the contribution of PNPM towards the reduction of poverty in the regions. Next, Chapter V explains the availability and accessibility of public facilities. Chapter VI describes the needs of the rural community and how they are fulfilled. In these two chapters, the main problems of the rural community and how the community utilizes PNPM to solve these problems can be seen. Furthermore, these two show whether or not empowerment has been happening in the study areas. The final chapter, Chapter VII, describes the conclusions and recommendations.
2 IMPLEMENTATION OF PNPM–RURAL IN STUDY AREAS

2.1 GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE PROGRAM AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION

PNPM Rural is one of the programs under the umbrella of PNPM Mandiri. This program is directed towards the development of rural areas by granting a certain amount of funds through the sub-district which will be managed by the rural communities themselves based on predetermined program mechanism. In this program, the sub-district is given block grant according to the size of the population and poverty level of each sub-district. To get the block grant, every village has to compete by submitting a proposal for a project to be implemented. The proposal must be chosen via participatory mechanisms whereby villagers conduct a series of meetings to discuss the needs and development priorities of their village and to come up with project proposals that villagers deem most representative of their needs. For that, the village people have to choose village facilitators who are going to assist them in the socialization and planning processes.

PNPM–Rural activities are based on open–menu principles and can be divided into 4 types: 1) development or maintenance of infrastructure that can bring economic benefits for poor people; 2) improvement of education and health services; 3) support for economic productive activities; and 4) Women’s Savings and Loan (SPP) programs. Based on the open–menu principle, the community has to choose a development project/activity that they need in a Village Consultative Meeting (Mudas) that must be attended by every element of the village. After all proposals are collected, there is an Intervillage Consultative Meeting (MAD) attended by village representatives who will then discuss to make final decision on which project to be funded. After the block grant is allocated, social and technical consultants will help with the socialization, planning, and implementation. The village meeting has to choose some people that will become part of the implementation team who will execute the project. Technical facilitators will help the implementation team to arrange the infrastructure plan, project budget, quality verification, and supervision. A more detailed description about the flow of PNPM process can be seen in Figure 1.

In the study areas, in general the stages as seen in Figure 1 were applied by all villages. However, there was a village in Kabupaten Agam (not a sample village) that received sanction because it failed to hold the Mudses for socializing the result of the MAD on proposal determination. According to a sub–district official, it was because the village’s program proposal failed to compete in the sub–district MAD, so the representative did not feel the need to inform their loss to the village people.

In areas that follow all the program stages, it was found that there were differences in the implementation quality from one village to another. The differences were mostly due to the high or low rate as well as the quality of the community’s participation in various program activities.
Figure 1. Flow Chart of PNPM–Rural

Besides implementation quality, in the study areas, there were also other cases found such as:

a. delays in the completion of activities found in a village in Agam District;
b. delays in fund disbursements in Ngawi District, Bombana, Konawe Utara, and Agam;
c. SPP funds embezzlement by the group chairman in Gresik District;
d. SPP arrears in Konawe Selatan District;
e. hires of third party to do infrastructure work which was supposed to be undertaken by the community itself in Agam District, Konawe Utara, Bombana, and Dharmasraya; and
f. lack of matching funds from the regional budget (APBD); thus, no funds were granted by the central government in Konawe Utara District.

In addition, there were indications that the MAD on Proposal Determination process was conducted just as a formality, when in fact the decisions had previously been taken among the village heads. Several modus operandi discovered were by:

a. adjusting the project budget with the number of activities that would be decided in the MAD so that every village could get a share;
b. putting forward projects with a small budget as a priority so that more projects could be funded; and
c. agreeing to not prioritize village that had been granted project in the previous year.

These indications were caused by program’s mechanism and procedures which are considered by the community as complicated and time consuming. A member of KPMD in East Java said, “We keep having meeting and discussion with no results. It was just wasting people’s time” (interview, male, 32, Ngawi District, April 23, 2010).
2.2 IMPLEMENTED ACTIVITIES

In general, PNPM activities in the study areas were related to infrastructure development. Although there are four types of activities encouraged under the program, PNPM–Rural often focused more on two types of activities, namely the SPP program and infrastructure development. Under the open menu principle, people can choose numerous activities in the list of activities that cover among others infrastructure activities, empowerment, capacity building, etc. However, in the study areas, except in one village, all open menu programs that the community proposed were related to infrastructure, such as road hardening or asphalting; or the repair or building of bridge, water channel, irrigation system, school building (kindergarten (TK)/early childhood education (PAUD), integrated health service post (Posyandu), and so on. A jorong in Dharmasraya District that chose a nonphysical program proposed and received skills training for housewives in the form of bakery training.

The great aspirations of the village community towards infrastructure programs are, among others, caused by (i) lack of main infrastructure in the village, (ii) understanding that PNPM is a program for all and thus has to be allocated for something that can benefit all people, (iii) PNPM is treated as program to dampen social envy caused by other programs that only benefit certain groups, and (iv) there is an indication of elite dominance in the village decision–making. These will be elaborated further in Chapter VI.

2.3 WOMEN’S SAVINGS AND LOAN (SPP)

SPP program has been running well and is considered effective by the people. Only two villages were found not embracing SPP because there was yet any business group in both villages that met the criteria of SPP–PNPM and there was one village that refused SPP because people were afraid that if there were SPP arrears, they would be denied the open menu program. People thought that SPP is effective in taking over the role of bank titil (daily bank/loan shark) which has quite a strong influence in several villages, especially in East Java and Southeast Sulawesi. A female community leader in Ngawi District said that in her village, there used to be many bank titil. But now, the number has decreased because she has worked hard to encourage people to borrow money from SPP–PNPM instead. An informant said, “Many people used to borrow money from bank titil. This worsens one’s economic condition. That’s why I suggest people to borrow money here [SPP–PNPM]” (interview, female, 47, Ngawi District, April 22, 2010).

Moreover, SPP is also considered giving contribution in developing people’s existing business and, in some cases, it can stimulate the community to create new businesses. An informant said, “Like me now, with the capital I got from PNPM, I build a business and it’s developing” (Middle Class Women’s FGD, 26, Bombana District, June 6, 2010), while another informant said, “Road building helps because it can smooth out the traffic and SPP made women feel like a king” (Middle Class Men’s FGD, 40, Kabupaten Dharmasraya District, May 14, 2010).

Finally, SPP can also improve household financial capacity. Even though, according to the understanding of SPP recipients, the funds are supposedly used to open new business or strengthen existing one, there is also some part of the funds that is used to pay for household needs:

PNPM also provides social funds that can be used for important needs, such as, if there is a family member who gets sick, then SPP money is used. (Interview, male, 46, Ngawi District, April 21, 2010)

The problem is that the people who received [SPP] use the money for education, to pay for [children’s] school tuition, because it was urgent. So, it’s not used for business. (Interview, female, 42, Konawe Selatan District, June 7, 2010)

There are some problems related to the implementation of SPP in study areas. First, the poor had difficulty in accessing SPP because PNPM implementers in the sub–district and villages required that every resident who wanted to apply for credit had a business of their own. This was to make sure that they were able to return the money as scheduled. Therefore, most of the recipients were from more prosperous group. A facilitator in Southeast Sulawesi firmly said that SPP was not meant for the poor, but for
those who already had a better economic condition (interview, male, 35, Konawe Selatan District, June 10, 2010). The following informants stated similar things:

The loan is supposedly for the poor, but if you are really poor, you will not be given the loan. The poor who have yet to have a business are also forbidden to borrow money because they are considered unable to repay. (Poor Men’s FGD, 50, Ngawi District, April 24, 2010)

Whereas for SPP, it seems that no women from poor families were eager to apply for the loan. This is because the first thing that the program implementers said was not how to manage the loan well, but instead they “threatened” the poor in case they are not able to return the money. So, the poor women do not dare to borrow money because they have no collaterals. (Interview, male, 60, Konawe Selatan District, June 3, 2010)

In that matter, I do find many women are actively involved in some groups. But, I don’t want it because I feel burdened if I have to be in the group which receive the loans and return them with high interests. (Interview, female, 54, Konawe Selatan District, June 5, 2010)

With such burdensome requirements, poor households are afraid to apply for loans. In addition to their misunderstanding of the program, this fear is also caused by the program implementer who “frightens” the poor people so that they do not apply for the loans and encourage them to transfer the loans under their name to those who own a business. This is done by the program implementer at the village level under the understanding that SPP channelling is a part of the requirements for the grant for the open menu program. If the village does not take SPP, it will not get the open menu program. A program implementer in Ngawi District said that open menu programs which were frequently realized in the
form of infrastructure development projects were really needed by the local people, so they tried hard to get the SPP loans, including by “outsmarting” the implementation.

Here, SPP payment is running smoothly due to the sanction implication. If there is often a delayed payment, the physical funds will be put off. So, the TPK is also involved in reminding people to pay their loan instalments. (Interview, male, 56, Ngawi District, April 22, 2010)

That [SPP] also becomes one of the requirements to get the physical (program). If SPP payments are late, the people will not get the physical funds. That’s why the head of the village also interferes. If one person’s credit payment is in arrears, the village won’t get the physical program. (Interview, male, 35, Konawe Selatan District, June 10, 2010)

However, in one village in Gresik District, East Java, the concern that the failure of the SPP program to run smoothly would have an impact on the inability of accessing the open menu program encouraged the community leaders to refuse the SPP program. Whether or not the success of SPP program would have an impact on the open menu program is not explained convincingly by program implementers in the field. Some of them assume that SPP has an impact on the open menu program because of the requirement stating that SPP proposal (if any) is an automatic proposal of the three proposals which are put forward in the MAD.

In addition, there were many attempts to bend the regulation of the program so that the village people can get the benefits easily. One of the indications found was the establishment of instant business groups to fulfil the

### MISUSE OF THE POOR’S NAME IN SPP

Angrek is a village in Konawe Selatan District, Southeast Sulawesi. In this study, the village is classified as a poor village. In reality, the number of the poor in this village is indeed high. According to some informants in the village, the poverty level is still around 35 percent. PNPM implementers’ data for 2010 shows that the number of very poor and poor households in this village is 101 out of 162 households, or around 62 percent.

This village has received PNPM since 2007. They allocated the PNPM open menu funds to build a kindergarten building (2007) and drainage systems (2008 and 2009). Besides, they have received PNPM–SPP three times, in 2007 for four borrowers’ groups (80 members), in 2008 for one borrowers’ group (20 members), and in 2009 for one borrowers’ group (20 members).

Based on the PNPM official data from the local sub–district, of the six groups that received SPP (with total number of 120 people), only 10 people did not come from poor households. This happened during the 2009 SPP program. However, based upon an informant’s information in the village, most of the recipients of SPP were not from poor households, but from the middle class and even the rich households. This was also admitted by a PNPM implementer in the village. According to the implementer, this happened because there were almost no poor households that wanted to receive SPP loans since they were afraid that they would not able to return the money. Since no one wanted to receive SPP, the program implementer in the village was forced to outsmart the system by using the names of poor HHs. Hence, in the official documents, the poor HH names were listed as the recipients, but after the loans were disbursed, the funds were given to other people who owned a business and could certainly return the loans on scheduled time. This had to be done because, according to the informant, if they did not take the SPP, their village would not get the infrastructure project that they really needed. According to another informant, the poor HH whose names were used also agreed to the scheme because they were made to believe that if they got the loan, they would not be able to return it. If they were not willing to have their names used, their village would not receive the infrastructure project. Thus, they did not have any options.
requirement for applying for SPP. Actually, under SPP regulation, the business groups should have existed and been actively operating for at least one year. This condition appears in nearly all villages as explained by a community leader in Konawe Selatan District, “So far, the business groups are usually established in order to get the loans. So the function is to get a share of the funds” (interview, male, 60, June 3, 2010).

There were also cases where the names of the poor were being used by those having better economic condition so that they can become SPP recipients. However, this misuse of names is considered legal because it is a way out of the problem of SPP funds channelling based on program regulation while ensuring that SPP funds are absorbed entirely (as demanded by the program implementer). A KPMD in Konawe Selatan District explained as follows:

*SPP [recipients] can become either a direct or indirect beneficiary. An indirect beneficiary means, for example, using my name, but the money is used by others, and that is allowed [according to PNPM]. This is called indirect benefit. It means a person borrows [SPP] and another person manages it. ... This is because PNPM prioritizes RTM [poor households], but because they cannot return the money, so non--RTM make use of it. (Interview, female, 42, Konawe Selatan District, June 7, 2010)*

### 2.4 INSTITUTIONS IN THE KECAMATAN AND VILLAGE

Viewed from the organizational structure, the institutions implementing PNPM are in accordance with the stipulations of the program, both at the sub-district and village levels. What is felt to be not proportionate is the number of personnel, especially the sub-district facilitators (FK). In a certain sub-district, an FK could have light burden because he/she only handles a small number of villages, whereas in another sub-district, the FK could have an immense workload due to the large number of villages under his/her jurisdiction. In the study areas, most of the sub-districts have more than ten villages. Having a large number of villages/jorong to supervise makes it difficult for FK to carry out many of the empowerment duties such as villagers’ group development, the strengthening of SPP recipients’ businesses, etc. One FK who supervises 21 villages in Konawe Selatan District stated that the administrative work of putting together monthly reports for 15 project villages alone has already taken up all of his time, leaving no spare time for the empowerment activities. Besides the disproportion of personnel to the workload, several FK also complain about the lack of micro credit facilitators. The need for micro credit facilitators has apparently become more pronounced because the FK have no time to supervise SPP recipients’ that can amount to hundreds of groups in just a single sub-district. Although there are now micro credit facilitators at the district level, according to a facilitator in West Sumatra, these facilitators are needed more at the sub-district level to implement empowerment activities associated to SPP. The facilitator thinks that because the SPP program is very important and widespread, it is perfectly natural to have a professional facilitator to ensure the smooth implementation of the program.

At the village level, the PNPM institutions are marked by the local elite’s dominance of key positions. In almost all of the study villages, the PNPM implementers, namely the TPK, KPMD, TP (monitoring team), etc., are part of the elite circle due to power or familial relationships. Basically, the election mechanism orchestrated by PNPM makes it possible for everybody to elect and be elected. But because of the dominance of the village elite in various decision-makings, the existing mechanism is rendered void. The dominance of the village elite in the PNPM institutions is, among others, caused by the lack of alternative human resources besides the village elite and the disinclination of the commoners to be involved in activities that are considered to be part of the elite’s turf. This belief that project administration in general, including PNPM, is the village elite’s ‘turf’ is the result of the commoners’ having rarely been involved in the management of government programs or aids.

Regarding the SPP recipient groups, there has been no development aside from being a means of obtaining loans. There is no difference in region across time and welfare categories. The groups’ lack of development is because the group members and program implementers see the groups merely as a prerequisite to receiving an SPP loan. There is no concrete effort made by either PNPM.
implementers (in this case, the FK) or the community to improve the institutional capacity of the SPP groups so that they can function more than just a borrower group.

2.5 COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION

The community’s participation at each stage of the PNPM Rural is quite high. FGDs from various study areas show that the number of community members attending PNPM meetings is larger than any other meeting that has been held in the villages. The percentage of participation is different for every area. For example, an informant in one of the villages in Lumajang said that the participation rate was approximately 70 percent of the adults in the village. In a village in Konawe Selatan District, Southeast Sulawesi, the meetings were only attended by 30 to 60 people out of a population of 900. This number was considered high because there had never been a meeting that attracted as many people before. The high attendance rate of the PNPM activities is because:

a. PNPM is considered as a “cash” program, that is, a program that does not merely dole out promises but shows instant realizations. This can be seen from a respondent’s comment, “PPK, because everybody here can directly reap the benefits such as the benefits of having easy access to clean water. The people here don’t have to walk far to get water anymore. Water comes to our houses” (interview, male, 42, June 5, 2010).

b. The people feel sceptical towards development planning through the Development Planning Consultative Meeting (Musrembang) because after years of planning, nothing has been realized. A village head in Bombana District said, “I have been the village head for eight years now, but many of the plans are not realized because of the “pending”. The “pending” happened because of lack of lobbying” (interview, male, 42, June 4, 2010).
c. In some areas, the competitiveness is very evident where the dusun members flock to the village hall to vote for their dusun’s development proposals. Some members come because of their own awareness to win the competition, but some others come because of the dusun officials’ prodding.

Even though the community participation rate in PNPM is quite high, many indications show that their participation is merely instrumental, only to fulfil the program requirements. A program implementer in one of the jorong in Agam District said that he had to come to the village people’s houses and persuade them to come to the musala (small prayer room) to participate in the Jorong Consultative Meeting (Musjor). A village head in East Java said, “The system [to involve large numbers of community members] was not yet practiced in 2002 because this system was developed to fulfil the PNPM’s requirements and in 2002 PNPM had not come to this village yet” (interview, male, 40, Gresik District, April 22, 2010).

In the majority of villages, few community members participate actively. Only a small percentage of them dare to speak up, give suggestions, or object when they disagree on a suggestion. An informant’s statement describes this condition:

In such a meeting, the women are also invited. But, just like the men, they play no part at all. They [the women] are passive listeners. Oftentimes, after the meetings, they speak their minds, but only to other women or to other participants, not to the village head” (interview, male, 53, community figure, Konawe Utara District, June 16, 2010).

The people invited to the meetings are the intellectuals, Sir. (Poor Women’s FGD, 33, Dharmasraya District, May 13, 2010)

Lai pernah buk wak di undamg rapek PPK, tapi wak dok ngarati doh, tu aniang se wak, kok apo–apo hasil rapek biasonyo wak tau dari kawan–kawan balellong atau di lapau nyo otaan di urang [I have once been invited to the PPK meeting, but I didn’t understand anything at all, so I kept silent. I usually understand the results of the meetings from my balellong/friends, or from the coffee shop gossips]. (Interview, female, 26, Solok District, Very Poor HH, May 12, 2010)

In addition, the passiveness also happens because of the dominance of the village elite. The poor and the commoners, especially the women, do not dare voice their requests or objections because they think that the only ones who are in the position to speak are the intelligent village elites as described above. The village elite’s dominant position in the various study areas is caused by, among others, the familial system or relationship, or patron–client relationship. The patronal system is evident in villages in Java, where the economic structure creates patron–client relationships between employers and employees or between landlords and farm hands. In villages in West Sumatra, familial relationship which is translated into the communitarian governing system, namely the nagari, has a very large role in handing over the power to the nagari elites. Lastly, in the villages in Southeast Sulawesi, the familial relationship, even though not transformed into a formal system like that in West Sumatra, gives an undeniable power to the village elites.

In such cases, it is impossible for the commoners and the poor to deny the wills of the village elites because there are many layers of relationships between them and the elites. It has been known that in rural communities, the poor do not only have a formal administrative relationship with the village elites, but also have economic relationships (employer and employee), sociocultural relationships (e.g. head of kaum with kaum members; mamak—nephew/niece in West Sumatra) and familial relationships. Each layer of relationship has its consequences which are not to be viewed lightly if someone does something to jeopardize the relationship: losing a job, banned from the kaum,
Those involved in decision-making are the RT, RW, village administration and its officials, village institutions and community representatives from all areas, and community figures. In this place, Sir, abot sawangane, which means respect for the elders, is strictly held. So, the elders are asked for their opinions first. (Interview, male, 39, RT head, Gresik Gresik, April 23, 2010)

As good community members who understand their rights and duties, it is probably very important for the village people to be directly involved in decision-making. But, if all community members are simultaneously involved in the decision-making, it would be taxing on the available resources, either in terms of location or time. So, the method and system employed in A Village [the name of the village is obscured] are through cooperation of the Bamus (Consultation Council) with the representatives of 58 kaum. As an example, to construct a perna [nagari regulation], the Bamus will make a [regulation] draft that is then given to the 58 representatives of the kaum. The representatives will discuss the draft with all of their kaum members. All suggestions are compiled to be re-discussed with the Bamus and wali nagari and combined with all other kaum’s’ compilations before they are made into a regulation. (Interview, male, 60, wali nagari, Agam District, May 10, 2010)

The rich have been employing the poor as farm hands. Without the jobs provided by the rich, the poor would become even more impoverished. (Interview, male, 53, village head, Gresik District, April 21, 2010)

Pertaining to the women’s participation, all informants confirm that there has been a significant rise. Within PNPM, there are forums that are specifically formed for women.
In these meetings, women actively voice their opinions. According to an informant, in some villages, such as those in West Sumatra, women can be more active than men.

Women are clearly more active now. We are also invited whenever there are meetings to make decisions because we have new groups formed by PNPM. So, if there are any decisions to be made related to the program, we can voice our opinions. (Interview, female, 45, poor HH, Ngawi District, April 25, 2010)

Ever since PNPM was launched, women's participation has risen exponentially; sometimes, they are even more active than men. (Interview, male, 40, TPK member, Agam District, April 16, 2010)

In the past, maybe because of the system in Minang or because of the terrain here, the women's participation rate in the jorong consultative meetings was quite low. But since PNPM requires women to be represented, the women started to become more involved in decision–makings. (Interview, male, 33, jorong head, Agam District, May 16, 2010)

About the women, I hear that it's getting better for us because we are now always present in meetings, group meetings or not. (Interview, female, 54, very poor HH, Konawe Selatan District, June 6, 2010)

Nevertheless, such activeness does not always work in the decision–making process. The men still hold more power in deciding. The only decision–making medium that is relatively sterile from men's influence is the women's consultative forum which produces one SPP suggestion and one open menu suggestion. The minimum domination of men in this forum is because this forum is attended by women only. But, it does not mean that this forum is completely devoid of men's domination. In some places, such as a village in Gresik District, women's suggestions, especially about SPP, are re–negotiated at the village level. Based upon the decision of the village elites, which is dominated by men, they concluded that they would not propose for the SPP. Their consideration was that they were afraid if their citizens would not dutifully pay back the credit. According to them, if SPP repayment is in arrears, their village will not get any open menu program. Therefore, rather than jeopardizing the open menu program, they would rather not propose for the SPP.

Another important issue is that, in PNPM forums, both the women only and the mixed ones, not all the village women are involved. It is likely that only women from the more prosperous families would participate in the meetings. Some female informants from less prosperous families said that they were never invited, let alone participated in the meetings in the village hall.

The women rarely attend meetings; only men do. I get information about the meetings from my husband. He talks about the meetings after he gets home. (Poor Women's FGD, 38, Lumajang District, April 24, 2010)

Women's participation now compared to that in 2002 has not shown any improvement. If it is said to improve, it's minimal. Women's representatives are often invited to meetings, but they are unenthusiastic about them and rarely come. (Interview, male, Gresik District, April 22, 2010)

But, all this time, Sir, when women are invited to meetings, they only come for the sake of attending them. They rarely speak or give suggestions. (Interview, female, 42, Konawe Selatan District, June 7, 2010)

The lack of improvement of the poor women's participation is, among others, caused by many internal and external factors. The internal factors include being occupied with their own job and life, feeling out of place or unimportant to attend the meeting, being old or ill, or being a widow. The external factors include not being invited and living far from the meeting venue. But from all of the reasons given by the informants, it seems that the most dominant ones are the internal factors. This can be seen from the statements mentioned above and also in the “Participation” section in the following chapter. The poor, especially the poor women, feel that it is inappropriate for them to attend meetings at the village hall because they are not ‘important people’ or ‘intellectuals’. 
Laporan Kecamatan_livering  presents report Jangulum 25/2010 L6
In some sample villages, especially in Southeast Sulawesi and some villages in West Sumatra, the village administration’s institutions have yet to function well. Oftentimes, those institutions only have names, but do not have any activities. The village administration is only passively waiting for instructions from the higher–level governments and has no initiative to encourage its people to develop the village based on its own capacity. In some other villages, particularly in East Java, the village administration tends to be more dynamic, open, and participative. The accountability of the village elites is also high.

Institutionally, except for West Sumatra villages, all villages have the same organizational elements. The government mechanism is also similar because all villages are under the same regulations and law. In West Sumatra, the government at the village level is characterized by a local nomenclature, that is, the use of the term *nagari* with its elements for the lowest government unit. Although using a local nomenclature, functions existing in regular village administration basically also exist in a *nagari* administration.

The differences in performance among the village/nagari governments generally lies in the human resources, both the officials in the village administration and the community. In addition, equally important in influencing the performance of the village administration is the adequacy of their budget to move the wheel of the administration, not only the budget from the village/nagari itself, but also budget from external funds or higher–level governments.

### 3.1 INFORMATION FLOW AND TRANSPARENCY IN THE VILLAGE

Generally, the village elites, particularly the village/nagari head, control and become the source of any information related to the life in the village. There are no mechanisms, forums, or media which formally necessitate and ensure that the information reaches the community. In this context, whether or not information reaches the community is not determined by the system but based on “the kind–heartedness” of the village elites. Hence, it is not based on the obligation as the village administrator. Some information is passed on to the community by the village head or *wali nagari* through the head of *dusun/jorong* or RT head. The RT head is then asked to pass on the information to the community by using regular local means and routine religious meetings in the village. For certain cases, the information is sometimes passed on formally through meetings in the village hall. But this only occurs occasionally.

The information that is generally passed on by the village official is information on programs from higher–level governments and also on voluntary community work.
activities (kerja bakti). Information on programs is not always conveyed openly, but limited only to the target recipients. There is a tendency that the village administration passes on more information concerning the obligations of the village community while on the aspects related to the rights of the village community, generally the village administration has not been transparent. A village head in East Java explained, “Not all information should be passed on to the community, especially that concerning the budget. As far as the budget is concerned, it cannot be exposed openly” (interview, male, 45, Lumajang District, April 22, 2010). Besides, the information passed on to the community is usually partial. Any information which is more detailed or related to a project’s finance or budget, for example, is not conveyed. None of the commoner informants can tell and know how much aid has been received by their village and how has the village administration spent it. One informant said, “I even have no idea what ADD [Village Funds Allocation] program is, let alone anything about budgeting” (Middle Class Men’s FGD, 41, Lumajang District, April 25, 2010).

In the matter of transparency, there is a different perception between the village officials and elite, and the community in general. The village officials and elite assume that the village administration has already been transparent when it comes to development programs as well as other governmental aspects. On the contrary, some community members think that the village administration is not transparent because they are not willing to explain various existing programs clearly. The following quotations describe the information flow and transparency in the sample villages:

The information which is usually not spread in the community is the information about assistance for the poor. Sometimes we know about it only after there are people who get the assistance. (Interview, male, 72, Solok District, May 1, 2010)

Sometimes the information does not reach the community because it stops at the RT level. … Information from the village officials never reaches the community because the RT heads never convey the results of meetings between them and the village officials. This information is usually obtained from a chat with people from a different RT. … There has never been any transparency about the results of meetings in the village hall. (Interview, male, 46, Gresik District, April 23, 2010)

If there is a meeting in the nagari, people who participate are normally the community figures. The poor are never invited. So far, if the jorong and nagari hold a meeting, they never inform the results of the meeting. I just know the information from my neighbours. (Poor Men’s FGD, 31, Dharmasraya District, May 13, 2010)

For the past three years, PNPM has been the only one that distributes the information well, while for other public services, the way of information distribution has been the same. (Interview, male, 38, Bombana District, June 6, 2010)

The fact that the information is not distributed maximally and transparently is due to the obstacles in the social structure and institution of the village community, especially the wide gap in relationship between the village elites and the community. In all sample villages, the village elite still consciously pose themselves as being more superior, knowledgeable, and responsible than the common people. On the other hand, the community in general acts passively, and even tends to be ignorant towards any information concerning many village life aspects. They usually just wait for the information to be conveyed by the officials. Rarely does the community proactively ask for information to the village officials. The following quotations reflect this reality:

If it is informed by the wali jorong [jorong head], then I will know the information. If it is not, I will not get the information. (Interview, male, 72, poor HH, Solok District, May 13, 2010)

Here, the people are not active enough to seek information. Only when there is an invitation or visit by the village officials will they get the information. (Interview, male, 31, middle class villager, Bombana District, June 8, 2010)

No need to ask questions to the jorong. For us, working at the rice field is more important. (Interview, male, 49, middle class villager, Dharmasraya District, 26 April 26, 2010)
ACCOUNTABILITY IN DESA WETAN

The implementation of PNPM in Desa Wetan, Kabupaten Gresik, has started since 2007. At that time, the program activity was program socialization, planning from the bottom up to the proposal agreement at the village level, and the MAD at the sub-district level. Wetan Village’s open menu proposal at that time was the building of a kindergarten building in Dusun Karang Liman which was proposed by the women’s group and was included in the ranking list of funded programs. The implementation of the building project was realized in 2008. For the implementation of PNPM 2009, the proposal of Wetan Village was in the form of drainage repair in Dusun Wetan which was included in the ranking list of non-funded programs, but in 2010, it became a funded program under the Optimization PNPM (PNPM Optimalisasi). This PNPM Optimalisasi, according to one of TPK members in Wetan Village, is “the agreement of all parties to choose a non-funded proposal from 2009 to be directly implemented without going through planning from the bottom as usual.” When this study was conducted, the drainage development was still in the planning stage. The physical development had not been carried out yet. For the three years of PNPM existence in Wetan Village, if seen physically, the benefits have not been felt yet by the locals because this village has only received one physical development. Nevertheless, if seen from the perspective of transparency and accountability, at the least a model such as PNPM has given an impact to the community, that is, the changing of their perspective on how a development project should be accountably reported. After seeing how PNPM accountably reported all matters related to the building project, the village people demanded that a model like PNPM is also applied to other development programs. This was clearly stated by a KPMD in Wetan Village.

The way PNPM reported the financial budget by attaching the information on the information board makes people want to have a reporting mechanism just like that for all projects implemented in the village. There was once a self-managed project from the Government of Gresik District to build a madrasah (madrasa, or Islamic school) which was rejected by the community because it could not fulfill the people’s demand to have the report written in details and attached on the information board.

(Interview, female, 40, April 25, 2010).

The apathetic attitude of the community towards information concerning the village administration is probably because the community has no concern for the information. For most village people, what is important is that their daily works can run well. This kind of community attitude can possibly lead to the absence of urgency in the village officials to run the government transparently. In this context, both the community and the village officials do not seem to consider transparency in the government as a crucial topic to discuss, let alone to realize.

The information flow as explained above has not changed in the last three to eight years, except for the information flow in PNPM which is better structured through group meetings, posters, and attachments of financial accountability reports during project implementation. However, the model of information flow from PNPM does not give many impacts towards other program models or other village policies. Of the village samples, only one village was found to have citizens who demanded that other programs imitate the transparency model applied by PNPM.

3.2 PARTICIPATION AND REPRESENTATION IN POLICY-MAKING

In most study areas, decision-making at the village level is usually carried out in meetings attended by the village elites (the village officials, BPD, LPM —Community Empowerment Institution, PKK, RW/RT, and community figures). They are considered to have already represented the community: “... it is not necessary to invite all village people because their opinions are already represented. ...
If the community figures are already invited, the people are already represented ....” (Interview, male, 38, village official, Konawe Utara District, June 6, 2010). In some other sample villages, some villagers are involved in village meetings. But, at most, they only listen or verify decisions that have already been made by the village head or the village administration. There are at least three reasons why the village people, especially the poor, are not directly involved in decision-making processes. First, just like other government levels, the community has already been represented by various institutions formed to represent the community. Second, technically, it does not seem possible to involve the people directly in decision-making processes because of, among others, the limitation of the meeting room capacity and the accommodation cost. Third, a meeting that involves a large number of people is inefficient as explained in the following statement. “All villagers do not need to be made present in the meetings because they can make the meeting chaotic and it becomes difficult to reach an agreement. It is enough with the representatives only” (Interview, male, 40, village official, Gresik District, April 22, 2010).

Direct community involvement can only occur at the dusun/RT level. Unfortunately, very few villages hold meetings at the dusun and RT levels. Meetings frequently held at the dusun/RT level are only the informal ones, such as pengajian (Quran recitation), yasinan (Quran recitation to pray for the dead), or arisan, which are not meant to discuss village problems.

Informants or community members in the sample villages have different opinions on the decision-making process like the one explained above. First, there are community groups that think that their participation has been represented by the village elites and community figures attending the decision-making process. This type of community believes that whatever is decided by the village administration must be the best decision.
I just believe in them because they have the capacity. Like wali jorong, he is chosen and trusted by the community, just like the saying, “didahulukan salangkah, ditinggikan sarantiang.” ... It is enough because if all people are present in a higher forum, imagine how crowded the meeting will be. The total population in Nagari A [the name of the nagari is obscured] is around 2,500 people. If half of the population is adults, it means 1,200 people will attend the meeting. (Interview, male, 36, middle class, Agam District, May 15, 2010)

All of us really trust the RT [head] and kasun [dusun head]. They will prioritize and care about the community’s interest. So, we put our faith in the hands of the RT head and kasun. (Interview, female, 45, very poor HH, Ngawi District, April 24, 2010)

It is good if kadus [dusun head] represents his/her people [in the meeting] because kadus also knows what his/her people need. The RT here does not function; kadus functions more. (Interview, female, 48, very poor HH, Konawe Utara District, June 9, 2010)

Second, there are community groups that are critical and consider that the decision-making process does not completely reflect people’s aspirations. In other words, some decisions accommodate the interests of the village elites more than the interests of the community. To prevent bias decisions in favor of the village elites, they want the decision-making process to directly involve the community. Some informants said:

Well, sometimes it is adequate, but sometimes not. It’s adequate if it can represent the people’s aspirations. It’s not adequate if they put forward their personal interests or if it is just for the sake of agreeing on any decision. It seems like that. (Interview, male, 49, very poor HH, Gresik District, April 26, 2010).

I don’t think we are [adequately represented] because poor people like me need more than other people do. (Interview, female, 54, very poor HH, Kabupaten Konawe Selatan District, June 8, 2010)

In implementing PNPM, the participation and representation of the community can be classified as high. All informants admitted it. But the good level of participation and representation in PNPM has in fact little influence on other policy processes and programs. Participation in the policy-making and programs in the village have generally experienced no changes. Participation and representation are still seen as normative and formal. As a result, there is no fixed pattern to further absorb aspirations regarding the needs and interests of the village people in general. And there are no patterns which make it possible for the active involvement of the people in formulating needs as well as in decision-making. This condition is also supported by the local culture and thus it becomes a tool of legitimation for the village elites as well. For example, the term abot sawangane (Javanese) which in the local culture means to give priority to the leaders and elders is often used as an excuse to break the deadlock over participation and representation of the community. The following quotations describe community’s opinions on their representation and participation in the decision-making process at the village level:

Although there are quite a number of community figures invited to the meetings, not many debates happened in this kind of meeting. In the meetings, the one who talks a lot are the village head and other village officials, while the other participants of the meetings just concur. (Interview, male, 38, village official, Konawe Utara Distrit, June 6, 2010)

No need to invite all people because there are representatives. (Interview, male, 48, village official, Gresik District, April 26, 2010)
The important thing is that we can be aware of the issues discussed and actually every community member [should be invited], but we are sometimes not invited. There are those who are invited, but they are too lazy and bored if they have to attend meetings all the time. (Interview, female, 40, Bombana District, June 4, 2010)

... We concur to whatever is decided by the village officials, especially on the things that are related to the village development ... I never get involved in any decision-making. I just follow the decision and it’s all up to the village officials. ... (Interview, male, 60, poor HH, Gresik District, April 28, 2010)

... The problem is that those who attend the meetings are only the community figures, Sir. (Poor Group’s FGD, male, 45, Dharmasraya District, May 13, 2010)

... The people are perhaps going to be interested to come to the meeting if the meeting is related to an assistance that is going to be distributed. ... There are many meetings that are not related to assistance distribution. (Interview, female, 44, poor HH, Agam District, 15 May 15, 2010)

Specifically for women’s participation and representation, most of the informants in all sample villages claimed that ever since the implementation of PNP, formally, the participation of women in the decision-making process has increased. In this case, women’s participation is generally still ceremonial because it is more out of the necessity to meet the formal requirement of the program. Besides, the increase of the participation generally occurs in the middle to upper class community. For the poor community, women’s participation tends to stay the same: it is even decreasing in certain villages. The poor women’s position is still marginal. This fact is reflected in the following statements:
We have to admit that it still has little influence. Because the way other activities are done is still unlike PNPM. Only the community figures and the village officials are often involved. The women being involved are only the community figures. If it is PNPM, all people are involved and know the development of the program. (Interview, male, 40, KPMD member, Gresik District, April 25, 2010)

What’s the use of attending the meetings? There are already those who are responsible for each field. ... In nagari meetings, there are the nagari officials. In Bundo Kanduang meetings, there are its members. If we come, those people are given meal boxes. We just watch while they eat. (Poor Women’s FGD, 40, Solok District, May 12, 2010)

3.3 REPRESENTATION SYSTEM

The representation system in the village is formally regulated by the law under which the village is given duty to form a BPD. BPD is expected to be able to perform as a legislative body at the village level that ideally receive and channel community aspirations. In villages of K1, K2, and K3 categories, it turns out that BPD and other representation systems have not functioned optimally. The community thinks that the institution or person that is supposed to represent the community’s interests in the formulation of community’s needs, programs’ decisions, and policies, until now tend to serve as a legitimation tool of the village administration. This is indicated by the absence of special meetings at the community level (RT/RW/dusun/jorong) to absorb community’s aspirations as well as to inform how far have the aspirations been realized.

According to respondents, even though the village administration system recognizes dusun–and RT–level governments, there are no planned/regular activities in the dusun and RT except for giving information to the people as ordered by the village head. At the dusun or RT level, there are no routine meetings held to discuss problems occurring at the RT or hamlet level. However, in the context of representation system, some people consider that the system is already good because it represents the community’s aspirations in general, while some others are unsatisfied because they do not think it is transparent. If explored further, community members who consider that the representation system has already fulfilled their aspirations do not base their consideration on the reality whether or not the system has run well. This kind of attitude is mainly caused by the social relations that place leaders’ domination as something absolute. These are reflected by the following statements:
I don’t think we need to [take part in making decisions]. We have people representing us already. That should be enough. We all have faith in the RT and dusun heads. They will surely prioritize and care about the community’s interests. So, we give full authority to the RT and dusun heads. We never [complain]. And whatever the decision is, I accept it. If there are dissatisfied people, it is never more than people whispering to one another, but they do not do anything. (Interview, female, 45, poor HH, Ngawi District, April 24, 2010)

Well, it’s already enough if we have wali jorong to represent us because he knows the people’s condition better and he has been given the authority to represent the people. (Interview, female, 32, poor HH, Solok District, May 15, 2010)

Rarely do people ask about the decisions from meetings attended by community figures because they have complete faith that they will be represented by the community figures. (Interview, male, 40, poor HH, Lumajang District, April 24, 2010)

If it’s about complaints on village decision, it has never happened before. The community usually accepts the decisions that have been decided because they believe in their representatives in the village institution. (Interview, male, 49, dusun head, Ngawi District, April 27, 2010)

On the contrary, those who are disappointed with the representation system practices that have been applied all this time have the following arguments:

Well, sometimes it is adequate, but sometimes it is not. It’s adequate if it can represent the people’s aspirations. It’s not adequate if they put forward their personal interests or if it is just for the sake of agreeing on any decision. It seems like that. (Interview, male, 49, very poor HH, Gresik District, April 26, 2010).

It is not enough if the community is only represented, but they have to know the conclusion from the meeting. (Interview, male, 38, middle class citizen, Bombana District, June 8, 2010)

The decision all depends on what the wali nagari, jorong head, and other nagari officials want. (Interview, male, 36, middle class citizen, Dharmasraya District, May 16, 2010)

The village administration makes policy through a meeting held with concerned village officials without the village community being present. ... The people should be involved if there is a meeting at the village hall. But here, we are never invited. So, if something happens, we just tell one another. (Interview, male, 46, middle class citizen, Gresik District, April 23, 2010)

In the sample villages, it can be said that there has never been any serious conflict related to the implementation of the program. The conflicts that occurred are not massive; hence, they do not create social tensions or horizontal mass conflicts between community groups. At the village level, this is probably the reason why there has never been any standard conflict or complaint resolution mechanism to handle conflicts and complaints caused by any program or policy at the village level. When conflicts or complaints happen, the solution is handled sporadically and it is usually the village head who acts as the main actor in solving the problem. These conflicts can generally be solved through explanations and consultations involving community figures.

During PNPM implementation, conflicts occurred in several sample areas such as in Nagari Tanah Tinggi and Nagari Marapi (Agam District), and Desa Waru (Ngawi District) (the last two nagari/villages are not sample villages). For Nagari Marapi, the case was about the suspicion of the locals that PNPM clean water project in Nagari Singgalang took water from the water source in Nagari Marapi and thus causing a decrease in water debit. In Nagari Tanah Tinggi, the case involved Jorong Pakan Baru, Padang Gantiang, and Simpang Limo regarding the use of PNPM roads in Jorong Pakan Baru and Padang Gantiang to carry materials for the PNPM road building project in Jorong Simpang Limo. According to Tanah Tinggi’s Wali Nagari, this conflict would not have happened if the nagari administration had
been involved in the program implementation, especially in the coordination between jorong, because the jorong administration has no authority whatsoever, except for the extension of wali nagari’s authority. Therefore, resolving a problem in and between jorongs is more effective if it involves the nagari administration.

In Desa Waru, the case was caused by disagreement among some of the villagers towards the talud (breakwater) building proposal that later became the village proposal. Some citizens who disagreed regarded those who formulate the proposal as incompetent (it was likely that the proposal formulation was not transparent). The first case could be solved well by involving the sub-district head and the Public Works (PU) Office of Kabupaten Agam. For the second case, the problem could be solved at the nagari level. For the case in Desa Waru, it is still in the process of finding the solution. The sub-district facilitator is handling the case. Outside the three conflicts, other PNPM implementation conflicts occur within the village scope such as conflicts between the village administration and TPK, conflicts between TPK/community and certain interest groups, and also conflicts related to the procurement of goods and services. However, these conflicts did not trigger any social tension and the problems could be solved internally at the village level.

Pertaining to the complaints of the community towards the performance of the village administration and/or a program implementation, most of the respondents stated that the village community generally says nothing. They tend to keep the matter to themselves or talk about it with their fellow citizens. This condition is, among others, due
to the feeling of reluctance and fear towards the officials, as well as the loss of hope because the complaints they conveyed have never received a positive response. This phenomenon is recorded in the following quotations:

... never conveyed any complaints to the jorong or dusun head. ... I'm afraid that I would be ridiculed or that I would be a gossip target in the community. Rather than being gossiped by others, ... [it is better] not to convey any complaints. (Interview, male, 51, poor HH, Agam District, May 13, 2010)

I never conveyed it [complaint] to the village administration. The complaint only becomes the talk at the community level. (Interview, male, 38, middle class citizen, Bombana District, June 8, 2010)

If there is a dissatisfaction/complaint, people tend to feel shy or reluctant to convey the problem and usually just gossip with one another. (Interview, female, 60, middle class citizen, Lumajang District, April 25, 2010)

I usually only tell my friends. If I don't get Raskin, I don't dare to tell the jorong head. And I couldn't stand keeping it to myself either. So, I share the problem with my friends. We can laugh while talking about it, Sir. (Poor Men's FGD, 44, Solok District, May 16, 2010)

Even if there are people who are dissatisfied, they just tittle–tattle over the problem, but they don't do anything. (Interview, female, 45, poor HH, Ngawi District, April 24, 2010)

Even if we complain, it will be useless. No one will pay attention because the ones who protest are considered as commoners. (Interview, female, 46, middle class citizen, Lumajang District, April 26, 2010)
3.5 ACCOUNTABILITY AND RESPONSIVENESS OF THE VILLAGE ADMINISTRATION

In general, in all the sample villages, a systematic mechanism for village administration’s accountability and responsiveness is not available. The village administration’s accountability still depends largely on the leadership of the village head, not yet on the institutional system. Coupled with the condition in which the community members who generally still put themselves in the inferior position in the leader–people relation, the village head becomes a dominant figure. The village administration is then identical to the village head. Based on this, the community has different assessments over the accountability of the administration. For a village/nagari that has a capable and responsive village head/wali nagari, the local community generally regards the village government as having a high accountability. On the contrary, for a village/nagari that is lead by a village head/wali nagari whose leadership does not really meet the bar, the community in general assesses their village administration to have a low accountability.

This phenomenon emerges, among others, because in the village administration practices, the village head never gives the accountability reports regarding the work performance of the village administration openly to the village community. Even if there is an accountability report, it is only submitted to the BPD at the most. In one of the sample villages in Southeast Sulawesi, a BPD member even stated that the BPD had never received any report regarding the income and expenditure of the village administration, including ADD/RAPBDes (Village Budget Plan) funds, from the village head:

Not all information has to be reported to the people, especially that involving budgeting. Budgeting issues should not be widely open. (Interview, male, 45, Lumajang District, April 22, 2010)

Nyo ganjia mah buk, kok ado pitihnyo warga dak tau doh, pi kok nan kabagotong royong capek warga tau mah [This is different, Ma’am. If it concerns money, the people know nothing and don’t need to know, but if it’s about gotong royong — voluntary cooperation in the neighbourhood — the people are informed quickly]. (Interview, female, 54, Solok District, May 13, 2010)

For ADD, the supervision is so, so [not strict]. The inspectorate is the one that develops and also controls. So, that is that. … But, PNPM is supervised and followed regularly, while the volume has been predetermined. But, if it’s another project, such as ADD, there is no supervision, just a program alone, the report, well, you can make it the way you want. … You plan it by yourself and implement it by yourself. Yeah, that’s our regional head. (Interview, male, 45, Gapoktan head, Konawe Selatan District, June 9, 2010)

There are financial problems in ADD managed by the village, such as unclear budgeting for posyandu; supplement foods for children [aged] five and under are also unclear. For Dusun A [the name of the dusun is obscured] citizens, in the end, PKK and activities for children five and under use the pengajian funds. There is a jimpitan rice assistance program [“pinches” of rice collected for charity]. … If we want to protest, it’s useless. They won’t listen to our protest because they think of us as common people. The village head’s wife ran for legislative member last year [2009] and lost, and she seemed to have fallen into a lot of debts, so the ADD operational funds as well as the Raskin funds were used first for her businesses. She rented the tanah bengkok [meant for village officials] as other parties when it was still idle. When it was finally going to be used and it was claimed by the respective officials, the lessee forced the village head/his wife to pay back and they even brought police and soldiers along. Being used to dealing with soldiers and police, to them, protests submitted by village people do not worth their attention. (Interview, female, 46, middle class citizen, Lumajang District, April 26, 2010)

Aside from the village head’s leadership, the community’s assessment over the accountability of the village administration is also influenced by political aspirations. The supporters of village head candidates who lost in the election generally tend to give an unsatisfactory assessment towards the elected village head. A village head in Gresik District, for example, stated, “We’ve done our best but they [the supporters of the village head candidate who lost the election] still think that what we’ve
done are all wrong, let alone if we make real mistakes” (interview, male, 40, April 22, 2010). Community assessment on the village administration’s accountability also depends on whether their interest is accommodated or not, without considering other factors. For BLT, for example, the poor people who do not receive BLT will instantly accuse that the village administration is not accountable, showing favoritism, etc., while in fact the authority to decide BLT recipients is not in the hands of the village administration.

The following quotations give a description on respondents’ perception towards the accountability and responsiveness of the village administrations in the sample areas:

Most of the village people are already quite happy with the existing services. (Interview, male, 40, poor HH, Lumajang District, April 24, 2010)

The administration has not yet been able to be fully responsible for its community. (Poor Men’s FGD, 37, Gresik District, April 23, 2010)

Once I suggested to the village head to plea to PDAM to install PDAM water pipes up to RT 8. The village head said, “God willing, I will propose to it.” But, until now, there has been no news from the village head regarding the development of his proposal. (Interview, male, 40, poor HH, Ngawi District, April 25, 2010)

3.6 IMPACT OF PNPM ON GOOD GOVERNANCE IN THE VILLAGE

As can be seen above, the PNPM management model, which puts forward participation, transparency, and accountability, has yet to have an impact on the management of the village administration, both on the bureaucracy management and the management of programs received by the village. Based on information from and observation in the villages, it seems that this is caused by the following factors:

First, as described in Chapter II, the strong domination of the village elites and the lack of initiative from the community have contributed to the establishment of status quo. Community members are usually afraid or reluctant to suggest changes to the existing mechanisms that are related to participation, let alone transparency and accountability. Demanding better transparency and accountability means challenging the ruling village elites. After a while, this condition creates an indifferent attitude among the community members.

Second, there is no guarantee for the community that if they duplicate the mechanism applied by PNPM in other programs and activities in the village they will earn something (project). Participative planning in PNPM will certainly end with a project, while planning involving as much community participation as possible through the Musrenbangdes, for example, may not necessarily end up with a project. This condition is worsened by the experience of those who participate, especially in the Musrenbangdes, where from year to year their proposals have never been realized. Besides, in certain cases such as the cases in several villages in Southeast Sulawesi, after the proposal that had been designed participatively was realized, those who got to reap the benefits turned out to be only certain people from the village elites. On the other hand, for the village elites, mechanism such as the PNPM will obviously be a disadvantage for them in the sense that their domination will be removed along with various privileges that come with it.

Third, there is an indication that the community and village officials lean towards a normative attitude. If a program or certain activity does not require participation, transparency, and accountability, they will not demand it either. Such normative logic is apparently becoming stronger because there is no critical awareness as well as sufficient understanding among the community about what ideal governance is.
The management of various programs is vulnerable to the village elites’ cooptation. In a sample village in Southeast Sulawesi, this phenomenon has occurred over and over again and there was no concrete resistance from the community. According to the informants, in 2005, the farmer groups in the village were asked by the government to submit a proposal to get agricultural tools. These groups suggested asking for tractors. Then, the government gave four tractors to the village. Each farmer group got one tractor. According to farmer groups’ prior agreement, the tractors could be used by both the members of the farmer groups and the non-members. The difference was only in the rental costs. If the one who rented the tractor was a member of the farmer groups, he would have to pay Rp650,000, but if he was not, he would have to pay for Rp700,000. It was agreed that the rental money would be used as funds of the farmer groups to fix any damage to the tractors and for the farmer groups’ savings.

However, since 2008, it was no longer clear whether the tractors are still owned by the farmer groups or by individuals. What is obvious for the farmer group members is that the tractors have always been dominated by the head of the farmer group. The money from renting the tractors has never been reported to the members. From the start of the farmer groups’ establishment, the members (who became FGD participants) have never received the groups’ dividends.

In the beginning, the farmer groups received the machines for the groups to use, but then the machines were taken over by the head of the farmer group for his personal use. Another case was the case in which the house renovation assistance was first allocated for the house of the village secretary. According to informants, the village secretary was not poor and so he had no right to receive that house renovation assistance. An informant from a poor household said,

I don’t really know for sure, but I and many other people have never been involved. Even during PNPM, we were not involved. Usually during data collection, our names are listed but when the assistance is obtained, we do not get any. In fact, those who are not in the list get the assistance. One example is the house assistance. There were some houses, including mine, that were listed and even photographed, but when the assistance was received, it was the village secretary and the village head who received the assistance instead. (Interview, male, 38, poor HH, Konawe Selatan District, June 7, 2010)
4.1 POVERTY AND ITS DYNAMICS

The concept of poverty has evolved from merely someone’s inability to fulfil his/her basic needs to the concept that poverty is a complex condition involving social and moral dimensions. As the dynamics of social, economic, political, and cultural life evolve, the concept of poverty also turns multidimensional. Poverty involves the dimensions of health, nutrition, education, vulnerability, powerlessness, inequality, social exclusion, and voicelessness. In general, it can be said that the problem of poverty is related to political and social ideas that reflect the community’s expectations and aspirations. Poverty is a condition in which a certain life standard considered decent by the society is not fulfilled.

Respondents in the study areas, including those who are poor, generally still perceive poverty in its most basic form, namely someone’s inability to fulfil his/her basic needs. This phenomenon probably indicates that the poverty occurring in the sample areas is absolute in nature. The following explanations depict the aspects related to the level and condition of the local poverty.

4.1.1 POVERTY INDICATORS

In all sample villages, the poverty has similar indicators/characteristics. Both the FGD and the in-depth interview results reveal that the dominant poverty characteristics are centred upon the aspects of asset ownership, daily needs fulfilment, and types of livelihoods. In the asset ownership aspect, the poor are usually characterized by (i) bad/uninhabitable housing conditions; (ii) lack of sanitation facilities/MCK (bathrooms, wash and latrines), or having them but in an unhealthy condition; (iii) lack of assets or valuable furniture/home electronics; and (iv) lack of capital goods such as rice fields, plantations, fish farms, or fishing boats. The following quotations illustrate the characteristics of poverty in the asset ownership aspect:

In general, the poor live in bad houses. (Village Representatives’ FGD, 45, Gresik District, April 23, 2010)

Tak andik [poor], bamboo houses, woven bamboo walls, dirt floors, clay tile roofs, lamps with electricity from the neighbor’s house, small houses. (Village Representatives’ FGD, 41, Lumajang District, April 22, 2010)

The poor families’ houses have palm leaf roofs. The ventilation is not adequate. (Village Representatives’ FGD, 45, Konawe Selatan District, May 13, 2010)

They don’t have adequate household furniture. (Interview, male, 56, community figure, Lumajang District, April 23, 2010)

Not having MCK. ... You’ve got to run to the stream. (Poor Women’s FGD, 45, Bombana District, June 4, 2010)
A communal MCK, on the river or ponds. (Poor Women’s FGD, 28, Solok District, May 11, 2010)

Lack of arable land. (Poor Women’s FGD, 51, Solok District, May 12, 2010)

... For the bansaik [poor], some have land and some don’t. Even if they do, it’s very limited. (Poor Women’s FGD, 64, Dharmasraya District, May 12, 2010)

Fishermen are ... poor. The ones who are wealthy are usually boat owners. (Poor Women’s FGD, 50, Gresik District, April 22, 2010)

Ingin bakabun tanah ndak ado, wak tiok pagi lah poi ka ladang urang [I want to farm, but I don’t have any land. Every morning, I go to work on someone else’s land. (Poor Women’s FGD, 37, Dharmasraya District, May 13, 2010)

Not all respondents agree that the condition of one’s house is an important indicator of poverty. Their opinion is based upon the fact that there are some community members who have nice and inhabitable houses but lack any productive assets or regular incomes and thus still experience difficulties in fulfilling their basic daily needs. Therefore, the household is categorized as poor. The nice houses are usually built by their relatives or children.

In the aspect of daily needs fulfilment, the indicator of poverty is generally associated with difficulties in fulfilling food, clothing, health, and educational needs. The following statements describe the lives of the poor in the sample areas:

... enough to buy food for the day, while for the next days, we’ll cross that bridge as we come to it. (Poor Women’s FGD, 38, Konawe Utara District, June 4, 2010)
... We go to the traditional healer first. If we don’t get better, then we go to the puskesmas [community health center]. (Village Representatives’ FGD, 43, Agam District, May 11, 2010)

Well, because of our extreme poverty, we are mostly elementary school dropouts. So, we are unable to find any other job [besides being farm hands]. (Village Representatives’ FGD, 40, Konawe Utara District, June 4, 2010)

They can’t afford the doctor. (Interview, female, 21, community figure, Gresik District, April 23, 2010)

Tak andik ... difficult to get healthcare. Some go to traditional healers; some go to drugstores [to buy over–the–counter medicine such as Bodrex and Mixagrip]. Tak andik ... Many don’t go to school ... Some go to pesantren [Islamic boarding school] ... Most are only elementary school graduates. (Village Representatives’ FGD, 38, Lumajang District, April 24, 2010)

Parents educate their children up to junior high school only. (Village Representatives’ FGD, 41, Lumajang District, April 24, 2010)

In the types of livelihoods aspect, the sample communities characterize the poor as a group of people who do not have regular jobs and/or have low–paying jobs such as farm hands, rubber tappers, construction workers, and sand miners:

... even though we already do odd jobs. You can say that we do any kind of menial labor. (Interview, male, 49, poor citizen, Gresik District, April 22, 2010)

The poor and very poor, they receive wages from the wealthy. (Village Representatives’ FGD, 53, Solok District, May 11, 2010)

... They work as daily laborers. (Middle Class Women’s FGD, 45, Dharmasraya District, May 14, 2010)

They work as tenant farmers ... in other words, they have nothing. (Interview, male, 31, village official, Gresik District, April 24, 2010)

... work as rice scavengers from the discarded rice stalks. They don’t have any land. They work as farm hands in other people’s rice fields. (Interview, male, 47, village official, Solok District, May 13, 2010)

It’s hard [for them] to find a living. They usually search for vegetables in the forest to sell. They don’t have regular jobs. (Interview, female, 28, middle class citizen, Konawe Utara District, June 5, 2010)

Besides the indicators mentioned above, some respondents in the sample villages also included other poverty indicators. In Kulon Village, Gresik, for example, they characterized the poor as a group of people who have low self esteem and do not socialize much with the general population. It is as if the poor “isolate” themselves so that the village authorities have difficulties in involving them in community activities. But this “self–isolation” is perhaps a reflection of their pragmatic mindset. The poor usually spend all their time trying to fulfil their basic needs, as described by the statement, “There has been a posyandu for a long time. It is about 300 m from my house. I know that it is scheduled once a month on Mondays, but I never bring my children to the posyandu. I have no time. All my time is spent in the plantation cutting rubber” (interview, female, 38, poor citizen, Kabupaten Dharmasraya, 12 May 2010). To a certain extent, the “self–isolation” is also perhaps a reflection of their perplexity and even loss of hope as a result of the difficulties they face in their lives, as seen in this following statement, “The poor are narrow–minded and are always bewildered because they seem to be hitting brick walls. Aku iki kerjo opo, usaha opo ...? Kok kabehe ora iso ...?” [What job should I do? What business can I do? Why can’t I do anything?] (interview, male, 63, poor citizen, Lumajang District, April 27, 2010).

Sociologically, there may be many factors that can explain the poor’s low self esteem. But it is perhaps simply associated with their relative position in the society. In a community where the proportion of the poor is small, making them the minority, the inclination to low self esteem increases. In Kulon Village where the proportion of the poor is only around 15 percent, the sentiments of belonging to the “failure” group are stronger. On the other hand, in Desa Kenanga, Bombana, where the poor amount
to 68 percent of the population, the poor have no low self esteem or difficulties in socializing with other members of the community. This is proven by the following statement, “There is no significant difference and there is no problem in the social relationships. [It is the poor] who in fact can finish the job whenever they [the wealthy] throw parties. The wealthy just sit around and wait for their coffees to come. Hahaha” (Village Representatives’ FGD, 44, Bombana District, June 4, 010).

Another indicator that characterizes the poor is that the poor are usually made up of people who are no longer productive due to old age and/or widows, as depicted by the following statement, “They are mostly elderly widows or elderly people who can no longer work” (Community Representatives’ FGD, 39, Kabupaten Ngawi, 22 April 2010). It also holds true in Dusun Bakung, Kulon, Gresik that the poor consists of the elderly widows. In this dusun, from the 25 households, 9 are headed by elderly widows and all are poor.

In the past three to eight years of PNPM implementation, the indicators of poverty have slightly changed. One of the changes recorded in this study is that the poor now have a higher awareness in sending their children to school, at least up to junior high school level. This is brought about by the implementation of the Nine-Year Compulsory Education and BOS (School Operational Assistance) programs which made it possible for elementary and junior high schools to be tuition free. Free schools give the poor a better access to education than ever before. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the schools are completely cost-free. Some respondents said, “Education is expensive. It is free on TV only; in reality, it is not” (interview, male, 49, poor citizen, Gresik District, April 22, 2010). Some respondents even see education as the factor that causes poverty, as seen from the following statement, “At first, we owned things [we were not poor], but because we wanted our children to get an education, we sold our assets to cover the expenses [and thus we became poor]” (Poor Women’s FGD, 53, Gresik District, April 24, 2010).
Another change in the poverty indicator, for example, is in sample villages in East Java, having a motorcycle is no longer an important differentiating factor between welfare levels. Many of the poor have motorcycles now even though they got them with credits. The poor’s housing condition has improved as well. A dirt floor is no longer a significant differentiating characteristic because many of the poor’s houses have cemented or tile floor, especially the living room floor.

4.1.2 THE CAUSES OF POVERTY

Poverty is a multidimensional problem; therefore, the factors causing it are also multidimensional. In the sample villages, the factors causing poverty are varied, but no apparent differentiating factors exist among all sample villages. Poverty is generally caused by a combination of the following factors:

A. HAVING LIMITED LAND OR NO LAND AT ALL

In all sample areas which economically rely on agriculture, an important factor causing poverty is not having land or having limited land. This makes poor community members who do not have land and lack other skills become seasonal farm hands. Some of the quotations above stated that the income generated by farm hands is not enough to fulfil basic needs. Combined with the lack of other job opportunities outside the agricultural sector, the farm hands will likely stay poor.

B. LIMITED JOB OPPORTUNITIES

The limited number of job opportunities is a dominant factor in all sample areas causing the community members difficulty in freeing themselves from poverty. The poor who work as daily laborers (mostly farm hands) have no other job alternatives that pay better.

C. LOW EDUCATION LEVEL

The low formal education level — most only being elementary school graduates or dropouts — coupled with the lack of other skills besides agricultural skills, is one of the factors causing poverty in almost all sample areas. Statements, such as, “The people are unintelligent, uneducated, so it is difficult for them to find a livelihood” (Poor Women’s FGD, 40, Gresik District, April 23, 2010), or, “Low education level, so they can’t work in factories” (Poor Women’s FGD, 42, Gresik District, April 24, 2010), are depictions of the educational characteristics of the poor who face difficulty in finding any livelihood opportunity outside the agricultural sector.

D. LIMITED CAPITAL

In all sample areas, almost all the FGD participants and interviewees mentioned the lack of both fixed capital (rice fields, plantations, boats, etc.) and liquid capital (funds) as important factors that hamper the poor’s efforts to escape poverty.

Besides the general factors above, some sample villages have specific factors that cause poverty and/or make it difficult to overcome poverty. FGD participants in Ndoyong Village, Ngawi, mentioned high transportation costs as the result of poor road infrastructure as one of the major obstacles to their efforts to raise their income. The non–functional irrigation channels also hinder the agricultural productivity of this village. The intermediary traders’ domination in the trade system causes the farmers to receive lower prices for their produce. In addition, the hilly terrain and the lack of irrigation in Nagari Bukik Barisan, Solok, are the causes of the low agricultural productivity which makes the farmers’ income lower and in turn makes them poor.

4.2 FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE THE DYNAMICS OF COMMUNITY WELFARE

Except in Wetan and Ndoyong, all the sample villages show a decreasing trend in the number of poor people, either in a massive or small scale. This change is not permanent though, but dynamic by the development of factors that cause poverty. Some very important factors that influence the decrease in the number of poor people and/or the level of poverty in sample villages actually do not differ significantly. The following factors have a role in decreasing the level of poverty in the sample areas:
A. THE PRESENCE OF NEW JOB OPPORTUNITIES AND/OR EXPANSION OF EXISTING JOB OPPORTUNITIES

The following cases reflect the expanding job opportunities which enable the poor to participate:

1. Exploitation of a gold mine by the people of Kabupaten Bombana, Southeast Sulawesi. For the people around the mine, including in Kenanga and Melati, the presence of the gold mine did not only create job opportunities as miners, but also created other job opportunities, such as traders and ojek (motorcycle taxi) drivers. The booming of job opportunities happened in 2008 and 2009. In Kenanga, which is approximately 10 km away from the mining site, the gold mine was the sole source of alternative jobs aside from the agricultural jobs. According to a participant of the FGD for village representatives Bombana District (39, June 4, 2010), between 2007 and 2009, the number of poor people in Kenanga had decreased from 78 percent to 68 percent. At the moment, gold mining has decreased due to the government regulation that forbids community mining. Without the alternative jobs, there is a possibility that the poverty level will cease to decrease or even increase again.

2. The chance of becoming migrant workers in urban areas, either in cities close to or far from the village. In Kulon Village, for example, many people become construction workers in Surabaya. Besides becoming domestic migrant workers, some villagers also work abroad as migrant workers to obtain better income.

3. Regional segregation (pemekaran wilayah) which creates new economic growth centers (the Dharmasraya case). This gives a chance to the local people, including the poor, to obtain new jobs aside from getting better prices for their agricultural commodities.

4. The opening of new factories/plantations in the sample communities’ surroundings. Some (palm oil) plantation investors in Southeast Sulawesi opened
plantsations around the sample villages so that new job opportunities were available for the poor. Besides that, in Kulon Village, since 2004, many farm hands have earned extra income from moonlighting as scavengers thanks to the opening of some plants that receive garbage to be recycled in that area.

B. THE INCREASE IN AGRICULTURAL COMMODITY PRICES

The increase in the prices of plantation (rubber, palm oil, and cocoa) and fisheries commodities, especially in West Sumatra and Southeast Sulawesi, give a large contribution to the locals’ income increase. This specifically started in the second semester of 2009 following the commodities’ price drop due to the global financial crisis. At the time of the crisis, the price of rubber in Nagari Gantuang, West Sumatra, for example, was only Rp1,500/kg, but now it has reached Rp11,500/kg (Poor Women’s FGD, 33, Dharmasraya District, May 13, 2010). Similar thing happened to the price of pokea (a sea mussel) in Kamboja, Konawe Utara, Southeast Sulawesi. The price of pokea is now Rp7,000/can, quadruple the previous price of Rp1,500/can (Poor Women’s FGD, 45, Konawe Utara District, June 5, 2010).

C. INFRASTRUCTURAL IMPROVEMENTS

In some sample locations, there have been village road improvements. This condition has improved trade

---

### COMMUNITY MINE AND THE DECREASE IN POVERTY LEVELS IN SOUTHEAST SULAWESI

Cempaka Village is one of the nine villages in Ranomeeto Barat Sub-district, Konawe Selatan District. Cempaka is a transmigration village for people from Ciamis and Tasikmalaya. At the moment, Cempaka is one of the two most prosperous villages in this sub-district. The development in this village is mostly supported by development programs such as the ADD, PNPM, Raskin, BLT, livestock assistance, integrated village stimulating funds, and savings and loans assistance projects or revolving funds.

In economic activities, the people of Cempaka have tough trading spirits. The people’s economic condition improved further when in 2007 a gold mine was discovered in Bombana District. Many people from this village and other villages from almost all over Southeast Sulawesi came to this mine to try their luck as miners or as traders fulfilling the miners’ needs. The people of Cempaka became the pioneers for economic activities in the Bombana gold mine. They leave their homes in the middle of the night and sell their goods at the mines in the morning. Some use motorcycle while others use pick-up trucks. They generally do the trading together with their spouse. Between 2007 and 2010, the economic condition of the people of Cempaka Village had improved greatly.

As a result of the improvement in economy situation of Desa Cempaka, a new group of wealthy people has emerged in this village. The men’s FGD showed that in 2007, there were only two community groups, the middle class and poor groups, and now, there is the third group, the wealthy. This group consists of traders and civil servants (teachers) who have experienced an increase in profit/salary in the last three years. The group’s members started buying vehicles (motorcycle or car) to support their business.

Since 2009, the mining companies have started to discipline the traders, forcing traders from Cempaka Village to become peddlers who sell their goods in neighboring villages. The presence of PNPM, activities of which include creating agricultural business roads, bridges, deker (small bridges) and giving SPP (capital assistance for women), helps to sustain economic activities in Cempaka community; some even experience improvement in economy. Their mobility becomes easier and unobstructed. Besides making it easier for the community to go to the rice field, the agricultural roads also becomes shortcut to go to the sub-district office and Puskesmas. The gold mine increased their economy temporarily while the PNPM does it sustainably.
efficiency and eased access to the market. Transportation costs have decreased and the prices received by the farmers have increased. The improvement of welfare due to improvements in road infrastructure has been found in sample villages which previously had terrible roads. In Nagari Tanah Tinggi, West Sumatra, a respondent said, "... the factor that has influence on the change in community’s welfare level is transportation. With the transportation running smoothly, people can reduce the cost of transporting their produce from the rice field to the market" (Village Representatives’ FGD, 54, Agam District, May 11, 2010). The increase in the quality and quantity of the rural economic infrastructure is a direct result of the programs/projects/assistance provided by the government. Specifically for the rural road infrastructure, some programs that have given a large contribution are the PNPM, JPD (Village Axis Road) program, and stimulant funds.

D. INCREASE IN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY

The agricultural productivity of some sample villages has increased due to the construction of irrigation infrastructure and the success of agricultural counselling. For example, in Nagari Gantuang, Dharmasraya, West Sumatra, in 2007, the central government had built a technical irrigation network capable of irrigating 18,000 hectares of rice fields in West Sumatra and Jambi. The construction of these irrigation channels has increased the rice planting frequency from two harvests a year to three to four harvests a year. In Nagari Tanah Tinggi, Agam, a community representatives’ FGD participant (32, May 11, 2010) stated, "The improvement in welfare was supported by the change in planting patterns which happened in 1999 and by the smooth marketing. In the past, the people of Tanah Tinggi only planted carrots, but after the
training held by the Agriculture Office, they have started to plant tomatoes and corn."

Besides the positive factors, in some sample villages, there have been factors that negatively influence the welfare level. In Wetan Village, Gresik, the number of poor people has increased due to the pollution of the fish farms by the waste of factories that operate in the areas surrounding the village. The fishers’ catch has also decreased due to the policy of Gresik District government that bans the use of trawls, while in fact fishers from other districts still use trawls in the Gresik waters. Thus, the fishers from Wetan Village lose in the fish-catching competition and their income has drastically decreased.

For Ndoyong Village, Lumajang, one of the causes of the increasing number of poor people is the policy of agricultural mechanization in the nearby sugar plant. The possibility for the locals to become seasonal workers in the plant has vanished. The local work force has also been marginalized from work opportunities because the rice wholesalers bring their own workers, shunning the use of locals.

4.2.1 GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS/ASSISTANCE

In the last eight years, both the central and regional governments have implemented various development programs that have a significant role to play in reducing poverty, or at least preventing the poor from becoming poorer. These programs can be grouped into two categories by their targets: first, programs that are narrowly targeted such as Raskin, BLT, various credit assistance schemes, Gardu Taskin (Integrated Movements in Poverty Reduction), BOS, and Jamkesmas (Health Insurance for the Poor); and second, programs that are broadly targeted such as PNPM, JPD, ADD, stimulant funds, fertilizer subsidy, etc. All those programs are to help prepare the people and give a wider space to them to enhance their economic activities.

Every sample village has a high level of variance, not only in the number and type of programs but also in the effectiveness. Nagari Gantuang, Dharmasraya, for example, has received 16 kinds of programs within the duration of 2007–2010. On the contrary, Kenanga Village, Bombana, has just received 5 kinds of programs within the same duration. The difference in the number of programs received will of course give different impacts on the village people’s welfare improvement.

Besides the number and type of programs received, the effectiveness of similar program’s implementation in every village is also different. Generally, the difference in a program’s effectiveness is a result of the difference in the implementation of the program. Because this study does not aim to directly assess the efficacy or usefulness of programs, but only assessing them indirectly through informants’ perceptions, there is a large possibility of a biased judgment. Based upon this fact, the whole explanation on the effect of government programs in this study is not exclusive in nature.

As an example, the Raskin program in Nagari Gantuang is not very effective because the majority of the recipients are not poor. This happens either because the poor are not included in the target group or because they cannot afford the rice:

In Jorong Padang Bintungan, there has been no Raskin assistance even though the program was initiated six years ago. The Raskin rice is [supposed to be] for the poor while in fact the people who receive it are not the poor, but the middle class people and the rich. (Poor Men’s FGD, 63, Dharmasraya District, May 13, 2010)

I have never received Raskin rice because I don’t have enough money to buy it. Today, I only have Rp1,000, and even that was used by my child to buy snacks already. How can I afford Raskin rice? The wealthy people can buy lots of it, up to five sacks. (Interview, female, 38, poor citizen, Dharmasraya District, May 12, 2010)

One of the reasons for this is because the targeting mechanism is the domain of those who have powers or the village elites as described in the statement, “The head of the jorong decides who gets the assistance. We are not consulted” (Poor Men’s FGD 52, Dharmasraya District, May13, 2010). The Raskin program’s low effectiveness due to mistargeting also happened in Nagari Darek, Solok, as described in the following statement, “… There are still poor people who have not received assistance while some
people who don’t deserve it get it” (Poor People’s FGD, 50, Solok District, May 14, 2010).

The implementation of the Jamkesmas program in Nagari Gantuang has also failed to reach its goals. This is depicted by a respondent, “My child died because of it, Sir. My child was dying and they told me to deal with all sorts of bureaucracy. So, my child could not make it, Sir” (Poor Women’s FGD, 33, Dharmasraya District, May 13, 2010). The ineffective implementation of Jamkesmas also occurred in Desa Lor, Lumajang, which is seen from the statement, “Even though we use Jamkesmas, a family member is still asked to vouch for us. If not, they won’t help you” (Middle Class Men’s FGD, 42, April 27, 2010).

In some other sample villages, the two programs turned out to be highly effective. In Jorong Koto Tangah, Agam, for example, from the eight existing programs, the local people ranked Raskin as the most effective program in helping the poor. In Nagari Darek, Solok, and Kulon, Gresik, the free health programs, both Jamkesmas and the local government’s health program, were highly appreciated by the locals. The appreciation can be seen, among others, from the statement, “… free health insurance, so the people’s awareness to seek medical assistance is quite high compared to that of 2007. Now that the people are healthier, the harvests have also increased” (Community Representatives’ FGD, male, 35, Solok District, May 12, 2010).

The same thing goes for BLT. Some sample villages regard it as an effective program because it gives assistance in the form of cash so that the utilization is very flexible, in line with the needs of the recipient’s family. In Kidul Village, Lumajang, BLT is the most effective program compared to the others (Poor Women’s FGD, 40, April 26, 2010). But on the contrary, the middle class women’s FGD results in
Desa Lor, Lumajang, and the interview results with the head of Angrek Village, Konawe Selatan, for example, state that BLT is not effective. In general, the reason is because BLT’s benefits are short-lived (only to fulfil temporary consumptive needs) and do not help the people improve their economic condition.

Based upon that, the poor give different responses towards different poverty reduction programs because they are basically heterogeneous. The chronically and persistently poor probably need social assistance more, while the transient poor will perhaps respond better to empowerment programs and opportunity openings, but at the same time need protection from shocks.

The perception of the effectiveness of a certain program does not only differ between sample villages. Even in the same village, there are always different perceptions. In Kulon Village, Gresik, the poor men’s FGD came up with a conclusion that the three most useful programs for the people are (i) JPD, (ii) dam dredging, and (iii) Raskin, whereas the poor women’s FGD chose (i) Raskin, (ii) road construction, and (iii) BOS. The middle class women’s FGD voted for (i) fertilizer subsidy, (ii) JPD, and (iii) Raskin, while the middle class men’s FGD concurred on (i) Jamkesmas, (ii) PNPM, and (iii) ADD.

Once again, this phenomenon indicates that people’s judgment on the effectiveness of a certain program does not follow any pattern. The level of subjectivity is very prominent. This subjectivity level can occur because of personal experiences that may be very different from one to another, but may also be caused by the interests of the concerned community groups.

4.2.2 OTHER ACTIVITIES/VILLAGE PEOPLE’S INITIATIVES

Poverty is the problem of the entire nation. The country, *cui us quo* the government, in accordance to its mandate, does have an obligation to reduce poverty and becomes the main actor in poverty reduction. Nevertheless, government poverty reduction programs will become more optimal if they are supported by all community elements, private sector, NGOs, and other parties that care about poverty reduction.

In all sample villages, unfortunately, all poverty reduction programs, both the direct and indirect ones, only come from the central and regional governments. For the last three to eight years, there has never been any institution outside the government that takes part in reducing poverty. The non-poor local community does not have any institution purposely established to contribute to reducing poverty systematically.

However, from a different perspective, the non-poor local community has actually taken part in reducing poverty. This is at least reflected in the statement of a respondent that says that the haves have employed the poor as farm hands all this time. Without the works provided by the haves, the poor will get poorer (interview, male, 40, village head, Gresik District, April 23, 2010). Outside this employer–worker relationship, the community’s concern towards the poor is still present in some sample villages. In Desa Jejeg, Ngawi, for example, a poor citizen whose house was destroyed in a fire received a new house as the result of the other village citizens’ mutual cooperation.

Furthermore, the various community groups that exist in the village have no special agenda targeting to reduce poverty. There is only one village or two that have community groups having special activities that touch the life of the poor. In Tanah Tinggi, Agam, there is the Bamus group whose activities include raising social funds in order to, among others, give financial assistance to orphans.

The very minimal role of the local community in helping the poor is at least caused by two things. First, the presence of the poor in the village neighborhood is considered as a natural phenomenon and not a social problem that needs to be solved together. Based on this, generally, the local community only feels sympathy towards them without making any real effort to solve the problem. Second, almost all informants in the sample villages, both the government officials and the poor, share the same opinion that the effort to reduce poverty is the responsibility of the government. For them, the government’s responsibility is in the form of assistance programs.

The stance of the people is probably the result of the old paradigm of poverty reduction programs. Most of the poverty reduction programs in the past used to be
top down in nature without including the community’s participation. The government placed the community as the party that requires assistance and, on the other hand, it positioned itself as Santa Claus who gives charity. In other words, development programs that were aimed at the poor were more like a charity rather than an improvement to the capacity and/or independence of the poor. A development paradigm such as this in practice will create dependence which eventually makes the community suffer even more.

4.2.3 IMPACT OF PNPM ON POVERTY REDUCTION

To reconceptualise the top down development mechanism, the government implemented PNPM that is participatory in nature. Through this program, the community is given space to formulate development activities that suit its needs. Conceptually, this kind of development approach is expected to bring about greater positive impacts. In sample areas, in the broad sense, PNPM Rural is divided into two main programs, namely the physical infrastructure development program and capital assistance program in the form of SPP. Due to the different nature of the programs, the impact of both programs on poverty reduction also has different characters. In this context, development programs in general and assistance programs in particular, no matter how small, certainly benefit the community. The question is how much does PNPM affect poverty reduction.

A. RURAL INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

The open menu programs of PNPM Mandiri–Rural have so far been focused more on physical infrastructure developments. Consequently, in all sample areas, PNPM activities are usually centred on the building and/or rehabilitation of roads, bridges, PAUD buildings, TK buildings, and clean water facilities. Overall, these
infrastructure developments are certainly advantageous for the local community. Even some informants in many sample villages place PNPM as one of the three programs that greatly benefit the community.

The explanation in the previous part showed that the prime causes of poverty in sample areas are related to the scarce capital goods and financial capital, scarce job opportunities, and low-quality human resources. Related to this, Chapter VI (Villages’ Primary Needs and Their Fulfilment) also explains that the villagers’ primary needs in all sample locations generally revolve around the needs of capital, alternative job opportunities, skills training, free education, and excellent health services that are free. In this context, the various physical infrastructure developments of PNPM Rural are not the type of developments that can directly solve the root of the poverty problem and/or fulfil the villagers’ primary needs.

Referring to the facts above, it can be said that the role of PNPM Rural in reducing poverty is not central or dominant, but only peripheral. Direct indications regarding this matter are particularly reflected in FGD results and also in in-depth interviews with the poor group. When answering the question about the three kinds of programs that are most beneficial (effective) in improving the welfare of the poor group, the respondents’ answers were generally around Raskin program, BLT, and other programs that were quite diverse. In many sample villages, PNPM did not make one of the three programs that were considered to have positive impact on the improvement in the poor’s welfare. In some sample villages, for example in Kidul Village, Lumajang, the FGD participants even did not mention PNPM as a program that were running in their village because they did not know whether PNPM was eventually implemented or not. According to the FGD participants, they were once invited to formulate their village’s primary needs and to decide on people to manage them in the initial stage of the PNPM implementation, but they had never been informed about the realization of the program. In this context, an FGD participant (male, 36, April 26, 2010) said, “…The poor are needed in the program proposal stage only, while for the program’s realization, they have never been consulted again.” This shows that PNPM’s existence is unfamiliar to the local poor community, let alone its benefits for them.

For the village community in general and some of the poor in particular, the peripheral role of PNPM in improving the community’s welfare takes place during the process of physical infrastructure development. This is reflected in the following statement, “The poor community gets work opportunities even though they’re only incidental. The community in general enjoys the better road condition” (interview, male, 40, village head, Kabupaten Gresik, 23 April 2010). However, the poor actually expect to get alternative permanent jobs, not the temporary ones, such as in the PNPM.

In addition to providing temporary job opportunities, the road construction in rural areas by PNPM also has had an impact on the decrease in marketing transportation costs as reflected in the statement, “…In the past, the cost to carry produce from the farm to the road was around Rp5,000, plus the transport cost to the market for Rp3,000. Now, with only Rp2,500, the produce can reach the market” (Middle Class Men’s FGD, 59, Agam District, May 14 2010). For the poor who own arable land, this decrease in transportation cost can more or less improve their income. But, for the poor whose profession is only a farm hand, this decrease has had little effect on their income. Therefore, PNPM infrastructure development has limited direct impact on reducing the population of the poor. Out of the 90 FGDs and around 216 in-depth interviews, information regarding the role of PNPM in poverty reduction only revolves around this aspect.

**B. SPP PROGRAM**

In sample villages, there are generally three kinds of understanding concerning SPP. First, SPP is considered a mandatory program or a prerequisite for the village to obtain PNPM infrastructure project. Second, SPP repayment performance will determine whether in the following year the respective village will get an infrastructure project or not. Third, SPP is not a program exclusively designed for the poor. Based on these perspectives, SPP implementation emphasizes more on the smoothness of credit return rather than the empowerment aspect. As a result, this program is biased in favor of middle class and wealthy groups. These groups are the ones that have the potency to return the credit smoothly, unlike the poor group. Besides, in some villages, there is a tendency that
SPP implementation is only a formality to obtain PNPM physical project.

Based on these phenomena, the realities in the field show that SPP is not a program that aims at reducing poverty. In Ndoyong Village, Ngawi, for example, the number of villagers that became SPP recipients was 21 groups, each group having approximately 10 members. Even though the number of SPP recipients is quite big, it turns out that most of them do not belong to the poor community. In this matter, all respondents, both from the community and village officials, as well as program implementers stated that program recipients targeting was merely based on the smoothness of loan repayment aspect, and was not based on the aspect of economic empowerment of the poor. Statements such as “I just feel sorry for the poor. If they borrow money, but later cannot return it, they will be burdened with debts” (Poor Women’s FGD, 32, April 22, 2010) are indications of which community groups are actually the targets of SPP. The same thing was also stated by some village officials:

Those who are supposed to receive SPP are the poor, but in practice, it is difficult to do because if one is poor and we give him/her money and he/she does not have any business [open a stall or trade], it will surely be a burden for them to return the money. (Interview, female, 48, village official, Ngawi District, April 22, 2010)

In this village, anyone can borrow SPP as long as they have a business and have the ability to return the loan. So, there is no stipulation stating that only the poor can get the loan. That’s why, for SPP, we announce it in the village that whoever wants to get a loan is welcome. So, there is no appointment because if there is one and something goes wrong later on, we would be blamed. (Interview, male, 31, dusun head, Gresik District, April 24, 2010)

The design of the SPP program implementation that is not aimed at the poor is also reflected in the fact that in Jejeg Village, Ngawi, for example, the local UPK requires prospective borrowers to hand over a motorcycle’s BPKB (ownership certificate) as collateral for SPP. The requirement is obviously peculiar because even to fulfil the daily needs, the poor have difficulties, let alone owning a motorcycle. In other words, this requirement is only a way to prevent the poor from borrowing SPP because they are suspected of being unable to return the loan.

Another fact in Kidul Village, Lumajang, showed that out of the nine poor women’s FGD participants, only one participant was aware that there was an SPP program in their village. In Lor Village, Lumajang, the poor do not have the courage to borrow SPP because they fear that they cannot return it; they do not have fixed monthly income. Related to this, there are some issues that cause the ineffectiveness of SPP in providing capital for the poor community. First, SPP’s monthly instalment scheme does not suit the income pattern of the community who are generally farmers. Their work as farmers usually can only give them earnings at every harvest time, that is, once every four months. Second, the sub–district facilitators (FK) and village cadres (KPMD), who are supposed to raise awareness (conduct empowerment) so that the people will want to make use of the loan and then to guide them in running their business, have not done their job well. Third, it seems that the FK/KPMD who are expected to carry out the empowerment function do not have the required time and skills to guide the borrowers so that they can make use of the loan productively.

Based on that, all the while, SPP has appeared only as a program to give away funds to the community without provision of economic empowerment or training for the people who receive the loan. For the poor who happen to get the SPP loan, the impression is that the program has instead deceived them into becoming powerless and this surely is against the spirit of PNPM itself that is based on the empowerment aspect. SPP’s powerlessness, seen both from its entity and recipients, is depicted by the following quotations:

What happened was different from the motto. The motto is poverty reduction. Those who should be given the loan are the poor, but the evidence showed the opposite. The assistance is supposed to empower the poor, but the poor were not given the PNPM loan instead ... (Poor Men’s FGD, 46, Ngawi District, April 24, 2010)

In PNPM [SPP], we have to be good at lying, so we can get the assistance, meaning that when we are asked about our monthly income to see whether we can return the
loan or not, we have to lie by saying that our income is high, so we are considered able to pay the instalment (of SPP). In fact, our income is not high. This has been proven; there are many members [of SPP] who got a two–million–rupiah loan because they lied about their income. And I know that their income is not that much. As a result, this village had a non–performing loan up to 15 million rupiah so that it got sanctioned and cannot propose a physical development project. The sub–district head lent his hand in an effort to repay the loan. (Interview, male 24, middle class citizen, Konawe Utara District, June 7, 2010)

I got Rp500.000. I belonged to the vegetable trading group, but I did not think it was enough for capital. Therefore, I used it to buy rice. ... So, I quit selling vegetables. To return the loan, I looked for a side job as a log carrier. I was paid Rp40.000 per day. I used this money to pay for the PNPM instalment. (Interview, male, 48, RT head, Konawe Utara District, June 4, 2010)

I had to buy clothes and school equipment for the children. That’s why I was allowed to borrow money from SPP. (Poor Men’s FGD, 31, Dharmasraya District, May 12, 2010)

That’s the way it is. My wife became a member, but I was the one who managed the capital. My wife could not sell vegetables. (Interview, male, 48, RT head, Konawe Utara District, June 4, 2010)

Various explanations and quotations above state that SPP program’s implementation has been so far unable to reach its objective in supporting the economic activities of poor women and the poor group in general. Yet, the Technical Guidelines for the Operation (PTO) of PNPM Mandiri–Rural state that the visions as well as the objectives of the program—which clearly includes SPP—are to improve the welfare and job opportunities of the rural poor community. What makes it worse is that because the implementation of SPP is biased in favor of the middle class and wealthy groups and it puts forward the smooth flowing of instalment payments as the criteria of success of the program, the existence of the poor is in fact exploited by certain parties for their personal gains. This is proven by the following statement, “So, it happened that there was an individual from this village who borrowed money on behalf of several people up to around 10 million rupiah. Then, he ran away. The village office was forced to pay for his debt” (interview, male, 31, dusun head, Gresik District, April 24, 2010).
Unequal availability of public service facilities and access to them have been found in the study areas. Out of the three provinces that became the study areas, the Province of Southeast Sulawesi has relatively limited infrastructure, while the infrastructure in the Province of East Java and West Sumatra is adequate even though its quality still needs improvement. This chapter will discuss the access to and quality of various public services in the study areas that cover the infrastructure of market, road, education and health services, clean water, and population administration service.

5.1 ACCESS TO MARKET

Even though they are part of the rural areas, no sample villages can still be categorized as subsistent village. This means that the villagers surely need the market, both as a physical medium where trade occurs and as an institution that mediates exchange, to trade goods and services to fulfil needs. The communities in the sample villages generally do not experience major difficulties in accessing market in order to get their daily needs because there are market facilities which are relatively accessible in their surroundings. The difference is that there are some villages that are closer to the market and there are those that are more distant. Besides, communities that are closer to the city, either the sub-district or the district, have more advantages in that they are closer to the markets that are open daily from morning to afternoon. Communities who live in the villages that are relatively distant from city centers can only access the market on market days, which are once to thrice a week, with restricted operating hours.

The past three to eight years have shown that there has been tendency of easier access for the community to the existing markets. The impact of this change is that the community can gain advantage by saving up on transportation funds, getting higher sale price for their agricultural produce and lower buying price for consumer goods. Some comments from the community reflect this tendency:

*In the last three to eight years, access to the market is really easy because the road facilities are already good and this is supported by the peddlers who sell people’s daily needs.* (Interview, male, 46, community figure, Gresik, April 22, 2010)

*It’s close, 1 km. Two kilometers is the farthest, from Wawoluri, that is. We usually go on foot together or ride along a neighbor’s motorcycle that is going the same direction. We go to the market twice a week on market days, Thursday in the kelurahan, Tuesday in Wawoluri. Usually, I just shop for daily needs in the market because I sell my vegetables directly from the garden. My friends come to buy my vegetables and sell them at the market. This year, it’s getting better because there is another market on Saturday in Lembo Village. So, I can sell vegetables thrice a week at the garden.* (Interview, female,
28, middle class citizen, Konawe Utara District, June 6, 2010)

I use the car [cigak baruak]. It costs Rp4,000 to Rp6,000, depending on the driver. Some will accept Rp4,000, but there are others who ask for more up to Rp6,000. Now, I ride a motorcycle more often because I have bought one. (Interview, male, 44, very poor HH, Solok District, May 16, 2010)

The community has no problem with the access to the market because there are several markets that can be accessed by the community in this sub-district. There was even a PNPM implementation whose activity was to rehabilitate a market. It opens every market day. Looking at it, for the past three years, the access has in fact been getting better because there are markets that are expanded and organized. (Interview, male, 29, FK, Gresik District, April 21, 2010)

Based on the above comments, there are at least four factors that support easier access to the market. First, the numerous programs of road/bridge infrastructure developments, some of which are PNPM projects, help people from having to go through wet, rock-strewn, and potholed roads in order to reach the market. Second, the community has been able to own means of transportation such as motorcycle more easily (through the lenient requirement to motorcycle ownership credit), which has an effect on the much faster and smoother access to the market. Third, not only can the community access the market easily, but the “market” can also easily come to the community. This is seen from the increasing number of peddlers with motorcycles or cars that come more often to the villages to sell various kinds of consumer goods. Fourth, the number and frequency of market activities, as well as their quality, are increasing. In the past, markets in some villages were only open once a week. But in the past three to eight years, there have been some that open twice a week or more such as the cases in Agam District and Konawe Utara. Besides, the market buildings have been improved and there have even been developments of new markets as can be found in Konawe Selatan, Gresik, and Lumajang.

The improvement of community’s access to the market in some sample villages is attributed to the role of PNPM that has improved the quality of market buildings, eased access to the market, and smoothed market penetration to the community or even created a market in the village as described in the following:

a. The quality of market is improving because in some regions, PNPM has built new markets and renovation expands the existing markets as can be seen in study villages in Ngawi, Gresik, Konawe Utara, and Konawe Selatan.

b. Community’s access to the market to sell agricultural products or buy consumer goods is getting easier because PNPM has repaired the roads in the village and the roads included in agricultural business roads and constructed or fixed bridges connecting the village to the market. This condition occurs in almost all the study villages.

c. Market penetration is getting smoother because with the road and bridge repaired, intermediary traders and distributors of consumer goods can directly visit the village to buy the community’s agricultural and plantation products or distribute consumer goods directly to the stalls in the village.

d. PNPM through the SPP program has also contributed to encourage some villagers who accepted the loans to change or add professions, mostly, to become traders. This is because the “business” that one must own as a prerequisite to get SPP, is always understood as a new business, which is different from what they have been doing all this time, namely farming.

5.2 ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE AND TRANSPORTATION

The condition of road infrastructure in the study locations is generally quite good at present, especially in East Java and West Sumatra. In East Java, the village roads and even the dusun roads are generally already asphalted. In some villages, such as in Lor, the pathways have used paving blocks. Although not as good as the roads in East Java, the roads in West Sumatra are adequate. The main road in the villages and several strategic roads in the dusun are already asphalted or at least hardened. In Southeast Sulawesi, except in Konawe Selatan, many of the village and


dusun roads that have yet to be asphalted, are damaged, have only been hardened, and, in Bombana District, are only dirt roads. Almost all the 100-kilometer road that connects Kendari Town and Bombana District is full with big potholes. What an irony: Southeast Sulawesi, as the biggest producer of asphalt in Indonesia, has many roads that have yet to be asphalted.

In some sample areas, damaged inter-village roads were found and they seemed abandoned. In Lor, Lumajang; Melati, Bombana; and Kamboja, Konawe Utara, some of the inter-village connecting roads are slightly damaged and some are heavily damaged. According to informants, the reason why most inter-village roads are relatively neglected is because because both the regional governments (subdistrict, district and province) and the central government pay no attention to the roads that should be their responsibility in their respective regions. A number of road repair and improvement budgets that has come into the village, such as PNPM, JPD, ADD, etc. are usually allocated to fix or build roads that are strategic for the villagers, namely the village axis road. PNPM funds, according to informants at the sub-district level, can only be allocated to build roads within the village and cannot be used to construct inter-village roads. Another reason why the inter-village roads were neglected is because every village assumes that the road is not their responsibility and thus they feel reluctant to allocate their development budget for it.

For villages that have good road infrastructure, it does not necessarily mean that transportation is no longer an obstacle because in these villages, for example, in Lor, Lumajang; Wetan, Gresik; and Angrek, Konawe Selatan, there is no public transportation vehicle that passes the village. This condition heavily burdens the people who do not own any private vehicle, such as motorcycles or cars. However, this condition opens up job opportunity for
other community groups such as ojek and becak (pedicab) drivers, who provide alternative transportation facilities for people who do not own private means of transportation. However, compared to the condition three to eight years ago, the present condition of the roads as well as the transportation in the sample villages has made rapid progress. Most of the repairs of the roads within the villages in the sample villages occurred in the past three to eight years. PNPM’s contribution towards the improvement of road infrastructure is mainly related to the construction of inter-dusun roads and farm roads, some of which are also inter-dusun roads, while the main road in the village is usually constructed by using other source of funding, such as the JPD program. The following are comments from the informants regarding the changes:

... At present, there has just been a road repair because this road is included in the provincial roads that will still be widened. In this village, there is one village road and one farm road. The village road is mud-spattered when it’s raining. The farm road is still in good condition; the road was hardened once in 2000s. I forgot the year. The transportation that is usually used is car or ojek. Sometimes people go on foot. Ojek costs Rp5,000 to go to the market. To Kasipute, the ojek rent is Rp20,000 for a round trip. (Interview, male, 44, TPK, Bombana District, June 5, 2010)

The road in this village is heavily damaged. Since the segregation of Bombana District, the road in this village has never been repaired. The current village road is the result of a project when Bombana was still part of Kabupaten Buton (Interview, male, 51, very poor HH, Bombana District, June 5, 2010)

There are still dirt roads; for example, the road to Siaro–aro is still full of dirt. (Interview, male, 43, jorong head, Solok District, May 14, 2010)
In terms of roads, there have been many improvements. Now, they are quite satisfactory. What lacks is the means of transportation. The impact on the economy is the smooth selling of consumer goods. (Interview, male, 28, RT head, Konawe Utara District, June 5, 2010)

The roads to this market from the villages around Lor are already good, except for some roads, such as the road coming from Pronojiwo. The problem is that there is no public transportation from the village to the market because what is available is only ojek. The inter-kecamatan access is awful, both for the roads to Pronojiwo [heading to Malang or returning to Lumajang] and to Pasitian heading towards Lumajang. However, PNPM cannot build this road because it is a kabupaten road. (Interview, male, 42, FK, Lumajang District, April 22, 2010)

5.3 EDUCATION SERVICES

For the informants, the availability of basic education facilities from elementary schools (SD) to junior high schools (SMP) in sample villages is quite satisfactory. Compared to three to eight years ago, the condition has been improved. Of all the sample villages, there is only one village in Konawe Utara that does not have an SD in the village. Aside from that, all other villages even have more than one SD. SMP is usually not available in the villages but available only in the villages that are the centers of the sub-district. The senior high school (SMA) is even fewer in number. Usually, there is only one in every sub-district or there is even none, so students from the village have to go to the district city. Some villages, such as Angrek, Konawe Selatan, which are located quite far from the closest SMP, had made a breakthrough by building an SD-SMP Satu Atap (literally: one roof). The SD and SMP are integrated in the same school, so after the SD students graduate, they can go directly to the SMP in the same school.

For SD, there has been one since years ago, but SMP was just opened in 2008. It is still called SMP Satu Atap. Facilities for the SMP are still very much inadequate, both in terms of human resources [teachers] and computers. For SMA, up to the present time, there has been none in Cempaka. Students are very active to go to school. (Interview, female, 42, community figure, Konawe Selatan District, June 7, 2010)

Public facilities such as the road and bridge infrastructure, and means of transportation that have been getting better for the past three years have uplifted the enthusiasm of the students to attend school. (Interview, female, community figure, Dharmasraya District, May 14, 2010)

The education facilities from year to year have been improving because if it is seen from the physical condition of the school at present, it is much better and tidier. (Interview, male, 75, community figure, Agam District, May 16, 2010)

Today, it’s embarrassing to only graduate from SD. It will be difficult to get a job. It’s different from the past. Back then, an SD graduate can be an SD teacher. (Interview, male, 52, middle class citizen, Ngawi District, April 26, 2010)

In the past, Sir, children went to school on foot. Now, almost all go to school by motorcycle, wear clean clothes, and wear shoes that are not splattered by mud. ... It seems that children are more diligent to go to school. What’s most evident is actually the impact of the existence of TK. So, children do not have to start from scratch in SD. Yes ... the TK which was built by PNPM. (Interview, male, 58, community figure, Konawe Selatan District, June 5, 2010)
In villages categorized as poor with a relatively small number of population, there is usually only one SD or two such as in Tanah Tinggi, Agam District; Angrek, Konawe Selatan District; and Bukik Barisan, Solok District. Villages that are categorized as wealthy can have more than two or three schools for every education level. Desa Lor in Lumajang, for example, has three PAUD, six TK, and five SD, one of which is MIN (public Islamic elementary school) and one Christian SD. For the SMP level, there is one SMPK, one MTsN (public Islamic junior high school) and one MTsS (private Islamic junior high school). For the SMA level, there is one Christian SMA and SMA Mataram (public SMA). In addition, in this village, there have been several extension campuses of some universities, namely Unkris (Christian University) which stopped operating in 1999, Unida Malang which had operated until 2009, and STIT which is still operating up to today with lecture days on Saturdays and Sundays.

The people in villages that only have one or two schools usually send their children to the nearby schools, while the community members in villages that are relatively close to the urban areas which provide more alternatives of schools are inclined to send their children to schools in the cities considered to have better quality. This tendency appears to occur among the middle to upper class societies who have more aspiration towards the quality, aside from being able to support the extra education costs. An informant depicted,

> Seen from the physical development, the education facilities in this jorong are getting better, but the number of students is getting smaller because the community prefers sending their children to the cities than to their own villages. (Interview, female, 29, middle class citizen, Agam District, May 17, 2010)
On the other hand, the enrolment rate of school-age children is getting higher. Particularly for the basic education level, all informants acknowledged that there are almost no children who do not attend school. Male and female discrimination has already been discarded by the community. In addition to the higher awareness of the parents about better accessibility to schools, this high level of enrolment rate is also affected by the existence of the BOS program that helps ease the burden of parents. If there are village people who complain about the cost of education, this is usually related to the fulfilment of school supporting needs, such as uniforms, books, pocket money, and also transportation costs that are not covered by BOS. Ten out of the 18 study villages expressed that the BOS program that helps students from poor households with free tuition fee and school equipment [uniform, shoes, bag, stationery] assistance. … (Interview, male, 45, village head, Lumajang District, April 21, 2010)

The enrolment rates for the last three years, both for boys and girls, in SD and SMP have been improving due to the available facilities of SD and SMP buildings in Desa B [the name of the village is obscured], besides the support of the BOS program that helps students from poor households with free tuition fee and school equipment [uniform, shoes, bag, stationery] assistance. … (Interview, female, 29, middle class citizen, Solok District, May 16, 2010)

The direct role of PNPM in improving the access to and quality of education services is by assisting in the building/renovation of school buildings. However, as described above, PNPM projects that are related to education are all allocated for education development at the pre–SD level, such as PAUD and TK/RA. Only one village in Konawe Utara does not have an SD in its area and is planning to build one although it has not been realized yet. Such tendency is because the primary basic education facilities for the community, namely SD and SMP, are already available in the village or at least easily accessible. The indirect role of PNPM Rural is by creating a smoother access for students to school through road improvement. As depicted in the above quotations, community believes that the betterment of roads passing through the schools has increased students’ motivation to diligently go to school.

5.4 HEALTH SERVICES

The availability of health services in the study villages is considered quite adequate by the informants, except in some villages in Southeast Sulawesi. In Melati Village and Kenanga, Bombana District; and Mawar Village, Konawe Utara District, health facilities such as village maternity post (polindes) along with the midwife are not available. Community’s access to the Puskesmas is also difficult because of its relative distant location. In general, health facilities that are usually available in every village is polindes or nagari health center (puskesri), such as those in the nagari in West Sumatra, along with its midwife, while the Posyandu is available in every dusun. Some villages that are far from sub–district centers and Puskesmas, such as Kamboja Village, Konawe Utara, have a secondary Puskesmas (puswu). Only one Puskesmas is usually available for one sub–district and it is located in the village where the sub–district center is. In addition to the government’s health services, in developed villages, such as Lor, Cempaka, Darek, etc., there are usually non–government health services, such as the private practices of doctors and midwives (not the village midwives), pharmacies, and maternity homes.

Related to these health facilities, the people in almost half of the study villages have several complaints, both those that are related to infrastructure availability and health service quality. In the matter of infrastructure availability, not all villages have a permanent building for polindes, let alone Posyandu, as happening in Desa Kamboja and Mawar. Villages that do not own a polindes usually do not have midwives and so the community has to go to the Puskesmas. Villages that do not have a building for Posyandu activities usually hold the activities in a
resident’s house or in the village office. This means that villagers who live far from the village office have to travel a relatively great distance. However, in the past three years, some villages have received assistance to build Polindes, both from the regional budget and through program assistance such as PNPM. These villages are, among others, Angrek, Bukik Barisan, and Mawar.

In villages such as Bukik Barisan, Kamboja, Kenanga, and Melati, informants also complained about the unavailability of village/nagari midwife. Even if there is one, the midwife does not live in the village/nagari, so the villagers cannot get her service outside work hours. The community also felt that the services received by Jamkesmas card holders are not as good as those given to patients who pay cash. For example, giving low quality medicine, prioritizing other patients even though the Jamkesmas holders came first, or even rejecting patients from getting services at the hospital just like what happened to the residents of a village in Lumajang. “Those who use Jamkesmas are treated later. ... But [that happens] in the hospital. But not here in the Puskesmas” (interview, male, 35, RT head, Lumajang District, April 26, 2010).

Another complaint is the midwife’s reluctance to give free services outside her work hours. In some villages, there is even a tendency that during work hours, the midwife prefers to refer patients who come to her for medication to the Puskesmas, let alone outside work hours. According to the villagers, this tendency occurs because the midwife does not want to be bothered.

Even though some informants complained about some health service aspects, in general, they think that compared to three to eight years ago, the health service condition at present is relatively better. In the past three years, some study villages have received many health infrastructure construction as well as renovation assistance such as those received by Desa Angrek, Bukik Barisan, and Mawar. The following quotation depicts these changes:
If it’s about health, today the condition is better than it was a few years back because there is a midwife in each jorong; there is Jamkesmas for the poor community. Posyandu is held routinely once in two weeks. This health facility improvement has the same impact on men and women because the jorong’s midwife does not only provide maternity services, but also serves people who ask for fever medicine. (Interview, male, poor HH, Solok District, May 15, 2010)

What is actually not peculiar is the fact that although health services are already available throughout the villages, the existence of traditional healers still persists. Some community members often still ask for medicine from the traditional healer rather than from a midwife or a doctor. The reasons why there are still people who use the traditional healer’s services are not only because their awareness of and knowledge about modern health is limited, but also because of the cost factor. Even though there is no further information about who use the services of the traditional healer, the probability is that these people are the villagers who do not have a Jamkesmas card or those who have it but are hindered to access the available health facilities. An informant elaborated, “If it’s just a common illness, then I go to the traditional healer. If it’s a disease that cannot be cured by ‘the puffing’ of the traditional healer, then I go to the Puskesmas” (interview, male, 38, village secretary, Konawe District, June 6, 2010).

The direct contribution of PNPM in the health sector in the study areas is the construction of building facilities for the Polindes and Posyandu. Three out of the 18 sample villages have received projects related to health infrastructure. The indirect contribution of PNPM is the construction of roads that pass through health facilities and thus community’ access to health facilities can be smoother and faster.

5.5 CLEAN WATER FACILITIES

Community’s access to clean water is one of the complicated problems in the sample villages. This complication occurs because the problem is experienced only by a small number of people who live in a certain part of the villages that does not have any access to clean water, both the clean water that is provided by the government through the PDAM and the clean water that can be provided by the people themselves such as the traditional well. This access is not available sometimes because it cannot be reached by the PDAM pipe network and/or the area does not have any adequate water reserve or water that is fit to consume. In Lor Village for example, there are two or three RW that cannot be accessed by the PDAM pipe network, while not all the locals who tried to dig up a well could find water and so they had to share the neighbor’s well. Mawar Village in Konawe Utara, Melati Village in Bombana, Tanah Tinggi Village in Agam, and Jorong Taruko in Dharmasraya actually have an abundant water supply, but the water is of bad quality because it is salty and muddy and contains so much iron that it cannot be consumed. The following quotations provide descriptions about this problem:

Since many years ago clean water problem has remained an unresolved problem in this village. There is no clean water network in this village. The community can only count on the water from the wells in the people’s houses. It’s just that the well water tastes salty because this village is near the sea. (Interview, male, 55, community figure, Bombana District, June 6, 2010)

For clean water, the people here could hardly get it. All this time, we get water from the river or a well. (Interview, male, 33, poor HH, Bombana District, June 6, 2010)

[We get] quite good service. Only in some points, it is not, such as in Jorong X and Y. But, for Y, it has just got access and has got the Pamsimas project. (Interview, male, 60, wali nagari, Agam District, May 9, 2010)

The community members here use their own well at their own house, but the water is not really clean because the region is a swamp area. So, 65 percent of the water is not clean. (Interview, male, 30, very poor HH, Dharmasraya District, May 14, 2010)

There hasn’t been any clean water. In this house, there is no motorcycle. So, it’s difficult to go to get water from S [name of kelurahan, obscured] since it’s far away. (Interview, female, 48, community figure, Konawe Utara District, June 9, 2010)
The PDAM’s clean water has been felt inadequate since years ago. The PDAM pipes stopped at RT 7 and they are not continued to RT 8 because of the lack of funds/program from the top. Digging up a well for RT 7 does not seem effective because you have to dig a really deep well to find water. Today, what the community members in RT 8 have been doing is making a simple waterway to channel water from the closest water source from their area to fulfil the community’s needs for water. (Interview, male, RT head, Ngawi District, April 21, 2010)

Some villages that are at present experiencing lack of clean water had once received assistance in the form of clean water pipelining such as Mawar that received assistance from Yayasan Insani in 2001, but then the pipes were damaged. Angrek Village also received clean water assistance from CRD, but it did not work because the water source was salty. This village also once received water pumping assistance, but, according to some informants, the pumps were controlled by some of the village elite members. Some other villages have received assistance recently, such as Desa Tanah Tinggi which has received the Pamsimas program; the program is still going on at the time of the study. There are also villages that are making efforts to improve the clean water access through ADD, such as the case in Kidul, Lumajang.

Only Kamboja Village already received clean water pipelining assistance in 2004 when PNPM was still called PPK. Melati Village and Kenanga in Bombana had already made a proposal as well, but until now, they have not been granted the budget for its construction. Actually, some people from other villages that have a clean water supply problem have proposed to make clean water access improvement as PNPM’s priority. However, some of the proposals did not make it because of a number of reasons. First, based on the cost estimation, the proposed project required a lot of funds. For example, the project
budget proposed by one of the sample villages amounted to Rp700 million so it was rejected in the MAD. If this project had been passed, this one project alone would have taken up most of the PNPM budget in the respective sub-district. Second, the urgency of the clean water supply was only felt by some people in a certain part of the village, so during the process to determine the ranks of the proposed projects, they lost. This was what happened in Tanah Tinggi Village, Agam District.

5.6 Administration

The people in the sample villages can attend to the administration affairs quite easily and fast. The matters regarding administration that are often accessed by the community are those related to the arrangement of KTP (ID card), KK (family card), and notification letters (letters to certify poverty, buying and selling transactions, and death). The needs for good and fast administration services have been greatly felt by the community lately. This occurred as a result of several factors, such as the direct election process that required KTP ownership, government as well as private assistance that also required complete population administration papers, and the more stringent policy of population administration regulation in general. The following is the elaboration of an informant:

For KK, the villagers have only started to make one after the LPG tank [assistance] had started, more or less in the past one or two years. This is because in order to get the LPG tank, one must have a KK. That’s why, this encouraged people to make one. Aside from that, the administrative arrangement of KTP today also requires KK ownership as a prerequisite. This requirement had been more effectively applied since 2009. (Interview, male, RT head, Ngawi District, April 21, 2010)

Some of the administration affairs can be taken care of in the village office, while some others have to be dealt with in the sub-district office, such as the arrangement of KTP. Some affairs even have to be taken to the district office, such as the arrangement of KK. If only for the administration services, the expense that is borne by the community is only around Rp5,000–Rp10,000. However, if it includes “cigarette money” and transportation costs, especially if they have to take care of the matter at the district office, the people living far from the capital of the district, such as Tanah Tinggi in Agam, Lor in Lumajang, or Angrek in Konawe Selatan, have to spend more than Rp100,000. Nevertheless, in general most informants admitted that compared to three to eight years ago, the present condition is much better in the sense that the process is faster now. There are still a number of problems though such as the presence of officials who asked for “cigarette money”, lack of discipline in terms of time among the officials, and for KK, the requirement to deal with the matter at the distant district office. The following statements from the informants from various villages depict their opinions:

It’s easy because there is a high commitment from the village officials to provide services to the maximum quality. Now, making a KTP is easy without having to wait long. If the community wants to make a KTP, they can ask a village official to take care of it without giving any cigarette money. (Interview, female, 58, poor HH, Gresik District, April 26, 2010)

Arrangement of population administration is handled quickly. Only when the official is not present the arrangement takes up some time. But now, for the arrangement of KTP, you have to go to the kabupaten and this is burdensome because it is far. (Interview, male, 42, FK, Lumajang District, April 22, 2010)

I think that administration matters are not difficult anymore because people just need to go to the village head’s house and take care of the papers and they can be finished on the very same day. (Interview, female, 54, poor HH, Konawe Selatan District, June 6, 2010)

It’s getting easier now because you used to have to go to Unaha [the capital of Konawe District]. After the district was segregated, it is closer now, that is, in Wanggudu. Making a KTP costs around Rp30,000–Rp50,000. The cost for KK arrangement is also the same. In the village and sub-district, you give only as much as you wish. If you don’t give any, it’s okay. (Interview, male, 28, RT head, Konawe Utara District, June 5, 2010)
The nagari administration has made improvements such as the services that are getting better. In addition, the officials' working hours have also started to follow the schedule. Three years ago, there were still nagari administration officials who asked for “cigarette money” to the people for any service. (Interview, male, 34, community figure, Agam District, May 15, 2010)

In the village, the administration process is simple, but in the kecamatan, such as when taking care of a KTP, it is difficult. It takes up a lot of time. (Interview, male, 40, poor HH, Ngawi District, April 25, 2010)

Well, service of this kind [administration arrangement in the village requiring cigarette money] remains the same, he he he. (Interview, male, 49, poor HH, Gresik District, April 26, 2010)

Improved administration services in various study villages are, among others, attributable to better equipped office, better skilled village/nagari officials, and the higher level of the officials’ welfare. A summary of an interesting comment from a community figure in Lumajang depicts this matter:

Improvement of administration services at the village level can be felt by all the village people without exception for the last eight years. This change is caused by several factors, namely (1) tools/equipment that are becoming more adequate with a computerized system; (2) officials that are more competent; previously, village officials were appointed, but now they go through a selection process; (3) the district officials giving training on village administration. This condition speeds up all villagers’ administration affairs. For example, in the past, it took days to get a KTP finished, but now it can be finished in
Besides the factors mentioned by the informant above, there is also factor of the officials’ salary raise, such as what happened in Tanah Tinggi, Kabupaten Agam. According to its wali nagari, originally, the nagari officials were paid Rp300,000–Rp500,000 a month. At present, their salary is on average more than Rp700,000 a month so that their commitment to their job and their discipline in terms of time are improving.

There is a little change in the services, but it is hard to make a self-judgement at the moment because the present administration has just been working for less than a month, but from the administration side, there has been an effort to improve services through the improvement of the nagari officials’ welfare. There has been a salary increase of around 50 percent from Rp500,000 to Rp750,000. (Interview, male, 60, wali nagari, Agam District, May 9, 2010)

However, the condition as explained by the informants above does not apply in all villages. Villages whose office has been equipped by computers are only found in East Java and West Sumatra. In Southeast Sulawesi, there are a number of sample villages that do not even have an office such as in Melati, Bombana, and thus administration affairs are done at the village head’s house. Most village heads in this province run government activities from their house despite having a village office. In most of the villages, the village administration is run only by the village head. The other village officials only play a complementary role in the structure and almost lack any function.

The same thing also happened to the other factors such as competency, training, and salary raise. Not all districts apply the same policy for their village administrations. This seems to be affected by the commitment and capacity of the district government in providing support for their village administrations. This happens because some aspects such as salary and training depend a lot on the policy and budgeting of the regional government.

If ranked, in general, East Java is the region that has the best village administration, followed by the nagari administration in West Sumatra and finally the village administration in Southeast Sulawesi. The relatively good village administration in East Java is very much related to the big budget commitment of the regional government to encourage improvement in the village administration by increasing the salary of the village officials and by giving honorarium to officials under the dusun administration (RW and RT heads). In addition, most village administrations in Java will also get extra income from the tanah lungguh which can be quite a lot. In Lor Village, for example, the village head receives 8–hectare tanah lungguh, the village secretary 6 hectares, and the village affairs heads and the dusun heads 4 hectares each. Even though not all villages in Java have tanah lungguh as wide as the tanah lungguh in this village, the existence of extra incentive for village officials in the Java region in general, among others, explains why the election of village heads in the region is very competitive.

Outside Java, the position of a village head is not fought over as fiercely as it is in Java. Some village heads interviewed admitted that they became a village head after they were forced to. There is also a village head who can no longer provide for his family maximally because his monthly salary as a village head is less than Rp600,000 and occasionally he does not receive the salary that he deserves. In Mawar, the salary of village officials is only around Rp200,000–Rp300,000 for two/three months. This happens because of the big number of village officials. An informant described that almost all families in the village had a family member who became a village official. The discrepancy in institutional capacities among village administrations explain why the administration services outside Java is not as maximal as those in Java. Therefore, the above quotations regarding the community’s satisfaction over the village administration’s services must be placed within the framework of this difference in capacity. The satisfaction as expressed by the informants in Java region has different nuances in quality from those of the satisfaction expressed by communities outside Java.
This part discusses various village primary needs and their fulfilment. The assumption of community empowerment program, such as PNPM, is that rural community empowerment can be seen when the villagers are able to formulate their needs and work independently to fulfil them, both individually and collectively. On the contrary, the inability of rural community to formulate their primary needs and independently fulfil them can be seen as evidence that the empowerment undertaken by several programs that claim to conduct “empowerment” has not been successful. Several proofs described above, and more specifically in this chapter, show that the empowerment has not succeeded. The last part of this chapter will give further explanation about the failure of the empowerment.

6.1 PRIORITIES OF VILLAGE NEEDS

In general, the community in every village has almost similar primary needs: most of the needs emerged in four or more villages. Only very few needs that emerged in one/certain village. The order of needs ranging from the most to the least needed by the village is capital, alternative job opportunities, skills training, free education, and free and excellent health services (for a more complete list on the order of needs based on their frequency of emergence, see Appendix 2).

Both the poor and middle class groups equally need capital assistance as reflected in the results of FGD with poor and middle class communities. The difference is that the middle class group understands that capital assistance has an interest and must be repaid. The kind of capital assistance that they seek is the one with low interest and flexible repayment. On the contrary, the poor citizens often perceive capital assistance as something that they do not have to return. It is thus understandable if there were only few poor citizens that tried to access capital credit assistance offered by programs, such as Savings and Loan–Urban Economic Unit (UEP–SP) and SPP–PNPM, because the capital must be returned along with the interest. Therefore, when they ask for capital assistance, what they mean is capital assistance that they do not have to return. An informant said:

"What we need is real assistance. Not the one that requires us to borrow the money. If it is assistance, why do we have to borrow the money? Ndadak ngembalikan [Suddenly we have to return it]. The women said, “Walah nek ono wong mbantu, sing gak nyaur” [If there is assistance, why not assistance that does not need to be returned]. ... If we borrow money, some of the money must be spent on food. In the end, we cannot pay it back. (Interview, female, 57, Ngawi District, April 26, 2010)"

The need for this kind of capital assistance emerges for fear of being unable to pay it back. This fear — or lack of courage — to take this kind of risk is natural, not only in Indonesia, but also in Southeast Asia in general, as shown by James C. Scott in his classic book The Moral Economy of
Peasant (1977). The results of an FGD stated, “Because of lack of capital and fear of applying for a credit. I don’t have the courage to apply for a loan for fear of losses” (Middle Class Women’s FGD, 26, Bombana District, June 6, 2010).

Generally, the poor community wants capital because they want to start a business. However, not all poor people know what kind of business they will open once they get the capital. Most of them see business as something similar to what they see in their surroundings, something that is different from their work as a farmer, namely petty trading. Most of the people in the sample villages such as people in Mawar, Angrek, and Lor who had become SPP borrowers used their loan to open a kiosk/stall that sold daily needs, to open a stall near school that sold snacks for children, or to become a peddler. There were not many SPP borrowers, especially the poor ones, who used their funds to meet agricultural capital needs. This happened, among others, because they were not sure that investing in the agricultural sector would give more results than usual so that they could pay the SPP funds back. Besides, the once a month repayment mechanism of the SPP loan in all villages is burdensome to the farmers. Agricultural businesses are not monthly in nature, but seasonal. How can they pay every month if their yield is seasonal? Therefore, several village people suggested that the loan scheme be made seasonal, instead of monthly, leading them to have an increased aspiration to have a more decent job. Some other village people who do not have any other options but the agriculture sector need stable prices of agricultural products. According to them, the prices of agricultural products have never benefitted the farmers. When the harvest season comes, the prices of almost all agricultural products plummet and the government does nothing to help then. In fact, they become heavily burdened day by day with the rising expenses for seeds, fertilizer, and product processing.
Alternative job forms that were revealed by the informants tended to refer to steady jobs that gave regular fixed income. What they imagined was a job in a factory or in a plantation. Aside from that, they also considered side jobs (not permanent) that could give extra income to their main job as a farmer, such as breeding livestock or trading.

The next primary need is skills training. This need is apparently related to the high degree of community’s aspiration to alternative jobs. Alternative side jobs such as breeding livestock, selling homemade products, and others are activities that are probably unfamiliar to them, so they need certain skills training. The kinds of training that were mostly mentioned by FGD participants were, among others, sewing, baking, beauty and make up, handicraft, agriculture (for special plants), and animal husbandry skills.

These top three primary needs actually show quite a solid flow of desire to leave the current unfavourable working condition. To start a new job, what they really need is capital as well as knowledge and skills.

Besides these three things, two other needs with a high frequency of emergence are the needs for good and free education and health services. The high aspiration for both of these needs arises because in reality the government’s jargon regarding free education and health services has not been felt by the poor community. In relation with basic education, the village people still have to bear quite some amount of money for educational support needs, such as uniforms, books, transportation costs, and pocket money. For the higher education levels, all needs must be borne by each individual family.

Some village people realize that it is impossible for the government to fulfil all their educational needs. Such needs as pocket money must surely be the responsibility of the parents. However, there are actually costs that people do not have to pay if the government improves the educational system. For example, in almost every region, whenever the (national) final exam is approaching, there are additional learning activities from teachers to help students to prepare for the exam. For that, parents must spend a lot of money. If the learning–teaching process ran effectively and efficiently, this kind of activity would not be needed and parents do not have to spend more money.

Related to the health aspect, not all villagers have received Jamkesmas and Regional Health Insurance for the Poor (Jamkesda) cards. Apart from that, especially for Jamkesmas/Jamkesda cardholders, the service that they receive is occasionally unsatisfactory. For example, they are treated as second-class patients who are served after patients who pay for the service, given medicine which, according to the people, is not of good quality, and even rejected for treatment at the hospital.

Besides these five common needs, there are other needs that only few villages mentioned, such as the needs for sembako (nine staple foods) assistance, irrigation, road, agricultural counselling, agricultural tools assistance, and seed assistance. Aside from these relatively common needs in each village, there are also needs that are specific to and contextual in certain villages. At least, there are three villages that have specific needs. The specific need of Kamboja Village, Konawe Utara, is to have electricity during day time. This need arises because in this village, electricity is only available for six hours at night. Outside this period of time, if they need electricity, they have to use a genset (electricity generator) and it is only owned by the rich people in the village. The people of Angrek Village, Konawe Selatan, specifically need water pumps to flow water to their rice fields. They need the water pumps because most of the rice fields are rain-fed rice fields. Although the village is passed by two major rivers, during the dry season, the river water is used up by the village located at the higher ground. Therefore, the alternative solution to water the rice fields is by pumping water from the many wells that are located in their rice fields. The people of Wetan Village in Gresik District need a local government policy that prohibits fishers from using trawl nets. The use of trawl nets is unfavourable for traditional fishers because the trawl users can catch all fish and left the traditional fishers with nothing to catch. They need the policy because the local government of Lamongan District, their neighboring distric, has forbidden the use of trawl in their area, making the trawl users move their operations to the waters around Wetan Village.
In several study areas, there had been efforts to create synergy, and even to integrate, between needs formulation by PNPM deliberation and Musrenbangdes. This synergic effort, for instance, is conducted by implementing Musrenbangdes after PNPM deliberation. Various development aspirations from the people whose proposals are not qualified to become PNPM proposal priority will later on be discussed as people’s proposals for Musrenbangdes. Musrenbangdes is conducted according to its mechanism with discussion attended by village/nagari officers (executives, legislatives, and LPM) and community figures. This kind of model is found in Dharmasraya, West Sumatra. In Agam District, the development planning deliberation is conducted during a deliberation that explores community aspiration in PNPM. Several aspirations of people that are not included in PNPM proposal priority will automatically become the result of Musrenbang. In this kind of case, Musrenbang is no longer held, which means PNPM deliberation is already considered as the vehicle of nagari Musrenbang.

Aside from the two regions, the effort to integrate both development planning models actually occurred in other regions, such as in Ngawi District. In Ndooyong Village, the effort to integrate both models had been done but was blocked at Musrenbang stage that required it to be discussed up to sub-district level. According to village officers, sub-district government didn’t acknowledge PNPM deliberation as Musrenbangdes so they still had to conduct Musrenbang separately. However, in their Village Medium Term Development Plan (RPJMDes), village government still put the result of PNPM deliberation in the village as part of the result of Musrenbangdes.

6.2 Fulfilment of Primary Needs

The needs discussed above in general have never been formulated together at the village/nagari level. Before the PNPM–Rural (or PPK for areas that received it) existed, the formulation of village/nagari needs was usually conducted in a technocratic way, i.e., formulated within a limited elite circle consisting of village officials, BPD, and several community figures. The formulation of needs was usually conducted in the Musrenbangdes/nagari. However, in several regions, such as the nagari in Sumatra Barat, there have been efforts to create a synergy between the need formulation model in Musrenbang and the participatory need formulation model implemented by PNPM.

The various village needs discussed above has generally been fulfilled or nearly fulfilled. The need for fund, for instance, had been realized for several villages through program scheme such as SPP–PNPM, UEP–SP, Gardu Taskin, Female Cooperative (Kopwan) in East Java, Baitul Maal wa Tamwil (BMT) in West Sumatra, Cooperative Work Group (KUBE) and Bantesa (funding credit loan from the Sintesa NGO) in Southeast Sulawesi. For new alternative job opportunities, the need is fulfilled through intensive program mechanism that usually only available in limited time just like PNPM projects. Aside from that, residents acknowledged that there were no programs or assistance that aimed to enable people to access alternative jobs. The need for skills training is the least fulfilled need. In research location, there was only one jorong, Jorong Taruko in Dharmasraya District where people received skills training, i.e. baking skill.

Other basic needs such as education and health have generally been fulfilled in all villages. However the people have not felt satisfied because there are still many burdens that they have to bear in order to fully fulfil the needs. Some of the specific needs of each village had been fulfilled, while others had not. The need for water pumps in Angrek, for example, had been given through government assistance. However, according to the people, the water pumps are mostly controlled by the village elites so that the general community have not felt the benefits. The need of Wetan Village, Gresik, for a policy that forbids the use of trawl net has been discussed with the local government of Gresik and the government has promised
to act on it. However, until now, the people still find the use of trawl net in their sea. Besides that, the specific need that has not been fulfilled is electricity need during the day in Kamboja. The people of Kamboja had already submitted the request to the authority, which is PLN in this case. However, due to limited power supply, up until now they can only enjoy six hours of electricity every night.

As described above, there are many parties involved in the fulfilment of village primary needs. According to most villagers, the fulfilment of village primary needs is first and for most the responsibility of the government, followed by the individual, and lastly the community. Most villagers considered that the fulfilment of needs related to individual such as jobs, basic needs and others is the responsibility of individual, then the government, and finally the third party (community, LSM, the rich people, etc.)

6.2.1 ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT

The role of government is very important in fulfilling the needs of community. In general, there are two models of government role, through routine budget and through program. The first model is by providing ADD with 30 percent provision for village operational and 70 percent for community empowerment. However, in study location, very few programs fulfilling the above village primary needs came from ADD budget. In fact, in many villages, the people questioned the use of ADD because the amount received and the purpose of the budget had never been announced.

In the second model, government provides programs, both programs with targeted recipients such as BLT, PKH (Family Hope Program), Raskin, and Jamkesmas, and general programs such as PNPM, BOS, JPD, and other implemented
programs. Village primary needs are apparently fulfilled more through this second mechanism. In the last three to eight years, all villages in study area have received plenty of programs (for more detailed information about received programs by the community, see Appendix 3).

6.2.2 ROLE OF THE COMMUNITY

Community role means the efforts that have been done individually or collectively, but not organized through certain institution, to help fulfil village needs. The role of individual is highly related to his/her capacity, especially in terms of economy. According to the informants, the rich people in the village have big role in giving assistances, both in the form of charity such as donation and in the form of professional assistance such as giving works to the poor. Most of them also give loans but, as in the case of Ngawi, they set very high interest rates. Instead of helping people who need capital, they are in fact conducting loan sharks practices.

The collective role of the people is by working together or commonly known as gotong royong, mutual cooperation in doing something for village interest or for the interest of certain people in the village. In Wetan Village, for instance, recently people worked together to build a house for the member of their community whose house was burnt down by fire. Both individual and collective roles of the people are usually not planned and sporadic. Related to various main needs elaborated above, the community role is only in to fulfil the needs of alternative jobs and capital.

6.2.3 ROLE OF SOCIAL GROUPS

There are many social groups of diverse nature in study villages. Some groups are very specific, while others can be found in almost all villages (for more detailed information on social groups in every villages, see Appendix 4). There are three groups that are very common and can be found in all villages: Qur’an recitation group, farmer group, and PKK. Besides, there are also groups that serve as a vehicle for certain assistance recipients, such as SPP female groups, Bantesa, etc. More specific groups are usually connected to local culture. For example, in West Sumatera, there are clan groups (or buhua arek) that act as gathering vehicle for villagers that come from the same clan. Other than that, there is Bundo Kanduang, an instrument of nagari government structure that consists of female leaders. In Southeast Sulawesi, there is Mepotaka group, which is a kind of arisan (regular social gathering for rolling saving) group that consists of only male members. There is an arisan group for various segments, including those that come from the same descendant (trah, Javanese) in East Java.

Generally, the informants put recitation group as the most important group to them. This might be a reflection of religious community. However, if connected to village primary needs, the most important social group is farmer group because farmer group is the only one that facilitates villagers to get various agricultural needs such as fertilizer, seed, and pesticide assistances. Yet, the presence of farmer group in several villages is only to fulfil the requirement to obtain the above mentioned assistance. There are no activities conducted together by them on a regular basis. Besides that, the informants acknowledged that they were extremely assisted by their membership in arisan group because in this group members can borrow some money, aside from the rolling savings. In certain regions, there are religious groups that not only conduct religious activities but also give economic support to their members. There is a recitation group in Lor that includes arisan and saving loan as its components. According to FGD participants, the fund that can be borrowed by members of this group was quite big, up to Rp5 millions. Unfortunately, this group has stopped lending capital for the last two years.

Group that was formed as the vehicle for borrowers of a program usually functions only to consolidate borrowers so that they can receive information easily, especially regarding the payment of instalment. This study does not find SPP borrowers’ groups that conduct productive activity together. The study also does not find the case where group was designed for joint responsibility if there is a member that cannot pay the instalment. In the case of arrears, village government will pay for it, as in the case of Wetan, Gresik, and a village in Moramo Sub-district, Konawe Selatan. Village officials are willing to pay for it because they understand that if their SPP repayment is stalled, the village will not receive physical programs.
6.2.4 ROLE OF PNPM

In fulfilling the main needs of the village, PNPM’s role is very limited. As described in the beginning of this report, most of PNPM projects in study area are related to infrastructure development, while village primary needs according to the people are not infrastructure, but capital, job alternatives, skill training, scholarship and quality health service. All village primary needs are not directly addressed by PNPM activities in every village. Indirectly, PNPM infrastructure program did create job opportunities for some poor community, even with limited workdays and payment. SPP Program had also given several people access to capital. However, the poor people have not become the main target in the infrastructure and SPP programs. It happened because in the infrastructure program, the workers in study area were not specifically recruited from the poor community and their payment was deducted in most regions due to voluntary contribution requirement. Moreover, in SPP Program, most of the recipients were not poor people because the program executors were afraid that if SPP had been given to the poor, they would not have been able to return the money.

The tendency to allocate PNPM projects to fulfil infrastructure needs is universal. There are no discrepancies found between villages that have received the program for a long time and villages that are new to the program, or between advanced and poor villages. It means that the community in villages that have already received PNPM Rural (PPK) since 2002 or have better welfare level has the same aspiration as the community that has just received the program in 2009 or has worse welfare level. However, logically, the villages that have already received the program since 2002, or K1 villages, are supposedly able to divert their development focus from infrastructure
after several years of receiving this program. Furthermore, K1 category villages in this study are mostly villages with high level of welfare. Main infrastructure availability in villages with high level of welfare is usually quite sufficient. So what encourages villages that have received PNPM for a long time and/or have high level of welfare to keep allocating PNPM to infrastructure sector?

In general, the tendency towards infrastructure and the similarity between old and new regions that just received PNPM can be explained by several things related to the objective condition of study villages as followed:

A. THE LACK OF VILLAGE INFRASTRUCTURE

Based on field observation, especially in poor villages outside Java, the main infrastructure condition (roads and irrigation) before PNPM–Rural arrives was still quite poor. In fact, until now, in several villages such as in Bombana District and Konawe Utara in Southeast Sulawesi, the main road or inter–hamlet road is still not paved or heavily damaged. The same thing happens to irrigation ducts. Most of the irrigations are still primer, and rarely secondary, or even tertiary. When PNPM arrived, the community could easily achieve an agreement over its allocation to this infrastructure project. A respondent in Bombana District, Sulawesi Tenggara, pointedly stated, “It fits perfectly. Do not terminate PNPM please. Every development activity carried out in this village, we owe it all to PNPM” (FGD Perempuan Menengah, 26, Bombana District, June 6, 2010).

B. PNPM IS CONSIDERED A PROGRAM FOR GENERAL COMMUNITY

The community feel that PNPM–Rural is intended for the villagers in general without looking at their welfare status. This program is different from other programs such as BLT, PKH, Raskin, and others that are specifically designed for poor people. From 72 FGD conducted with poor community and middle/rich community, most of them stated that the target of this program was the village community in general. Few of them thought that the program was intended to unemployed labours or sellers with no capital. Because this program is meant for all, it must be allocated to obtain something that can be beneficial for all segments in the community and that is village main infrastructure. In several study villages, PNPM infrastructure project did not hire workers that were specifically recruited from the poor but from any willing villagers. But since the wage was the same and was usually according to or under the standard wage of labours in local villages, there were almost no non–poor people who were willing to participate. Some of the following quotations illustrated the community’ opinion

For PNPM program, it is already right on target. All community enjoy it, not only poor people. (Poor Men’s FGD, 50, Agam District, May 13, 2010)

The whole community, but they should ask whether people want to borrow the fund [SPP] or not. (Middle Class Women’s FGD, 50, Bombana District, June 6, 2010)

All segments of community. (Middle Class Men’s FGD, 30, Konawe Utara District, June 5, 2010)

In PNPM, there is Jalan Usaha Tani (farm roads), so everyone can take benefit from it. (Poor Men’s FGD, 40, Konawe Utara District, June 4, 2010)

The most effective is PNPM because in broader sense it can be felt by the community, the poor get jobs and payment even though incidental, and the community in general enjoy the good improvement of the road. (Interview, male, 40, village head, Gresik District, April 22, 2010)

In my opinion, in terms of regulation, PNPM is the best. PNPM is a direct program. From the beginning, its purpose is to cover all community. Other programs are only limited to certain groups. (Interview, male, 45, village head, Lumajang District, 22 April 22, 2010)

C. TO AVOID CONFLICTS CAUSED BY TARGETED PROGRAMS (LIKE BLT, RASKIN, ETC.)

Before PNPM became a mass program, the community had received programs in which the recipients were segmented, especially to the poor, such as BLT, Askeskin (now Jamkesmas), and Raskin. In most of the study areas, these programs had generated problems, such as jealousy or even conflict between community groups. These problems occurred mostly due to the household targeting
mechanism that was considered unsatisfactory where people that were deemed to have the right for assistance did not receive it while those who were deemed ineligible actually received it. When PNPM arrived and did not explicitly targeted the poor group (community targeting), the village community was inclined to guide it towards something that can be enjoyed by all community in order to avoid protests from those who did not receive it. The flowing citations give the illustration of the tendency:

In my village, from the time PNPM arrived in, we decided in every village deliberation that it must be used in physical development, road, and bridges. (Interview, male, 45, village head, Lumajang District, April 22, 2010)

For data census, we let RT do it. There was someone from the sub–district that did the survey, but it wasn’t relevant. The data was not compiled. Many people protested. The surveyor ran way. RT was disregarded. (Middle Class Men’s FGD, 35, Gresik District, April 24, 2010)

Sometimes the survey was conducted based on kinships. (Middle Class Men’s FGD, 30, Gresik District, April 24, 2010)

There was a conflict in the village hall due to social jealousy in the disproportion of PKH reception. At that time, one of the citizens threw a chair upwards that broke that roof [ceilings; pointing the mentioned roof]. (Poor Men’s FGD, 37, Gresik District, April 23, 2010)

D. THE BIAS OF THE ELITE GROUP AND NON POOR GROUP

The role of elite group is very important in determining program types in the village. It can be seen from the proposed program type and FGD result about who has the most influence in decision–making process in the village. However, not all of the elite group involvement can be categorized as elite capture because in several regions, the participation of elite group is actually direly needed to dampen conflict among community groups resulted from highly different aspirations concerning development project proposal. The elite group mainly consists of officers at village, hamlet, and even RT level, and community leaders. In the study areas, their significant role can be found in several stages of the program, which are:

1. selection process of facilitators: in one of the provinces, there is an information from a sub–district facilitator that most of the sub–district facilitators in that province came from the same region as the chief of provincial satker (government agencies’ work unit);
2. socialization activities: in all regions, those who were invited to receive the early socialization of the program were the village elites, such as village officers cum BPD and community leaders, all were appointed by the head of the village;
3. proposal selection process at village/nagari level: in several nagaris in West Sumatera, nine village elites have huge role in deciding which program will be taken to the deliberation forum between nagari (MAN); and
4. proposal selection process at sub–district level: in several sub–district in all provinces, there is an indication that MAD/MAN is mainly a formality; the lobby between heads of village highly determines the project that will be approved.

The bias of non–poor group can be observed from the selection of proposed projects. The infrastructure projects such as road, irrigation, and TK/PAUD building projects are utilized and enjoyed more by the non–poor group. In the proposal formulation process in Musdus (hamlet deliberation) forum or Musdes, most of the people attending it were the middle and rich groups in most regions. Poor workers were also not cared for in the implementation of the project; more than often their pay was deducted from the given standard due to voluntary contribution reason.

For the moment, the existing program is inclined to be physical, right. ... So, the non–physical programs are abandoned, or lack of ... For poor community, the good program is capital aid program from UEP–SP. That is for poor people. As for the middle–rich, they pay attention to physical sector. (Interview, male, 45, village head, Lumajang District, April 22, 2010)

Road is only for those who can do business. We can’t do that. So, the only good this is that the road is no longer wet. (Poor Women’s FGD, 39, Lumajang District, April 24, 2010)
6.3 THE LIMITS TO PNPM’S EMPOWERMENT ASPECT

That there are no discrepancies between villages that have received PNPM since 2002 and villages that have just received it in 2007 or 2009 also indicates that there are problems in the program, both in conceptual and technical aspects. To be more precise, the non-significant discrepancies between K1 category villages and the K2 and K3 villages points to an indication of the not maximum aspect of PNPM empowerment. The failure of PNPM empowerment causes the lack of fulfillment of the village primary needs as well as causing a minimum impact of PNPM on the management of the government and programs other than PNPM. Besides many problems that have been discussed in the previous chapters, the followings will explain two problem categories that are considered related to the not maximum aspect of PNPM empowerment; which are conceptual and technical problems.

6.3.1 EMPOWERMENT AS A VERY MECHANISTIC CONCEPT

In general, PNPM conceptualisation of empowerment is as, “… the effort to create/enhance community capacity, both individually and in group, to solve various problem related to attempt in improving its quality of life, self-reliance, and welfare” (General Guidelines for PNPM Mandiri, p. 20).

Technically, the understanding of ‘empowerment” as the effort of “community capacity enhancement” is then embodied into a series of “community development” activities that are believed will ultimately create a prosperous and self-reliance community. The activities are

Community development components cover a series of activities to build critical awareness and community self-reliance that consist of the mapping of community’s potential, problems and needs; participatory planning;
The series of activities above is then formulated in PNPM implementation stages as described in Chapter II above. So, technically, what is meant as ‘empowerment’ by PNPM is conducting a series of activities in PNPM implementation stages. The assumption is clear; by carefully implementing the program stages, the output of the empowerment process will certainly be achieved, i.e. a prosperous and self-reliance community. Clearly, PNPM empowerment concept displays mechanistic view of changes whereby the community will change according to the given stimulus. PNPM expects the community to be participative, transparent, and accountable. For that, they will get an amount of fund that can be used in the development of their village. In the context of homogeneous society and where no interest group is threatened by changes, this kind of program might be working. However, in a more complex situation where many actors are involved and have interests in these various changes, the program that tries to shift the village development and empowerment paradigm like PNPM will encounter many challenges.

What is less considered by the program is the very complex social reality in a village. The low level of participation, transparency, and accountability; the poor quality of village government; the difficulty of welfare improvement; and the low level of community empowerment are not simple problems that can be solved in a year or two by a program such as PNPM. Many social aspects cannot be touched by PNPM, such as the dominance of village elites, the strong patron–client relationship, the established familial relationship, and the lack of courage and confidence of the poor. These relationships/realities have been created during many years in the living process of the community and have become the foundation of an established social relationship operation. Poor farmers can survive because of, among others, moral support and both social and financial assistances from the elite groups that later become their patrons. In many cases, they also depend on their family and relatives.

Conversely, the elite groups receive something in return from the poor in the form of legitimacy, trust and absolute obedience. This kind of relationship is stable because both give and take equally. This relationship model becomes the pattern that defines the roles and responsibilities of each party and various social institutions are created later on to strengthen and maintain it. In East Java, for example, there is abot sawangane that socially, culturally, and economically becomes the patron of general community, especially the poor. In West Sumatra, the role of ninik mamak (tribal chief) — despite the current shift — cannot be entirely suppressed by the changing of times. In Southeast Sulawesi, the elders and the rich in the village can decide on every matter related to public interests.

In such situation, PNPM idea about participation model that encourages individual to be directly responsible for all decisions in the village related to their own interests, on one side, means the elimination of the elite groups’ dominance. However, on the other hand, this idea also gives the poor more responsibilities because the loss of domination of the elite groups also eliminates the incentive from the elite groups as patron of the poor. When the poor are in a desperate condition, both economically and socially, the elite groups have no more obligations to help. Various quotations in the participation part in Chapter III suggest that the poor were indeed afraid of this situation.

Furthermore, PNPM idea about transparency and accountability will also mean the loss of privilege of certain group to village’s resources. By all accounts, the lack of transparency in decision making in the village is beneficial on certain level to certain parties, whether it is the officers or people who receive benefits from it. The notion of accountability, especially related to village budget, is even riskier. Transparency and accountability demand means accusing the related party for hiding and even swindling certain resources and it is a morally serious accusation in the rural area. This will also bring a very serious implication because, no matter what, the elite groups’ legitimacy in the rural area is mostly built based on moral aspect rather than formal aspect (legislation).

Based on the above explanation, it is clear that implementation of participatory programs like (but not only) PNPM can create negative consequence to social relationship stability, even though it does not cause chaos. Therefore, resistance will come from both the elite
groups and the poor, because PNPM ideas “threaten” not only the position of the elite groups but also the poor. As described by James C. Scott (1985), resistance will occur not only in offensive action but also in defensive action by way of silence. “Silent resistance” has been observed in the field, namely the low level of poor people participation in activities other than PNPM. The fact that the poor are relatively present in PNPM is because the program requires them to join and their participation is mobilized by the elite groups and is not entirely on their own awareness.

6.3.2 CONTRADICTING WITH LOCALITIES

Another issue that is considered related to the ineffectiveness of PNPM empowerment is that in certain level, the concept of PNPM empowerment is not suitable or is even against the local features. The most apparent evidence regarding this is the difference between the participation concept of PNPM and the participation concept in the Minangkabau custom tradition in West Sumatra. As mentioned above, PNPM encouraged the creation of participation in which every individual has to represent himself in any activity that is related to his personal interest. Representation system is deemed to only strengthen the dominance of elite groups.

Meanwhile, West Sumatra which since the start of reform era has enthusiastically revitalizing their old customs possesses a different participation concept. With the spirit of “going back to the nagari (concept)”, they developed a participation pattern that can be described as communitarian participation. In this communitarian participation, the community and not the individual, is put forward. In practice, in various decision-making processes related to public interest, the one involved is the community or the tribe where the individual become its member. In this model, the tribe chief automatically becomes the personification of the tribe. This is different from the representation concept in which the representative is just a person who is “appointed” to “represent the interest of the individuals” through an election process. According to a wali nagari in Kabupaten Agam, the revitalization of communitarian concept is part of their effort to bring back the traditional values existing in the old nagari government that they consider ideal.

In the nagaris in West Sumatra, this communitarian concept is institutionalized into the decision-making process in nagaris. For example, in Nagari Tanah Tinggi, Agam District, the formulation of nagari regulations involves all tribe groups which consist of 58 tribes. The implementation technique is first, the nagari government designs nagari regulation together with Nagari People Representative Board (BPRN). The temporary draft is then distributed to each tribe through its tribe chief. The regulation draft is then deliberated by each tribe by stating their agreement/disagreement over the design. After all tribes concur, the regulation is then taken to nagari plenary meeting which is attended by nagari officers, BPRN, and the representatives of all tribes in the nagari.

The coming of PNPM that bring along individual participation concept in certain level challenges the communitarian concept that is being re-established in West Sumatra. Even though the two are not in line with one another, both can run on their own. Individual participation takes place during PNPM activity while communitarian participation goes on outside PNPM. However, if PNPM continues to encourage liberal participation and is hoping that it will be adopted as public practice for all decision-making processes, it may lead to a collision. The incompatibility between participation concept that is promoted by PNPM and participation concept that is being established in this region explains why PNPM version of individual participation cannot affect other decision making processes in nagari except for PNPM.

6.3.3 FACILITATORS AND FACILITATING PROBLEMS

Facilitator is the key actor of PNPM empowerment. It is facilitator who ensures that the stages in the program that serves as an instrument of empowerment are properly applied in the field. However, as depicted in Chapter II, there are differences in capacity among facilitators from different regions that affected the success of the program implementation. Moreover, there are quite a number of facilitators that have no experience and that are even fresh graduates. Whereas facilitating, which is a work that is related to the efforts to invite, persuade, and motivate,
requires special skills that are mostly developed after having long experience. In addition, there is also a case in a certain province where some facilitators and the provincial satker (government agencies' work unit officer) are originally from the same sub-district. This indicates high nepotism in the facilitator recruitment. In situation like this, it can be understood why the quality of the facilitators has been neglected.

In sample areas, facilitators’ activity is mainly occupied by technical and administration affairs such as facilitating various community meetings as well as making numerous reports about the implementation of PNPM in the field. The more villages a facilitator has under her/his responsibility, the more time is used up for such technical and administration affairs. The study does not find any facilitator who is doing extra work to strengthen the existing social organizations or to assist SPP recipient groups. As mentioned in Chapter II, these facilitators admitted that they are running out of time to complete numerous program's technical and administrative affairs.

Besides the problem of human resources quality and the workload for technical/administrative works, there is another problem, that is the frequent rotation of facilitator from one region to another. On the one hand, this rotation policy probably has some advantages, for example, to prevent community’s dependence on the facilitator and to give new nuances and experience to facilitator. However, on the other hand, this policy becomes a problem because facilitation efficacy is also affected by the depth of facilitator’s understanding of the area she/he works in. In study areas, there is even a subdistrict that does not have any facilitator at all because its facilitator has been transferred to another subdistrict and there has not been any replacement yet.
7.1 CONCLUSIONS

a. In general, PNPM–Rural has been implemented quite well, except in the followings:
   1. Socialization activities were not effectively undertaken, resulting in varied understandings of PNPM. For example, PNPM was considered as a general program, not as poverty reduction program, and thus the poor did not have to be prioritized.
   2. The competition to win PNPM project at the kecamatan level tends to work improperly. In many villages, the competition was maneuvered, resulting in the decision to split the project funds evenly.
   3. The facilitators had different understandings about the program causing diversity in program implementation.
   4. Many facilitators considered that their workload was too excessive due to the large number of villages/jorong that became their responsibility.

b. Due to the PNPM implementers’ lack of understanding of the program’s implementation guidelines, some aspects in program implementation in the field were very much in contrast to the spirit of poverty reduction. These aspects are as follows:
   1. Program implementers did not specifically determine that the workers in PNPM infrastructure projects had to come from the poor community,
   2. Program implementers deducted the workers’ wage in the PNPM infrastructure project due to voluntary contribution (swadaya) reasons or others,
   3. Program implementers limiting the poor people’s access to obtaining SPP loan by applying requirements that they could never meet,
   4. Program implementers making SPP realization in the village as prerequisite to get the open menu program, and
   5. The conditionality where realization of 25 percent cost sharing funds from the kabupaten is prerequisite to get program funding from the central government.

c. PNPM Rural was considered beneficial by the community, especially in providing infrastructure in rural areas. Almost all of PNPM–Rural open menu programs were in the form of infrastructure projects. There were only few projects in the form of activities such as skills training for the community.

d. As a mechanism for the distribution of development fund from the central government to the village, this program is very effective and efficient. In study areas, there was almost no deviation found in the use of PNPM budget. However, as a community empowerment instrument or as a poverty reduction program, the program has not been able to accomplish many things due to the following reasons:
   1. The program’s design does not fully support empowerment.
2. The human resources (facilitators) for empowerment are lacking.
3. There are many disparities in program implementation.
4. There are socio-cultural obstacles, such as:
   a. the dominance of village elite's role,
   b. the strong familial system or relationship, and
   c. the presence of patronage relationship between the village elite and the poor.

e. There is a decrease in poverty level in almost all of study villages, except in two villages. However, the role of PNPM–Rural in decreasing poverty in the sample villages was not considered significant by the people. PNPM Rural is considered to participate more indirectly in poverty reduction by repairing community's access to various public services.

f. The creation of job opportunities in PNPM–Rural infrastructure projects is not enough to help the poor. The reason, apart from the very limited days and the fact the workers were not obligated to come from the poor community, is the deduction of wage that was regarded as the form of community participation in the program. SPP is believed to be highly beneficial to expand community's business, but the poor had difficulties in accessing it since the program implementers required the presence of productive business ownership. Almost all poor people do not have it. In addition, the community was also afraid to utilize SPP because their economic capacity could not give them a guarantee that they could return the loan within the determined schedule.

g. The participation of the community, both males and females, in the PNPM–Rural stages tends to increase. However, the participation was seemingly performed only to fulfill program's requirements. In various decision-making forums in the village, or in programs other than PNPM that did not require people's participation, the village elites were still very dominant, whereas the community, especially the poor, was almost not involved.

h. Numerous PNPM–Rural projects were not suitable with the needs of the village's poor people. PNPM Rural projects were dominantly in the form of infrastructure projects, while the three main needs of the poor people in the village are skills training, alternative job opportunities, and capital assistance. PNPM actually had the opportunity to fulfill these needs through the open menu program and SPP. However, in reality, it did not happen because:
   1. the open menu programs were almost always physical and there were almost no skills training activities,
   2. in the infrastructure projects, the workers did not always come from the poor community and there was wage deduction as a form of voluntary contribution, and
   3. SPP could not be accessed by the poor because of burdensome requirements or because the poor themselves are afraid of applying for the loan (for fear of being unable to repay the loan).

### 7.2 RECOMMENDATIONS

a. The program needs to consider avoiding uniformity of design and/or implementation in all regions. There is indication of disharmony between the program's general character that puts forward individual participation (direct participation) and local cultural pattern that leans towards communitarian participation (representative participation).

b. The program needs to expand and intensify the socialization of the program and its mechanism in general and, more specifically, on items such as open menu options, SPP requirements and mechanism, and the position of poor people as the target group in the program. For that, it is essential to maximize the facilitators' role in facilitation activities at every stage of the PNPM implementation, especially during the formulation of needs and program implementation. In order to achieve this, more facilitators are needed.

c. It is necessary to encourage the integration of development planning through PNPM with development planning through Musrenbangdes.
From various practices in the field, the best model is implementing both in one deliberation to formulate village needs. This integration will encourage Musrenbangdes to be more participative, aspirational, and open.

d. The program must consider to re-formulate the mechanism for and amount of SPP funds repayment that can ease the burden of the poor people and to have more systematic and intensive efforts to make people aware of the benefits of SPP as well as to eliminate their fear to applying for the loan.

e. It is extremely necessary to formulate a mechanism/institution that is credible and powerful to ensure that program regulations are implemented according to plan.

f. The program needs to review the proportionality of the number of facilitators to their workload, reduce the technical administrative workload of facilitators, and increase their social empowerment work portion through their intensive involvement in various group activities in the village.

g. Although PNPm is not targeted for agricultural sector development, PNPm needs to consider program design improvement so that it can touch agricultural issue more profoundly. This is based on consideration that in order to achieve PNPm’s objective of improving welfare in a sustainable manner, it will be more effective if the program is directed to develop activities/business/infrastructure that directly linked with community’s main occupation and local potential. In rural areas, this usually is the agriculture sector. This recommendation is also backed by the study findings that most businesses that were “established” by SPP beneficiaries — which usually were small stalls — tended to last only for a short while. This is because they do not have the experience, skills, and even guidance on how to survive in this totally new enterprise.

h. It is necessary to conduct continuous assessment and development to find various community empowerment models that are suitable for communities with diverse social conditions. In particular, it is also necessary to develop an empowerment instrument for the chronic poor by still treating them as an inseparable part of their community.
NOTES

1. *Nagari* is a village–level administrative unit in the West Sumatra Province.
2. A *dusun* is an administrative area within a village, consisting of a number of RT (neighborhood units).
4. An RT, or neighborhood unit, is the smallest unit of local administration consisting of a number of households.
5. A jorong is a *dusun*–level administrative unit in the West Sumatra Province.
6. An *arisan* is a social gathering in which the participants operate a savings and loans mechanism.
7. An RW is a unit of local administration consisting of several RT (neighborhood units) within a *kelurahan* (a village–level administrative area located in an urban center).
8. Looking at the requirements entailed in the informant’s village, it seemed that those who could access SPP were only the non–poor households, as the requirements are quite hard to meet. According to an informant who is also a KPMD in one of the village samples in Ngawi District, the requirements are that the creditor has to be a resident of Jejeg Village, sign the agreement, obey the rules, own a business, be obliged to save some funds for frozen savings as much as 10 percent of the total loan, pay loan service as much as 2 percent of the total loan, and agree to the return period of 10 months maximum (10 installments). Especially for individual creditors (not collective), they have to have collateral (usually in the form of a Certificate of Vehicle Ownership/BPKB) and must be willing to become a Pokmas (community group) member. In this context, the decrease in the number of people borrowing money from bank titil is only seen in the non–poor group. For the poor group, bank titil is still relied upon because it does not apply any burdensome requirements.
9. An RW is a unit of local administration consisting of several RT (neighborhood units) within a *kelurahan*.
10. In the Poor Men’s FGD (Konawe Utara District), some FGD participants stated that the one who usually does the talking is only the village head. Even the village officials do not usually say much; they just listen. They said that if the village officials themselves only listen, then the village people attending the meetings will stay silent even more.
11. Regarding the RT or *dusun* head, some FGD participants from the poor men’s group said that the RT and *dusun* heads just get paid without work, meaning that they get incentive from their position, but they do not function at all.
12. The researchers do not have more information on this village because it is not a sample village.
13. Exception occurred only in Jorong Taruko, Dharmasraya, West Sumatra. In 2009, the PNPM activity was conducted in the form of baking skills training for women.
14. The details are constructing/renovating TK buildings as many as eight projects, constructing/renovating PAUD buildings as many as three projects, and the building of Raudatul Atfal (RA), or Islamic TK, as many as one project.
15. Various studies show that even though the existence and the use of the traditional healer’s services are inclined to decrease from year to year, some people still access it up to the present time. See Rahayu, 2008.
17. This policy is specifically applied in Lumajang District. When the researchers conducted a field work in a village there, the village administration was holding a socialization of a district government policy which provides honorarium for RT and RW heads as much as Rp100,000 per month. This kind of policy was not found in other regions.
18. *Tanah lungguh* is the village land asset that is used specifically to pay for the salary expenditure of the village officials. Usually, the land is distributed the village officials proportionally in accordance to their position. The higher their position, the more spacious the land. After his/her term of office, the official has to return the land to the village. The size of the land is varied between villages. Villages that have experienced segregation usually have less *tanah lungguh* because normally regional segregation is also followed by the division of *tanah lungguh*. Villages that have never undergone segregation will always have their *tanah lungguh* as spacious as the original size, unless there is a policy, for example, to sell the land.
LIST OF REFERENCES


Direktorat Jenderal Pemberdayaan Masyarakat dan Desa, Departemen Dalam Negeri, 2008,
"Petunjuk Teknis Operasional PNPM Mandiri–Perdesaan"
## APPENDIX 1

### Table 1. Community Needs and PNPM Projects in Study Areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Village/Nagari/Kelurahan</th>
<th>PNPM Categories</th>
<th>Welfare Categories</th>
<th>Open Menu Activities</th>
<th>Needs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jorong Taruko</td>
<td>K1</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>TK building; Posyandu; PAUD building; baking training</td>
<td>Arable land; Skills education; Capital; Manure subsidy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bukik Barisan</td>
<td>K1</td>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>JUT, many times/in stages; water channel construction (tertiary irrigation), 2008; PAUD building, 2010</td>
<td>Primary Irrigation; Skills Education; Job opportunity; Capital.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lor</td>
<td>K1</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>Bridge and irrigation, 2004; inter-dusun/RW road; Posyandu building</td>
<td>Capital; Job opportunity; Road; Good and inexpensive health services; Skills training; Irrigation; Stable prices of agricultural produce; Sembako.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kamboja</td>
<td>K1</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>Clean water pipe lines, 2004; JUT; TK building, 2010.</td>
<td>Job opportunity; Agricultural tools and machines; Business capital; Sembako; Irrigation; Day electricity; Drainage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kulon</td>
<td>K1</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>Macadam road, 2004; TK building, 2005; RA building, 2006; intervillage road, 2007; bridge, 2009; paving block road, 2010; in 2008 got sanctioned because of road construction manipulation (below standard road)</td>
<td>Health; Road; House renovation; Free education; Sembako; Manure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village</td>
<td>K2</td>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>Assistance</td>
<td>Issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angrek</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>TK building and irrigation, 2008; irrigation, 2009</td>
<td>Job opportunity; Capital; Irrigation; Agricultural tools and machines; Farm animal assistance; Housing assistance; Land provision; Agricultural counseling; Stable prices.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mawar</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Just SPP, 2008; in 2009 got sanctioned</td>
<td>Housing; Food assistance; Scholarship; Debt relief assistance; Agricultural productivity improvement; Job opportunity; Capital.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ndayong</td>
<td></td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>Macadam road in 2 dusun, 2008; TK building, 2009 (postponed because phase three assistance could not be disbursed; in the end, it was funded by the district government)</td>
<td>Irrigation and pumps; Sembako; Skills; Capital; Job opportunity; Access Road.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanah Tinggi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>JUT in 1 dusun; JUT in 2 dusun; in 2010 1 jorong received sanction</td>
<td>Capital; Land; Education scholarship; Health services; Road; Agricultural training; Skills training.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wetan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>TK building, 2008</td>
<td>Trawl restriction; Education scholarship; Health assistance; Pollution management; Capital assistance; Stable prices of catch; Stable prices of necessities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gantuang</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>TK building, 2007; PAUD building, 2010; in 2008 received the assistance but was separated to become a different jorong</td>
<td>Job opportunity; Farm animal capital; School scholarship; Rubber/palm seeds; Agricultural counseling.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village</td>
<td>Level</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Projects and Assistances</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Melati</td>
<td>K2</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>The building of public toilet, 2008; water channel, 2008; road hardening, 2008; pump provision, 2009</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Skills; Agricultural counseling; Agricultural tools and machines; Road; Scholarship for dropouts.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koto Tangah</td>
<td>K2</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>Intervillage road, 2007 and 2008; 2009 received sanction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darek</td>
<td>K3</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>Irrigation channel; sewer in jorong</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Job opportunity; Free medicine; Free education; Business capital; Agricultural counseling.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jejeg</td>
<td>K3</td>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>Polindes building, 2009</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Business capital assistance without interest; Job opportunity; Marketing of woven products; Education scholarship; Nutrition assistance; Senior high school scholarship.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kidul</td>
<td>K3</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>TK building, 2009; slipway (breakwater), 2009</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Business capital; Free schooling; Free medication; Job opportunity; Training and business facilitation.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenanga</td>
<td>K3</td>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>Clean water pipe proposal for 2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Social assistance (Raskin, BLT); Land expansion and intensification; Clean water; Business capital.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cempaka</td>
<td>K3</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>JUT; bridge + decker</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Job opportunity; Primary irrigation (check dam); Awareness building training; Capital assistance; Free education; Rice seeds assistance; Skills training; Water pumps; Free medicine.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: FGD results.

Note:  
K1 = Village receiving PPK since 2002 and PNPM since 2007;  
K2 = Village not receiving PPK since 2002, but receiving PNPM since 2007;  
K3 = Village receiving neither PPK since 2002 nor PNPM since 2007, but just receiving PNPM since 2009.
### Table 2. Frequency of Needs in Study Villages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Needs</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Capital</td>
<td>17 villages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Job opportunity</td>
<td>10 villages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Skills Training</td>
<td>9 villages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>9 villages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Health</td>
<td>7 villages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Sembako</td>
<td>5 villages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Irrigation</td>
<td>5 villages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Land provision</td>
<td>4 villages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stable prices of products</td>
<td>4 villages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Road</td>
<td>4 villages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agricultural Counseling</td>
<td>4 villages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Agricultural tools and machines</td>
<td>3 villages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Seeds</td>
<td>2 villages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Water pumps</td>
<td>1 village</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Trawl restriction</td>
<td>1 village</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Day electricity</td>
<td>1 village</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: FGD results.
### Table 3. Poverty Dynamics in Study Villages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Village/Nagari/ Kelurahan</th>
<th>Program and Economic Categories</th>
<th>VP (percent)</th>
<th>P (percent)</th>
<th>M (percent)</th>
<th>R (percent)</th>
<th>VR (percent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jorong Taruko K1</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bukik Barisan K1</td>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lor K1</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kamboja K1</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kulon K1</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angrek K2</td>
<td>Poor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>64</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mawar K2</td>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ndoyong K2</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanah Tinggi K2</td>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wetan K2</td>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gantuang K2</td>
<td>Poor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>45</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Melati K2</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>40</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jorong Koto Tangah K2</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darek K3</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jejeg K3</td>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kidul K3</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenanga K3</td>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cempaka K3</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>82</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: FGD results.

Note:
- **K1** = Village receiving PPK since 2002 and PNPM since 2007;
- **K2** = Village not receiving PPK since 2002, but receiving PNPM since 2007;
- **K3** = Village receiving neither PPK since 2002 nor PNPM since 2007, but just receiving PNPM since 2009;
- **VP** = Very Poor;
- **P** = Poor;
- **M** = Middle;
- **R** = Rich;
- **VR** = Very Rich.
## APPENDIX 4

### Table 4. Various Organizations/Groups in Study Villages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province/District</th>
<th>Village</th>
<th>Organization/Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>East Java</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gresik</td>
<td>Kulon</td>
<td>Farmers’ groups, PKK, <em>tahlilan</em> groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wetan</td>
<td>PKK, <em>tahlilan</em> groups, fishers’ groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lumajang</td>
<td>Lor</td>
<td>PKK, <em>quran</em> recitation groups, farmers’ groups, SPP, religious groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kidul</td>
<td><em>quran</em> recitation groups, PKK, SPP, <em>dasawisma</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ngawi</td>
<td>Ndoyong</td>
<td><em>Dasawisma</em>, <em>yasinan</em> groups, RT <em>arisan</em>, PKK, farmers’ groups, Karang Taruna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jejeg</td>
<td><em>Arisan</em> groups, <em>quran</em> recitation groups, LIPK, farmers’ groups, stockbreeders’ groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>West Sumatra</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agam</td>
<td>Tanah Tinggi</td>
<td>Farmers’ groups, <em>adat</em> groups, religious groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Koto Tangah</td>
<td><em>Buha arek</em> groups, religious groups, Bundo Kanduang, farmers’ groups, PKK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solok</td>
<td>Darek</td>
<td><em>Arisan</em> groups, farmers’ groups, loan and savings cooperatives, youths’ groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bukik Barisan</td>
<td>Farmers’ groups, KUBE groups, SPP groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dharmasraya</td>
<td>Taruko</td>
<td>Majelis taklim (groups focusing on Islamic studies), farmers’ groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gantuang</td>
<td>Farmers’ groups, <em>yasinan</em> groups, SPP groups, <em>arisan</em> groups, <em>dasawisma</em>, <em>qosidahan</em> (singing Islamic songs) groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Southeast Sulawesi</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Konawe Selatan</td>
<td>Cempaka</td>
<td>Farmers’ groups, <em>arisan</em> groups, majelis taklim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Angrek</td>
<td>Bantesa groups, SPP groups, farmers’ groups (males &amp; females), males’ <em>arisan</em> groups (mepotaka)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Konawe Utara</td>
<td>Mawar</td>
<td><em>Arisan</em> groups, SPP groups, majelis taklim, farmers’ groups, stockbreeders’ groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kamboja</td>
<td><em>Arisan</em> groups, SPP groups, PKK, majelis taklim, farmers’ groups, <em>adat</em>/brotherhood groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombana</td>
<td>Melati</td>
<td><em>Arisan</em> groups, art groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kenanga</td>
<td>Farmers’ groups, <em>arisan</em> groups, mosque youths’ organizations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
RESEARCH REPORT
A QUALITATIVE STUDY
THE IMPACT OF PNPM RURAL
EAST JAVA—WEST SUMATRA—SOUTHEAST SULAWESI